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ABATEMENT. See DOWER; GUARDIAN AND WARD, 1.
Common-law rule that actions on penal statutes do not survive, applies to
penal statutes of United States, and this rule is not altered by state statutes
allowing suits on state penal statutes to be prosecuted after offender's death.
Sc&hreiber v. .S1arpless, 338.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT. See DEED, 5.
ACTION. See BILLS AND NOTES, 20, 21 ; CON RACT, 2, 20, 29 ; EASEMENT, 1;
FRAUDS, STATUTE OF, 7 ; MALICIOUS PROSECUTION, 5 ; MUNICIPAL CORPO-
RATION, 26-28; NEGLIGENCE, 11, 12, 31 ; PATENT, 6; TRovER, 3.
1. Lies for knowingly permitting third person to use your property in man-
ner, per se, injurious to adjacent land. Topf v. West Shore Co., 614.
2. Promise by A. to B., who hasassigned certain goods to A., to pay amount
owed by B. to his employees for labor on tile goods, will not render A. liable
to action by one of the employees. Mforrili v. Lane, 543.
3. If chattel in possession of bailee for hire, is injured by nezligence of third
person, and repaired by bailor and cost charged to bailee, at his request, latter,
although ho has not paid such cost, may maintain action of tort against person
causing damage. Brewster v. Warner, 544.
4. Where partners having distinct interests have been made the victims of a
fraud, fact that fraud was contrived against them all and same means were
ured to deceive them all, will not entitle them to maintain joint action for relief,
unless it was through joint transaction that fraud was accomplished. Levering
v. Schxell, 478.
5. Action for injuries to person does not survive as against wrongdoer's
executor. Starey v. Bircher, 478.
6. Obligation resting upon innkeeper to keep his guest safe, is one imposed
by law, and not growing out of contract, and for violation of, proper action is
case. Id.
ACTS OF CONGRESS.
1874, Revised Statutes.
Sect. 1007. See ERRORS AND APPEALS, 7.
Sect. 2503. See UNITED STATES.
Sect. 2505. See UNITED STATES.
Sect. 4283. See ADMIRALTY, 1.
Sect. 4284. See ADMIRALTY, 1.
Sect. 4285. See AD.MiIRALTY, 1, 2.
1875, March 3. See REMOVAL OF CAUSES, 1, 7.
March 3. See UNITED STATES COURTS, 5.
1883, March 3. See UNITED STATES.
ADMINISTRATOR. See ExECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS.
ADMIRALTY.
1. U. S. limited liability act of March 3, 1851, in favor of shipowners, etc.,
Rev. Stat. H 4283-85, applies to injury to person as well as injury to pro-
perty. Rounds v. S. S. Co., 614.
2. Proceedings and decree under said 4285 in U. S. District Court bar to
action in state court to recover for personal injuries receivid in marine collision
which was basis of proceedings in District Court. Id.
3. DEMURRAGE, 153.
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AGENT. See BANK, 2; DAMAGES, 8; FORMER RECOVERY; INJUNCTION, 7;
INSURANCE, 1, 12, 13; RAILROAD, 3, 8; SAVINGS B,%uK; TROVER, 6 ; TRUST
AND TRUSTEE, 1.
1. General agent is one authorized to transact all business of'principal, or
all his business of some particular kind. Furnace Co. v. Mjf. Co., 798.
2. In case of general agent, law permits usage to enter into and enlarge
liability of principal, in respect to contracts made by agent. Id.
3. Under resolution of corporation engaged in manufacture of pig iron,
appointing A. B. "1 sole agent for the consignment and sale of its entire pro-
duct, he to receive a commission," &c. Held, that agent so appointed had
right to 'contract, through broker, for sale of iron to be nianufactured and
delivered in future. Id.
4. It cannot be presumed that local station agent has general authority to
contract for fnrnishing cars to shippers to other stations than his own. Rail-
way Co. v. Stats et al., 339.
5. Agency cannot be proved by proof of oral declarations of supposed agent.
Id.
6. Railway companies not responsible for declarations or admissions of any
of their servants beyond immediate sphere of their agency and duripg transac-
tion of business in which they are employed. .d.
7. Employment of canvasser for sale of subscription books, confers no.
authority to receive payment for books sold, but not delivered by him, nor ever
in his possession. Chambers v. Start, 674.
8. On contract not under seal with agent in his own name for undisclosed
principal, either may sue : but if principal sues defendant is entitled to be
placed in same position at time of disclosure of principal as if agent had been
real contracting party. Balto. Co. v. F/etcher, 478.
9. Debtor applied to creditor's agent for extension of time of payment of
loan, creditor being non-resident corporation, and agent resident of state, act-
ing generally for creditor as to'loans therein. In first interview agent stated
he would consult home office, and in another interview said he was ready to
enter into arrangement that was thereupon made. Held, that debtor might
properly infer that agent received principal's sanction. Union Mat. L. Ins.
v. Slee, 614.
10. In undivided and continuous negotiation between A. and B., A. at one
time represented one principal anl at another time a different one. Held, that
A. notwithstanding change of principal was entitled to assume that all state-
ments of fact made to him by B., were repeated so long as not corrected.
Negotiation resulted in written contract. Held, that statements made by B.
after contract were inadmissible to show what influenced A.'s principal to sign
contract, but were admissible to corroborate evidence as to what statements B.
made before contract, it being admitted that B. before and after contract
made statements as to same matters and it being shown that subsequent state-
ments were asked and given as repretition and confirmation of preceding.
Fuller V. Atwood, 614.
AMENDMENT. See LIMITATIONS, STATUTE OF, 10.
APPEALS. See ERRORS AND APPEALS.
ARBITRATION. See CONTRACT, 10, 14.
1. To make award binding parties must be notified of hearings and arbi-
trators must act together. Wood v. Helme, 615.
2. On submission of "all demands between the parties" thereto, award is
no bar to claim not in fact submitted or considered by arbitrators. lnh of'
Mi. Desert v. Inh. of Tremont, 65.
3. Award broader than submission, and entire, or with its several parts so
connected as to be conditional and dependent, is void ; but if one part is com-
plete and independent and covered by submission, it will be upheld ; and even
part not within submission will become binding if accepted. Ellison v. Weath-
ers, 478.
4. No new consideration necessary to uphold subsequent ratification of un-
authorized award. Id.
5. Arbitrator not competent witness to impeach his own award. Id.
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6. Award, though made upon mere common-law arbitration, is prima facie
conclusive between parties as to all matters submitted to arbitrators, and this
notwithstanding defendant has failed to comply with its requirements. Groat
v. Pache, 339.
7. Where plaintiff's claim is simply for money due for materials and labor on
building of defendant, and it appears that matters in respect to such building
were submitted to arbitrators who made an award that defendant give check
ftr certain amount, surrender certain note, and receipt two accounts, one
against plaintiff and one against father-in-law: held, that award was bar to
action on original claim. Id.
ARREST. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 26 ; CONTEmPT.
ASSESSMENT. See TAX AND TAXATION, 3-6.
ASSIGNMENT. See ATTORNEY, 3, 4; CHECK ; CONFLICT Or LAws, 1, 2;
LIMITATIONS, STATUTE or, 7 ; MECHANICS' LIEm, 2; PARTNERSHIP, 3; RE-
MrOVAL OF CAUSES, 7 ; SALE, 2 ; VAREHOUSE RECEIPT.
1. Reservation of exempt articles in partnership assignment is inoperative,
and does not, therefore, render assignment void for uncertainty. Goll v. Hub-
bell, 799.
2. Of wages to fall due from any future employer, with whom Iio contract
exists, void. Kennedy v. Tierna', 674.
3. Reservation in assignment for benefit of creditors of "all such articles
of household furniture and other effects as are exempt by law from seizure and
sale on execution," void for uncertainty, and because such reservation is
fraudulent as giving to assignor a right at any time to withdraw by selection
part of goods assigned. Goll v. Hubbell, 675.
ASSUMPSIT. See ACTION, 2.
In action of, to recover money overpaid on settlement, it was proved that
defendant had money in his hands that in good conscience belonged to plain-
tiff. Held, that plaintiff was entitled to recover, although special ground upon
which he claimed to establish overpayment failed. Bates V. Quinn, 544.
ATTACHMENT. See CONFLICT or LAWS, 3: COR'oRATION, 7; EVIDENCH,
13 ; MECHANICS' LIEN, 1 ; OFFICER, 2 ; WAREHOUSE RECEIPT, 2.
1. Affidavit for, stating that defendant has disposed of or apsigned, &c.,
"his property or any part thereof," oris about to do so, with intent, &c., is in-
sufficient. .Perjury could not be assigned thereon. Bubber Co. v. Knapp, 675.
2. To garnishee proceedings in courts of this state, it is no sufficient answer
that debt of garnishee to defendant is by laws of state where both defendant
and garnishee reside, exempt from seizure under such process. Bailroad v.
Thompson, 339.
3. Foreign corporation coming into this state and leasing property and
doing business here may be garnisheed for debt due non-resident employee,
although debt was contracted outside of state. Id.
4. Garnishee proceedings bind only amount due employee at date of service
of process and not amounts subsequently earned, even under prior contract.
Id.
5. At time of service of writ firm was indebted to defendant, and member
of. firm held unmatured note of defendant, secured by collateral, for less
amount. At maturity, amount of note was, by agreement between payee and
defendant, credited upon firm's indebtedness, and note and security surren-
dered. Held, that firm was to be charged with its indebtedness to defendant,
without deducting amount of note. Donnell v. Railroad Co., 799.
6. Alleged trustees on an afternoon directed their book-keeper to send de-
fendant check for amount due him. Check was thereupon made. At 8 P. M.,
writ was served upon trustees. They notified book-beeper next morning and
were informed by him that he had mailed cheek at 7.15 A. M., without notice
of trustee process. Check was duly presented and paid. Held, that trustees
were not chargeable. J'ordon v. Jordon, 66.
ATTORNEY. See CONTEMPT; CRIMINAL LAW, 17; DAMAG.S, 8; ERORS
AND APPEALS, 8; SLANDER AND LIBEL, 4; PRACTICE, 4; SHERIFF, 5
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ATTORNEY.
I. Appointed by court to defend one on trial of indictment not entitled to
recover of county for his services. Johnson v. Whiteside Co., 615.
2. Has lien on money collected for client for general balance for services
and disbursements ; and when client has deceased before rendition of judg-
ment, lien secures charges for services performed for intestate as well as for ad-
ministrator, who has entered to prosecute. Hurlbert v. Brigham, 615.
3. Agreement 9f, with client, that attorney shall have lien upon certain
judgment to be recovered for specified sum, as compensation for services, consti-
tutes valid equitable assignment of judgment pro tanto which attaches as soon
as judgment is entered. Terrey v. Wilson, 143.
4. Such assignment is superior to claim of judgment-debtor to set of? judg-
ment purchased after entry of judgment against himself and before he had
notice of assignment. Id.
AWARD. See ARBITRATION.
BAGGAGE. See COM31ON CaIER, 10-13.
BAIL.
Is discharged by any judicial act depriving him of right to arrest and sur-
render defendant. State v. Glenn, 268.
BAILMENT. See ACTION, 3 ; TnOvER, 4.
Livery stable-keeper letting horse for hire for trip, impliedly warrants that
he is suitable for purpose: Windle v. Jordan, 66.
BANK. See CrEuK : SAVINGS BANK; SURETY, 11.
1. Authority of cashier outside of ordinary duties may be by parol and col-
lected from circumstances. Martin v. Webb, 144.
2. A. lent money to B. for his own use, and as security for its repa)menc,
and on his false representation that he owned, and had transferred to A. a cer-
tificate of stock to an equal amount in national bank of which B. was cashier,
received from him such a certificate, written by him in one of the printed forms
which the president had signed and left with him for use in president's absence,
and certifying that A. was owner of that amount of stock "transferrable only
on the books of the bank on the surrender of this certificate." Bank never rat-
ified, or received any benefit from transaction. Held, that A. could. not main-
tain action against bank to recover value of certificate ; and that such action
could not be supported by evidence that in one or two other instances stock was
issued by B. without any certificate having been surrendered ; and that shares,
once owned by B., and pledged by him to other persons before issue of certifi-
cate to A., were afterwards transferred to president, with approval of directors,
to secure debt due from B. to bank, without evidence that such issue of
stock by B. was known or recognised by officers of bank. Moores v. Bank,
408.
BANKRUPTCY. See LiMITATxoNs, STATUTE OF, 12, 13.
BILL OF EXCEPTIONS. See ERRORS AND APPEALS, 8.
BILLS AND NOTES. See CEcK ; DUREss, 1, 2 ; HUSBAND AND WIFE, 9;
LIMITATIONS, STATUTE OF, 1, 21 3; MORTGAGE, 2, 5; PARTNERsHIP, 10;
PRESUiMPTION, I ; SURETY, 11.
I. Form ; Consideration ; Rights oJ parties% 4-c.
1. Material alteration of note, at instance of payee and without knowledge
of maker, releases latter. Addition of a party as maker is material alteration.
-Nicwlson v. Coorbs, 193, and note.
2. Word "executed," as used in answer charging that note was changed
after it had been " executed and delivered," implies complete and perfect
contract. Id.
3. That note signed by agent with principal's name, is drawn to agent's
order and sold by him, not sufficient to impute bad faith to purchaser. Read
v. Abbott, 208.
4. Payment of interest in advance for certain time on note not conclusive
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evidence of'contract to extend time of payment of note for that time. Gard
v. Neff, 208.
5. Waiver of apprisement, stay, exemption and homestead laws does not
destroy negotiability of note. Lyon v. Mlartin, 340.
6. MNaker of note may show that he was surety for endorser, and that holder
knew this before taking note. Hall v. Bank, 144.
7. Instrument in form "Building committee will pay G. W. T. the sum of
$126.25, and charge to (signed) N. and L.," is inland bill of exchange, and
,imports a consideration without words "value received;" no consideration
need be alleged in declaration. Taylor v. -rewman, 144.
8. Endorser who has been obliged to pay note may show by parol that maker
acted as agent of defendant (whose name did not appear on note) in obtaining
endorsement. Saner v. Brinker, 144.
9. Erasure of payee's name and substitution of another, after delivery, by
party interested, is material change of note. Daris v. Bauer, 744.
10. One of several makers of note given for accommodation of payee,
and so altered, whO voluntarily pays same at maturity, cannot recover against
another maker. Id.
11. Draft drawn and endorsed by drawer and placed in the hands of payee,
who was also drawee, but never accepted by him, in legal effect a promissory
note. De Vaughn v. Hargabook, 675.
12. Seller of, in good faith without endorsement, at rate of discount indi-
cating that purchaser has compensation for his risk, does not impliedly warrant
solvency of makers or endorsers. Milliken v. Chapman, 66.
13. Where debtor entitled to make paymentof antecedent debt gives therefor
promissory note payable on demand, note is payment conditional on its being
met, and is founded on valuable consideration. Stott v. Fairlamb, 371, and
note.
14. Reservation in note of" right to pay this note before maturity in instal-
ments of not less than five per cent. of the principal thereof at any time the
semi-annual interest becomes payable," does not render same uncertain as to
amount or time, and does not prevent note being negotiable. Riker v.
Sprague, 478.
15. If time of payment named in note must certainly come, although precise
day be not specified, it is sufficiently certain. Id.
16. After note had been protested maker asked "for additional time as a
favor." Holder said he" was willing to show anyreasonable favor." Maker
then said he would give paper drawn on liis customers, and did so when he got
it. No time was named. Held, that bolder retained right to sue maker at,
pleasure ; and that as proceeds of draft did not pay note, endorsers were not
discharged. Edwards v. Clair Co., 409.
17. -Where party in full possession of all his faculties and able to read, even
though slowly and with difficulty, signs promissory note under belief that it is
instrument of different character, without reading instrument biit relying on
reading and representations of stranger, he is liable to bona fide holder. Ort v.
Fowler, 340 and 569, and note.
18. Where party executes note to order of fictitious firm, and thereafter
holder endorses note in firm's name, bona fide endorsee may recover against
maker, although latter was ignorant that firm name was fictitious. Id.
HI. Endorsement, Acceptance, 4-c.
19. Endorsement "for collection" mere warrant of attorney authorizing
endorsee to collect amount due on draft for payee. Central Railroad Co. v.
Bank, 675.
20. Second endorsee on such draft receiving money from drawees, receives that
which belongs to original payee, and this puts them in such privity with such
payee that, upon failure to pay on demand, an action for money had and
received would lie. .d.
21. Reception by one of money belonging to another, and demand by that
other, makes all the privity necessary to maintain action for money had and
received. id.
22. Note transferred after maturity passes into hands of endorsee subject
INDEX.
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only to equities and defences connected with note itself. Missouri statute of
set-off (R. S. 1879, sect, 3868), does not apply to negotiable paper. Cutler
v. Cook, 145.
23. Of successive endorsers, prior one must primafacie indemnify subsequent
one; but whole circumstances attendant upon making, issue and transfer of
bill or note may be referred to in order to ascertain true relation to each other
of parties who put their signatures upon it. Macdonald v. Whitfield, 66.
24. Note bore upon its face statement that it was issued as collateral to
maker's draft accepted by third party. In action against endorsers: Held,
that undertaking of maker's was contingent; that amount due at maturity was
uncertain;. that note was not negotiable, and that endorsers, as such, were not
liable. Bank v. Sprague, 478.
25. Where telegram is sent authorizing draft to be drawn, and counter-
manding telegram is afterward sent, and on faith of first telegram, which only
was exhibited to cashier, draft was discounted by bank, drawee cannot be held
liable as acceptor. Bank v. Clark, 544.
26. Drawee of draft will not be held liable for breach of promise in not
accepting, unless there was promise to accept it at time draft was drawn. Id.
27. Where negotiable note appears properly endorsed by payee and endorse-
ment is without date, presumption is that it was so endorsed before maturity,
and that plaintiff in action thereon is bonafide holder. This presumption not
overthrown by its appearing that plaintiff's counsel is also counsel of payee in
other actions ; that general collecting agent of payee is witness for plaintiff on
trial (there being no showing as to how he came to be witness or that he was
not regularly subpenaed ;) or that plaintiff when he endorsed note to bank for
collection waived protest both for himself and payee. Lyon v. Martin, 340.
Ill. Presentment, 4-c.,
28. .Protest not necessary where endorsers have waived demand on maker
and notice. Riker v. Sprague, 478.
29. Joint note of husband and wife is valid obligation of husband, although
wife is not liable at law thereon. McClelland v. Bishop, 341.
30. Where such note is payable at future time, but at no particular place,
and husband after making same, abandons his place of residence, and deserts
to some place unknown to holders, which they cannot after diligent inquiry
ascertain, when it falls due, they are excused from making personal demand
upon him. In such case personal demand on wife with due notice of non-pay-
ment to endorser, is sufficient. fd.
31. Where there is a series of notes all secured by mortgage which stipula-
tes that in default of payment of any note, -I then each and all should fall due,
and this mortgage to become absolute as to all said notes remaining unpaid at
the happening of such default." Held, that upon default mortgage may be
foreclosed for whole debt, but that such stipulation did not operate to vary or
extinguish the obligations expressed on face of notes themselves for general
purposes : for purpose of demand and notice to charge endorsers, such notes
are to be deemed as due according to their terms. Id.
BOND. See OvrtcIn, 3.
BOUNDARIES. See EJECTMENT, 5: MIUNICIPAL CORPORATION, 36.
Boundary line settled by adjoining owners by parol, when followed by pos-
session, binds owners and their grantees. Grim v. Murphy, 745.
BROKER. See AGENT, 3.
1. May recover compensation from both parties when he n~erely brings par-
ties together, they making their own contract. Ortn v. ,o jd, 799.
2. If broker agrees to buy and hold certain stock for cuktomer, who pays
part of purchase-money, agreeing to pay interest on sums advanced by broker,
and, in case stock depreciates, to make a "margin" of certain\sum per share,
this does not create relation of pledgor and pledgee, and after failure of custo-
mer to make advances, a sale at broker's board, without notice, will not make
broker liable for conversion. Covell v. Loud, 208.
BURDEN OF PROOF. See LDI.TATIONS, STATUTE OF, 6.
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CASES AFFIRMED, COMMENTED ON, OVERRULED, ETC.
Aldrich v. Howard, 7 R. I. 199, distinguished ; Couch v. Steel, 3 El. & B.
402, discussed. Grant v. Slater Co., 484.
Beach v. Abbott, 4 Vt. 605. and Rood v. Scott, 5 Id. 263, distinguished.
Rider v. Sheldon, 748.
Brackett v. Wait, 6 Vt. 411, distinguished. Hill v. Murray, 622.
Butler v. Dorman, 68 Mo. 298, followed. Chambers v. Short, 674.
Cleland v. Hedley, 5 R. I. 163, affirmed. Wood v. Helme, 615.
Corby v. Burns, 36 Mo. 194, distinguished. State v. Case, 152.
Duke of Bedford v. Trustees of the British Museum, 3 My. &K. 552, prin-
ciple of, applied. Sayers v. Collyer, 69.
Hart v. Swayne, 7 Ch. Div. 42, and In re Turner and Skelton, 13 Id. 130,
disapproved. Jolli/fe v. Baker, 162.
Hickman v. Kunkle, 27 Mo. 401, overruled. Deardorfv. Thatcher, 483.
Hobbs and Wife v. The London and Southwestern Railroad Co., L. R., 10
Q. B. I11, distinguished. Railway Co. v. Kempt, 412.
Ingalls v. Dennett, 6 Me. 79, commented on. Donnell v. Railroad Co.,
799.
Kendillon v. Maltby, Car. & M. 402, dissented from. .3funster v. Lamb,
12.
Lake Shore and Michigan Southern Railway Co. v. Chicago and Westein
Indiana Railroad Co., 100 I1. 21, distinguished. Railroad v. Jacobs, 80l.
Lamb v. Eames, L. R., 6 Ch. 597 ; In re Hutchinson and Tenant, 8 Ch.
Div. 540; Curnick v. Tucker, L. R., 17 Eq. 320, and Le Marchant v. Le
Marchant, L. R., 18 Eq. 414, commented on. In re Adams and Kensington
Vestry, 78.
Munday v. Clements, 58 Mo. 577, overruled. Cutler v. Cook, 144.
Norton v. London and Northwestern Railway Co., 9 Ch. Div. 623, and
Surndon Waterworks Co. v. Wilts and Berkshire Canal Navigation Co., L. R.,
7 H. L. 697, considered. Bonnert v. Railway Co., 70.
Oliver v. Morgan, 10 Heisk. 322, departed from. Oliver v. Chemical Works, 76.
Reynolds v. Wheeler, 10 C. B. (N. S.) 561, approved. ifacdonald v.
Wlht ield, 66.
State ex rel. v. Lansdale, 49 Wis. 348; Stuart v. Allen, 45 Id. 158, dis-
tinguished. Cleveland v. Burnham, 147.
Steele v. McKinlay, 5 App. Cas. 754, distinguished. Macdonald v. Whit-
field, 66.
Taylor v. Phcenix Ins. Co., 47 Wis. 365, distinguished. King v. TAs. Co.,
148.
The Ohio Wesleyan Female College v. Love's Ex'rs., 16 Ohio St. 20, cited
and distinguished. Johnson v. Trustees, 341.
Tillinghast v. Wheaton, 8 R. I. 536, affirmed. Providence Tst.for &avings
v. Teft, 680.
Troy v. Aiken, 46 Vt. 55, distinguished. MAcGuire v. Kiveland 548.
Wright v. Bircher, 72 Mo., followed. Sutherford v. Stewart, 683.
CEMETERY ASSOCIATION. See TAx AND TAxATIoN, 5, 6.
CERTIORARI. See MUNICIPAL CORtPORATION, 13, 41-43.
1. The rule that special tribunal having judicial functions, whose power to
act in particular case depends upon determination of certain facts must allow
hearing to persons interested, does not prevail where act done is purely dis-
cretionary. In such case review cannot be had by certiorari. State v. Rector,
208.
2. Person who prosecuted petition to alter road over his land before commis-
sioners of- highways, and was present at every step taken, will not be allowed
by certiorari to question legality of proceeding in case decision is adverse to
him. Office of writ at common law, and when issued as a matter of right and
when on cause shown by petition. Supervisors v. Magoon, 409.
CHARITY. See CONTRACT, 26-28.
1. Testamentary gift for purposes both public and benevolent, when will
shows it to have been inspired by philanthropy and aimed at permanent good,
is charitable gift. Pell v. M2fercer, 486.
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2. Bequest in trust for such works of religion or benevolence as executors
may select, good when it appears that benevolence is used in legal sense of
charity. Pell v, Mercer, 486.
3. Law of charitable uses as administered by English chancery in its regu-
lar jurisdiction is part of law of Rhode Island. Supreme Court having full
chancery powers by statute has so much of cy pres power as is exercised by
English chancery without recourse to prerogative powers delegated to it in par-
ticular cases by sign manual of crown. Id.
4. Testamentary disposition "one-quarter part of my trust property to he
given to educational institutions similar to those mentioned in article thirteen,
and the remaining quarter part of my trust property to be given to charitable
institutions similar to those mentioned in article thirteen." Held, not invalid
because indefinite. Trust Co. v. Olney, 615.
CHATTEL MORTGAGE. See MORTGAGE, II.
CHECK. See ATTACHMENT, 6.
When not drawn on particular fund, nor for whole sum to depositor's credit,
does not, before presentment and acceptance, operate in law or equity as as-
signment of so much of deposit. Dickinson v. Coates, 181, Bank v. Coates,
188, and note.
CITIZENSHIP. See REMOVAL OF CAUSES.
CITY. See MUNICIPAL CORPORATION.
COLLATERAL SECURITY. See BILLS AND NOTES, 24. PLEDGE.
COMMON CARRIER. See FERY; SALE, 4; SLEEPING CAR COMPANY.
1. When duly authorized agent of railroad company receives personal pro-
perty to be transported as baggage, company must account for same as baggage
although strictly it micht not be. Railroad Co. 6, Conklin, 544.
2. Condition in bill of lading that carrier shall-have bencfit of insurance
upon damaged goods, not unreasonable. Rintoul v. RailrcadCo., 294, and note.
3. Where it is shown that goods were injured while being transported over
defendants' railroad, and that accident, in ordinary course, would not have
happened if those in charge had used ordinary care, presumption is that acci-
dent arose from defendants' negligence. Id.
4. How far can carrier exempt himself from negligence by special contract.
Id, note, p. 300. See 7.
5. Is bound to receive and will be liable for cars of another railroad com-
pany, just as if property belonged to an individual. Railway Co. v. Railway
Co., 410.
6. In this case, defendant company's principal business was switching cars
for other companies. Plaintiff corporation ordered certain car taken to dis-
tillery, which was done, and car unloaded. It was then, without plaintiff's
orders, taken to sugar refinery to be loaded ; on same day refinery and car
were burned. Held, that defendant was liable as common carrier for value of
car. rd.
7. Cannot exempt himself by contract from liability for delay in transpor-
tation caused by his own negligence. Dawson v. Railroad Co.. 676.
8. Not bound to provide freight facilities for extraordinary occasions. Id.
9. Receiving property for transportation, without agreement to contrary,
undertakes to carry and deliver it within reasonable time, regardless of ex-
traordinary pressure of business. Id.
10. " Baggage" includes only such articles of convenience or necessity as
are usually carried by passengers for their personal use, and does not include
samples. Railroad Co. -. Capps, 376, and note.
11. Permission given by railroad agent to passenger to leave trunk con-
taining samples for few days at station to which it had been checked, agent not
knowing that trunk contained samples, does not render company liable for
trunk and its contents except as a warehouseman. Id.
12. Semble. where railroad company receives articles for transportation as
baggage, knowing that they are not, it will be responsible therefor as a com-
mon carrier. Id.
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13. Who is responsible for baggage. Railroad Co. v. Capps, 376, note.
14. Insurance company having paid loss suffered by insured in consequence
of fire for which common carrier was also answerable, may sue carrier, in his
name to its use, and measure of damages is full value of goods destroyed. If
only part of loss has been paid by insurer, insured is entitled to residne, and
carrier cannot set up insurer's payment of his part of loss as partial satisfaction.
Railroad Co. v. Jurey, 479.
15. Where upon sale of round trip ticket with coupons attached for passage
over two roads, special contract was made that passenger should sign his
name at terminal point before agent there, before he could return on the ticket,
such contract controlled ; and on passenger's failure to sign, company could
eject him. This being done politely by conductor, passenger was not entitled
to damages. Aroses v. Raiload, 799.
16. If one road passed him, other was not bound to. fid.
17. Fact that conductor of contracting road, upon return of passenger
detached last coupon before refusing and returning it and ticket, did not alter
the case. rd.
18. Railroad company may charge reasonable amount more when fare is
paid on train than it does at ticket offices. Railroad v. ,Skillnan, 67.
19. One persistently refusing to pay sech increased fare, after reasonable
time in which to determine the matter, may lawfully be removed from
train. d.
20. Expulsion may be at place other than depot or usual stopping place,
provided care is taken not to expose person to serious injury or danger; and
no right to remain on train is acquired by offering to pay after train has been
stopped for expulsion. Id.
21. LIABILITY or LIVE STOCK CARRIERs, 753.
CONDITIONAL SALE. See SALE, 5.
CONFLICT OF LAWS. See ABATEMENT, 1; ATTACHMENT, 2, 3 ; CONSTI-
TUTIONAL LAW, 17, 27 ; CONTRACT, 23; LIMITATIONS, STATUTE OF,
8 ; PARENT AND CHILD, 4 ; RECEIVER, 1, 2 ; SURETY, 9 ; WAREHOUSE
RECEIPT, I.
1. Decree appointing assignee or receiver has no extra territorial effect on
debtor's real estate. Heyer v. Alexander, 268.
2. Non-resident debtor cannot assign his real estate in state to prejudice of
domestic creditors. Id.
3. Insolvency laws of one state not enforced in another by giving effect to
statutory assignment of debtor's effects, even as against attaching creditor of
debtor's state. Rawn v. Pearce, 745.
4. Cause of action which accrued In one state, under statute making every
railroad corporation liable for damages sustained by employees in conse-
quence of negligence 'of co-employees, may be enforced in another state
where common-law rule on subject prevails. Herrick v. Railway Co., 27,
and note.
5. That such statute only applies to corporations operating railroads does not
make it conflict with provision of Fourteenth Amendment of Federal Constitu-
tion that no state shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws." .1d.
6. Subject to exclusive authority national government, by its own judicial
tribunals, to determine whether persons held in custody by authority of Ufiited
States courts or commissioners thereof, or by officers of general government
acting under its laws, are so held in conformity with law, states have right
by their own courts to inquire into grounds upon which any person, within their
respective territorial limits, is restrained of his liberty, and to discharge him
if restraint is illegal, notwithstanding such illegality arise from violation of
constitution and laws of United States. Robb v. Connolly, 479.
CONSIDERATION. See ARBITRATION, 4 ; BILLS AND NOTES, 7, 13 ; CoN-
PT.ACT, 6, 15, 26, 27 ; FRAUDS, STATUTE Or, 4, 7 ; PATMENT, 2;
SURETY, 4. *
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. See CONFLICT 6F LAWS, 5, 6; COPYRIGIrT, 2;
COURTS, 3; CRIMINAL LAW, 1, 12, 22; EMINENT DOMAIN; EQUITY, 4;
EVIDENCE, 6; M UNICIPAL CORPORATION, 17, 20 ; OFFICER, 4, 5.
I. Powers of Legislature, and Generally.
1. Congress can make United States Treasury notes legal tender in peace or
war. Legal Tender Cases, 342.
2. Time when amendment to constitution considered to be adopted. Arrow-
smith v. Hornnening, 259, note.
3. Statute may authorize selectmen of town to allow such ringing of mill
bell as had previously been judicially determined to be private nuisance. Saw-
yer v. Davis, 676.
4. Mere grant of right to build railroad between given termini, creates no
implied obligation to iiot thereafter grant right to build parallel railroads be-
tween same termini or that other railroads shall not be allowed to cross the first.
Con. Railway Co. v. Union Railway Co., 269.
5. Incumbent of county office not protected by prohibition of federal consti-
tutiou apainst impairment of obligation of contracts. His salary may he
diminished during his term of office, and a law so diminishing his salary after
law takes effect, is prospective and not retroactive. Harvey v. Count!) Comnais-
sioners, 545.
6. Provision in act to reorganize embarrassed corporation that all holders of
mortgage bonds who do not, within given time, expressly dissent from plan of
reorganization shall be deemed to have assented to it, and which provides for
reasonable notice, is valid. Gi~fllan v. Canal Co., 209.
7. Act conferring corporate powers so special that it canT apply, at any
time, only to three certain cities, uiconstitutional. City v. Gillett, 745, and
778, and note.
8. Act may be special where it applies to many particular and existing per-
sons or things, and where it simply describes them as well as where it gives
their names. Id.'
9. Law attempting arbitrarily to change place of payment of negotiable
paper (e. g., county bonds) after sale and transfer thereof, cannot be upheld
because it impairs the contract. Dillinghani v. Hook, 545.
10. Where municipal corporation has, in due exercise of power conferred hy
legislature, assessed and levied tax, legislature may, by act retrospective in its
terms, and which takes effect before such tax becomes due, annul the assess-
ment, and vest in another body power to make assessment for that year. State
v. Railway Co., 676.
11. Act " to provide for the assessment and collection of taxes on bridges
owned by joint stock companies, and property and franchises owned by tele-
graph companies" not a "special" law. Id.
12. Statute providing for granting of conditional pardons, and that, where
conditions are violated, convict shall he arrested and governor and counsel
shall examine case of such convict and "if it appears by his own admission
or by evidence that he has violated the conditions of his pardon," the governor,
with advice of counsel, shlil order convict to be remanded, and confined for
unexpired term, held, constitutional. And that no notice or opportunity to be
heard, need be given to convict. Kenizedy's Case, 209.
13. Ordinance of Chicago, making owners, &c., of tug boats, engines, &c.,
liable for allowing emission of dense smoke from smoke-stacks, is not in viola-
tion of See. 8, Art 1, of Federal constitution, declaring that "Congress shall
have power to regulate coimerce," &c. Harnon v. Cit,, 800.
14. A state has all power necessary for protection of property, health and
comfort of public, and may delegate this power to local municipalities and
resume it again when deemed expedient. Id.
15. Act entitled "An act to amend the charter of the Cairo & St. Louis
Railroad Company," legalized election previously held, at which people voted
in favor of subscription to stock of that company, and granted authority to
issue bonds in payment of such subscription. Held, that this provision of the
act was sufficiently covered by the title under constitution providing that '- ,.
private or local law which may be passed by the general assembly shall embrace
more than one subject, and that shall be expressed in the title." City v. Rail-
road Co., 342.
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16. Statutd of state of Virginia, Code of 1873, cap. 100, see. 4, which for-
bids non-residents to catch fish for manufacture of manure and oil, and to
manufacture manure and oil from fish caught within waters of that state, is not
in yiolatiou of article IV. see. 2, of U. S. constitution. Chambers v. Church,
479.
17. Contract to be executed wholly in Virginia, in violation of this statute,
will not be enforced in Rhode Island. Nor can bill in equity be sustained in
Rhode Island for account of profits of such contract which has been exe-
cuted. Id.
18. Statute for abolition of system of remunerating prosecutors of pleas by
fees and substitution of fixed salaries, but fixing salaries of different amounts
arbitrarily and not by any general rule or according to population, is local or
special act. Freeholders v. Stevenson, 745.
19. While prosecutor of pleas represents state in administration of justice,
amount he is to receive from county treasury concerns county alone, and statute
fixing salaries of such prosecutors is act regulating internal affairs of coun-
ties. Id.
20. Minnesota stat. of 1883 requires, as condition of right to practice as phy-
sician (except as to those engaged five years in practice in state), certificate of
qualificatiol from faculty of medical department of state university. Section 9
authorizes board to refuse certificate to those guilty of unprofessional or dishon-
orable conduct. Relator was refused certificate upon that ground. Held, 1.
Appellant had right to be heard upon investigation as to his conduct. 2.
" Unprofessional," in section 9, is used convertibly with "dishonorable."
3. Act not unconstitutional. 4. Relator not entitled to mandamus to secure
review or reversal of determination of board. State v. Examining Board, 714,
and note.
21. Where constitution requires certain formal rules to be complied with by
legislature before bill becomes law, and appropriate office of journal is to record
successive steps of legislative action, such journal will be sufficient evidence to
overturn enrolled bill in conflict with it; but where constitution does not
require amendment to be entered upon journal, but journal shows that original
bill was amenmed, and is silent as to rescission of amendment, and enrolled bill
contains no amendment, court will presume amendment was rescinded. Chicot
County v. Davies, 269.
22. Not only enrolled bill, but legislative journals, and records and files of
office of secretary of state, may be looked to for purpose of ascertaining whether
act was duly passed. Id.
23. For law or constitutional provision to have retrospective operation, intent
must be clearly expressed. So. where legislative charter provided that directors
of corporation should be elected by vote of stockholders, allowing one vote for
every share, and also provided that legislature should have no power to alter,
suspend or repeal charter, and subsequently constitutional provision was adopted
providing in general terms for cumulative voting at all elections of corporation
directors, Held, that as there was nothing in this provision specially applicable
to corporation in question, and as there were other corporations in existence
when constitution was adopted, to which it could apply, in addition to those
which might thereafter be incorporated, it would be held not to operate upon
this particular corporation. State v. Greer, 480.
24. Right of corporators to vote at elections for directors is property right,
and if mode of voting is prescribed by irrepealable charter, it is protected
against constitutional or legislative enactment by provision of U. S. constitu-
tion prohibiting states from passing laws impairing obligation of contracts. Id.
II. Powers of the Judiciary.
25. Where court or office is established Py legislative act apparently valio,
and court has gone into operation, or office is filled and exercised under act, it
is a de facto court or office, the legality of which cannot be called in question
except in a direct proceeding by the state. Burt v. Railroad Co., 534, and note.
26. It is declared in constitution of Kansas that no warrant shall be issued
to seize any person, but on probable cause supported by oath or affirmation ;
raeretore complaint or information filed in District Court charging defendant
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with misdemeanor and verified on nothing but hearsay and belief, is not suffi-
eient to authorize issuance of warrant for arrest of party therein charged, when
no previous preliminary examination and no waivcr of right to such examina-
tion has been had. State v. Gleason, 545.
27. In determining whether Supreme Court of state has given effect to state
law impairing obligation of contract, Supreme Court of United States will
decide for itself whether there is a contract and whether its obligation is im-
paired ; and if decision of question as to existence of alleged contract requires
construction of state constitutions and laws, it is not necessarily governed by
previous decisions of state court, except when they have been so firmly estab-
lished as to constitute rule of property. Railroad Co. T. Palmes, 66.
III. Eminent Domain.
28. Legislature may grant to telegraph company exercise of right of eminent
domain. Pierce v. Drew, 544.
29. Additional servitude not imposed by appropriation of public highway
under Pub. Sts. (Mass.) c. 109, for use of line of electric telegraph, by erec-
tion of poles and wires above surface of ground; and statute is constitutional,
although it makes no provision for compensation to owner of fee in highway.
Id.
30. By construction of ditch for purpose of preserving highway, waters of
river were diverted from one part of land of riparian'owner and thrown upon
another part thereof so as to change condition and cut away portion of bank.
Hed, that there was a taking of his land within meaning of sects. 1236-7,
R. S. Wis. Smith v. Gould, 676.
31. Even where fee of street is in public, construction of ordinary railroad
along and over it is damage to abutting property, within constitutional provi-
sion for compensation for property damaged. City v. Bayer, 440, and note.
32. For injuries or annoyance which owner of abutting property shares in
common with general public, he is not entitled to compensation, but for those
damages which are peculiar to him, he may recover. Id.
33. Municipal corporation authorizing use of street by railroad is not liable
in damages to abutting lotholder. Id.
34. For injuries of this kind single recovery can be had for whole damage to
result from act. Measure of compensation is actual diminution in market value
of premises. No personal inconvenience or annoyance, no interference with
owner's trade or business, no decrease in rental value, and no temporary inter-
ruption or damage constitutes test. These things can only be considered as
they may aid in determining actual depreciation of market value. And if
owner receive benefits from road peculiar to himself, this should be con-
sidered. .d.
CONTEMPT.
No privilege from arrest exists against execution of attachment against
solicitor for contempt in disobeying order of court made against him as officer
of court. In re Freston, 67.
CONTRACT. See ACTIO-, 2, 6; BILLS AND NOTES, 4; Co~noN CAnnIBE,
7, 9, 15 ; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 17 ; CORPORATION, 2, 5, 9 ; COVENANT,
2; INSuRANCE, I ; MECHAINICS' LIEN, 2; MUNICIPAL CORPORATioxoN, 21 "
NEGLIGENCE, 10; PATENT, 7; PUBLIC POLICY.
1. When obligation is in alternative, right of election is with promissor.
Dessert v. Scott, 144.
2. A. at request of C. recommended to him a builder, who orally promised
to pay A. sum of money " for his trouble," and was employed by C. Reld,
that action therefor could not be maintained. Holcomb v. Wearer, 678.
3. Where physician agrees, for valuable consideration, not to practice in
certain city "and vicinity," he is bound by his contract and can he enjoined,
,but injunction should define exactly what is meant by "and vicinity." Zim-
merman v. Devin, 50, and note.
4. Between manufacturer of pig iron and person using same, that former
will supply and latter purchase all pig iron which latter should need during
ensuing season-fixing limit of time--sud amount supposed about a certain
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named -quantity, is not wanting in mutuality. Furnace Co. v. Manufacturing
Co., 800.
5. Suit will not lie for money payable upon architect's certificate, without pro-
duction thereof or evidence of waiver, express or implied ; less evidence of
waiver requisite when contract has been fully performed. Byrne v. Sisters,
209,
6. Waiver by sub-contractor of lien for materials furnished for erection of
building, and discharge of principal contractor for liability therefor, constitutes
sufficient consideration for promise by owner to pay for such n'aterials. Gris-
woldv. Wright, 801.
7. It seems that such promise is not within statute of frauds. rd.
8. In alteration or re-building ofhouse, involving use of party-wall, owner must
see that reasonable care ant skill is exercised to prevent injury to adjoining
property, and he cannot avoid responsibility by delegating work to third
person. Hughes v. Percival, 93, and note.
9. Liability of employer for injuries resulting from work done by independent
contractor. id., note.
10. Where by buildingcontract price to be paid extra or deducted on account
of changes is left to architect and his decision made final, a fraudulent decision
by him will not bind; and if it be shown that lie has disregarded important,
clearly established or obvious facts, primafacie presumption will be that he did
so wilfully. County of Cook v. Harms, 269.
11. Erection of side track connecting with railroad, at expense of plaintiff,
and subsequent erection of expensive car works, from which cars were deliv-
ered by means of side track, held, not to change revocable license into contract
so as to estop railroad company from revoking license to connect side track with
company's track. Jackson 4- Sharp Co. v. Railroad, 269.
12. Valuable services, which would, as between strangers, raise implied
promise to pay, will not, when performed for person in loco parentis, even if
partly performed after majority. Cowell v. Roberts, 677.
13. In action against estate of deceased person for services performed during
lifetime, Held, that his will making provision for plaintiff was properly admitted
in evidence as corroborative of defence that position of plaintiff was that
of member of family, and as bearing upon supposed undertaking to pay
wages. Id.
14. Under contract between L. and railroad company, L. agreed to furnish
company with ice of given description, same to be subject to inspection and
approval of company's agent. Held, that judgment of agent was conclusive,
unless tainted with fraud or bad faith. Lmynn v. Railroad Co., 67.
15. Promise by sons, after their father's death, to pay the amount of a note
given by him in consideration of its transfer to them and their not being
troubled about it, there being no administrator of his estate nor any estate out
of which the note could have been paid, is nudum pactum. Schroeder v.
_'nk, 68.
16. Agreement of corporation purporting to be made by "B., agent," and
signed and sealed by him as such, and signed and scaled by other parties, the
testimonium clause calling for seals, is deed of corporation. Bradstreet v.
Baker, 677.
17. Instrument provided that company was to furnish and C. and D. were
to receive, between certain dates, 5000 tons of ice at specified price, and that
C. and D. were to pay cash in full at same price for all ice not received by
them at last date, such ice to remain property of company. Hd, that stipu-
lated price was penalty and not liquidated damages. Id.
18. Letter containing offer to pay specified sum for certain services, and
acceptance of such offer evidenced by performance of service, constitute con-
tract in writing which evidence of antecedent or contemporaneous verbal
agreement is inadmissible to vary or control. (Whether parol testimony is
inadmissible to show that such letter was not intended as an agreement for
another purpose, not determined.) Hooker v. Hyde, 807.
19. Stipulation in, made by parties uninfluenced by misrepresentation or
fraud and with full knowledge that one party shall be absolutely released in
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case statement made by the other shall be found not to be in all respects true,
is valid, and must e enforced, where it does not affirmatively appear that
party making said statement, with reason, believed it to be true. Peniston v.
Ins. Co., 342.
20. Agreement made on valid consideration by one person with another, to
jay money to a third, can be enforced by latter in his own name; that agree-
mentis under seal and such third person is not named therein, do not affect
right to enforce it. Emynitt v. BrophyJ, 343.
21. By written agreement made in presence of C., D. agreed with P., for
valuable consideration, to pay $300 to C. out of certain moneys, before satisfy-
ing other claims, and at same time accepted an order on him by P. in favor of
C. for $300 to be paid first out of said moneys. In action by C. against D. for
the $300, Held, that evidence of parol contemporaneous agreement between P.
and D., varying terms of the written contract as to payment of said $300, was
inadmissible. Cook v. Durham, 677.
22. For speculation in stocks upon margins, when broker and customer do
not contemplate or intend that stock purchased or sold shall become or be
treated as stock of customer, but real transaction is mere dealing in difference
between prices, is unlawful in N. J., and securities given therefor are void by
force of the" act to prevent gaming." Flagg v. Baldwin, 480.
23. Such contracts, though made in another state, where they are to be pre-
sumed to be lawful and enforceable, will not be enforced in N. J.-at least
against its residents and citizens-because their enforcement would violate plain
public policy of state on gambling and betting, evinced by statute above men-
tioned. Id.
24. Where one agreed to build party-wall resting equally upon his own
and land of neighbor, who agreed to pay half the cost on completion, and as
land of neighbor did not extend as far north as wall, party erecting agreed to
convey to him small strip lying north of where his line terminated : such con-
tract was absolute and the covenants independent ; therefore conveyance by
party building was not condition precedent to enforcement of his claim for half
cost of wall. Ensiqn v. ,Sharp, 343.
25. In case of concurrent conditions, to be simultaneously performed, if one
party is ready and willing, and offers to perf6rm, and other will not, first is
discharged from performance and may maintain action against other. Id.
26. Creation of fund with which to pay indebtedness of educational institution
not sufficient consideration for promise to contribute certain amount to that
object. Johnson v. Trustees, 341.
27. Therefore, where party gave to educational institution his note for $100,
payable three years after date, and stipulating therein that the money was to be
used exclusively to liquidate its then existing indebtedness. Held, that same
was without consideration. 1d.
28. Authority in charter providing that trustees "1may procure funds for the
endowment of pro.sorsleips, the erection of buildings* p urchase of
lands * * * and for whatever may be necessary for the prosperity of the insti-
tution, and shall faithfully apply what they shall receive by donation or otherwise
to these purposes ; provided that all donations, bequests, &Z., shall be applied
in accordance with the designs expressed by the donors," does not convert
above note and its acceptance into case of mutual promises, nor otherwise make
it valid. Id.
29. CONT-&CTS FOR TE BENEFIT OF THiim PERoNs, 1.
COPYRIGHT.
I. Lecturer from unpublished manuscript to limited audience may enjoin
subsequent publication of such lecture by one who has taken it down in short-
hand and attempts to publish it for his own profit. Nicholls v. Pitman, 435,
and note.
2. Under clause of U. S. Constitution empowering Congress to secure to
"authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and dis-
coveries," copyrighting of photographs, so far as they are representatives of
original intellectual conceptions of author, can properly be authorized ; and
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they are such when artist has posed his subject and arranged the draperies, &c.,
so as to produce distinct effect. Lithographic Co. V. ,&rony, 343.
CORPORATION. See ATTACHMENT, 3; CONSTITUTIONAL LAw, 6, 23, 24;
CONTRACT, 16; PARTNERSHIt-, 7 ; REMOVAL OF CAUSES, 3 ; WILL,
12, 13.
1. Owner of all the capital stock not legal owner of its property, cannot
maintain replevin therefor in his own name. Button v. Hoffman, 678.
2. Publication by savings bank directors, that "directors and stockholders
are personally responsible for its debts," does not constitute contract with de-
positors ; but if statement is false there may be action for deceit. W'estervelt v.
Demarest, 616.
3. Except as to matters affecting the civil rights of individuals or property
of the corporation, when courts of law will interpose, the governing bodies of
the religious society have exclusive jurisdiction with respect to a church's affairs.
State v. Rector, 208.
4. Shareholder entitled to mandamus to compel officers holding corporate
documents to allow him an inspection and copies of them at reasonable times
for specific and proper purpose, upon showing refusal to allow such inspection.
Commonwealth v. Iron Co., 388, and note.
5. Payment of shares in may be made otherwise than in money, as by publica-
tion in newspaper of articles, &c., favoring the enterprise (building bridge over
Mississippi), and pointing out its need and value as an investment; such con-
tract not contrary to public policy. Liebke v. Knapp, 678.
6. Stockholder cannot set off indebtedness of corporation in action to enforce
his individual liability. Tliebus v. Smiley, 746.
7. Such action is in nature of equitable attachment, and thereby creditor
acquires preference, which neither other creditors nor stockholders can defeat,
unless possibly by bill for general closing up of affairs of corporation. Id.
8. Pledgee of stock receiving power of attorney to transfer same on books
of company, but who never had same so transferred nor votes upon it, nor exer-
cises acts of ownership thereof, is not liable to creditors in action to enforce
individual liability of stockholders. Henke v. Manufacturing Co., 68.
9. Liability of stockholders to creditors " to an amount equal to the amount
of stock held by them respectively, * * * until the whole amount of the capital
stock * * * shall have been paid in," &c., is not in nature of penalty, but
based on contract between stockholders ani creditors, and can be enforced out-
side of limits of state by which law was passed. Flash v. Conn, 145.
10. In such case as above, decision of state codrt is entitled to great, if not
conclusive weight with federal courts. Id.
11. Under statutory provision making stockholders responsible for debts of
corporation to an amonnt equal to stock held by them, they are in effect made
partners, and are jointly and severally liable to amount stated: one stock-
hdlder cannot, therefore, sue another on such individual liability. Tompson v,
.Aeisser, 270.
12. When a stockholder is thus sued he cannot set off a debt due from cor-
poration to himself. Id.
13. In determining whether act is ultra vires, regard is to be had to its effect
and real object. Bankc v. Flour Co., 746.
14. Accordingly: Although trading corporation may not with its own means
pay or secure private debt of president to third person, yet where he is its
creditor, it may pay or secure such private debt, when real object and effect is
to pay or secure indebtedness of company to him in same amount. Id.
15. In action by creditor to enforce personal liability of stockholders, where
all were not before the court, and it did not appear that those not served could
not have been served, it was error to assess upon the stockholders served the
whole amount of corporation's indebtedness. Bonewitz v. Bank, 410.
16. In such action it was error togive judgmentfor some of stockholders, upon
finding that they did not own stock at time liability sought to .be enforced
accrued. Id.
17. Corporation of one state doing business in another under law of latter
compelling it to always have there resident attorney upon whom process agaipst
INDEX.
CORPORATION.
company may be served, may be sued in latter state on any simple contract
just as if that were the only state in which suit could be brought. And if let-
ters of administration must be taken out for purpose of suit, liability of cor-
poration to be sued in latter state makes such simple contract debt assets there
for purpose of founding administration. Ins. Co v. Woodworth, 410.
18. Bat in such case foreign corporation does not lose its right of removal
into United States court. Id.
19. Constitution of Colorado required foreign corporation doing business in
the state to have an authorized agent or agents in the same. "upon whom pro-
cess may be served," and state statutes required certificate to be filed desig-
nating such " an authorized agent or agents," residing at its principal place of
business in the state. Held, that certificate stating that the "general manager,
residing," &c., without naming him, was such agent, was sufficient. Goodwin
v. Mortqage Co., 343.
20. Stock issued beyond charter limit is void. Clark v. Turner, 344.
21. If one who subscribed to stock of insurance company, after charter limit
was reached, induced insurance on part of any other person, in that company,
by his acts as trustee or agent thereof, or on faith of his subscription, individual
action on part of person so induced would lie against him, but not an action by
company or its assignee for his subscription. Id.
CORPSE. See CRIMINAL LAw, 2, 3.
COSTS. See MUNICIPAL CORPORTION, 43.
Party succeeding in substantial particular, on exceptions to master's report,
is, as general rule, entitled to costs in such proceedings. ,anford v. Clarke,
480.
COUNTY. See MUNICIPAL CORPORATION.
COURTS. See CONSTITUTIO AL LAW, 25 ; CRIMINAr LAW, 22 ; EVID NCE, 5,
6; INFANT, 3.
1. Certificates of inferior courts as to what has transpired in their presence,
cannot be contradicted by affidavits. State v. Camp, 145.
2. Mandamus does not lie to compel court to do what it has discretion to
refuse to do. Td.
3. For purpose of construing statute or constitution, may take judicial
notice of everything which may affect validity or meaning thereof. City v.
Gillett, 778.
4. While court takes judicial notice of such things as division of state into
counties, and of latter into townships, according to government surveys, it
cannot take notice of fact that land located under scrip is in lake which is navi-
gable body of water, and hence not subject to location. Wilcox v. Jackson, 411.
COVENANT.
1. If non estfactum is not pleaded, plaintiff need offer no proof of execution.
W'harton v. Stoutenburgh, 746.
2. Where mining lease stipulated for raising annually specified quantity of
ore or to pay stipulated rent. Held, that non-existence of quantity of ore was
no defence. Id.
3. Vendees of lots of building estate covenanted with vendors and each
other not to build shops or use their houses as shops, or carry on any trade therein.
Purchaser of one lot, who occupied his house as private residence, brought
action against another purchaser, who was using his house as beer shop with an
" off" license. Defendant had, to knowledge of plaintiff, so used his house for
three years before action was commenced. Several other houses built on others
of lots (one immediately opposite plaintiff's house) had been for some time used
as shops, and many of houses adjoining plaintiff's were occupied by two
families each at weekly rents. Held, inequitable to enforce specific perform-
ance of the covenant. Sayers-v. CoUlyer, 68.
CRIMINAL LAW. See ATTACHMENT, I; ATTORNEY, I; BAIL; CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW, 26 ; EQUITY, I ; EVIDENCE, 22, 23 ; JURY, 2 ; REMOVAL 0P
CAUsEs, 6.
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1. Generally.
1. Constitutional right to meet witnesses face to face may be waived. Williams
v. State, 801.
2. Not misdemeanor to burn dead body unless so done as to amount to public
nuisance. Queen v. PIce, 560, and note.
3. If inquest ought to be held upon dead body, it is misdemeanor so to dis-
pose of it as to prevent coroner from holding inquest. Id.
4. Better rule is, that respondent has no ground of complaint when he chal-
lenges juror for cause and is refused, and then challenges peremptorily, if he
has challenges left when panel is filled. &tate v. Gaffney et al., 746.
5. By pleading not guilty to indictment and going to trial without making
objection to mode of selecting grand jury, the objection is waived ; at least,
except where objection goes to subversion of all proceedings in empanelling and
swearing grand jury. United tates v. Gale, 209.
6. Where licensed person is charged, under section 13 of English Licensing
Act of 1872, with having sold intoxicating liquor to drunken person, it is no
defence to show that neither accused nor his servants knew, or had means of
knowing that person served was drunk. Candy V. Le Cocq, 768, and note.
7. In 'absence of notice, neither defendant nor his counsel bound to attend
court 'on Sunday on coming in of jury; and where court, in their absence,
received verdict on that day and discharged jury, and refused to poll jury next
day, Wd, there must be reversal of judgment and new trial. State v. Muir,
747.
S. Challenge to array ought not to be sustained on account of mere irregu-
larities or informalities ; yet where statute specifically prescribes class or list of
persons from whom jurors are to be selected, failure to draw jurors from pre-
scribed class or list, is sufficient ground of such challenge. State v. Jen-
kins, 746.
9. If judgment of conviction has been pronounced by justice of peace, upon
valid complaint, charging offence of which he had jurisdiction, a regular appeal
by defendant from such judgment confers jurisdiction upon appellate court, even
though justice may have committed errors which divested his jurisdiction. State
v. Boucher, 411.
10. Where person has sufficient mental capacity to understand nature and
quality of particular act or acts constituting the crime, and to know whether
they are right or wrong, he is generally responsible. State v. Nixon, 545.
11. In criminal prosecutions, where jury entertain reasonable doubt as to
insanity, they should acquit. Id.
12. There is a class of offences that may be committed by party in one county
upon person or thing in another county, when offence may not inaptly be defined
as having been committed in either county; and offences committed on county
line or within inappreciable distance therefrom, may with propriety be regarded
as having been committed in either county, and by doing so no one is deprived
of any constitutional right. Buclrice v. People, 616.
13. Great caution is necessary in 'admission and use of dying declarations.
Admissibility and competency of the evidence is for judge to decide, and he
should instruct jury afterwards to pass finally on question, whether or not
declarations were conscious utterances in immediate prospect of death.
Mitchell v. State, 145.
14. Burden of proving insanity is on the accused. Graves v. State, 146.
15. Judgment of conviction will be reversed on refusal to grant new trial on
ground of newly-discovered evidence which is relevant and important. State
v. Curtis, 146.
16. Plea of once in jeopardy not sustained by proof of former trial of same
indictment, with verdict of guilty set aside on motion of defendant for miscon-
duct of juror. State v. Blaisdell, 270.
17. Attorney's consent to try client for misdemeanor in client's absence will
be primafacie presumed to be by authority of client. Martin v. State, 270.
18. Court should not permit defendant to be tried in his absence where pun-
ishment may be imprisonment: but having done so with defendant's consent
he cannot complain. Id.
19. Temporary insanity produced immediately by intoxication, furnishes no
'VoL. XXI.-104
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excuse for the commission of homicide or other crime, but fixed insanity does:
which kind of insanity accused was under, question of fact for jury. Upstone v.
People, 411.
20. Voluntary drunkenness not available to disprove intent, so as to reduce
crime from murder to manslaughter. Id.
21. On trial for crime, opinions of neighbors and acquaintances, not experts,
may he given as to defendant's sanity or insanity, founded on their actual ob-
servations. . Id.
22. Under constitutional provision conferring upon Supreme Court power to
issue writs of habeas corpus, judge of that court has no power to issue such writ
during vacation, nor can legislature confer such power. TA re Garvge, 733.
23. Habeas corpus proper remedy where court below has denied prisoner's
motion to be released, under statute providing that he shall be set at liberty
unlegs tried on or before second term of court. Id.
24. A. was convicted of murder and sentenced. On appeal judgment was
reversed. Court below, without new trial, sentenced A. for manslaughter.
This judgment was reversed. Meanwhile more than two terms of court below
had elapsed after reversal of original judgment. Held, that prisoner should'be
di'hharged under above statute. Id.
25. Credibility of defendant testifying on his own behalf tested in same man-
ner-as in case of any other witness: jury can consider his interest, as well as his
demeanor and conduct upon witness stand and during trial; also his contra-
- diction by other witnesses ; and if, -after considering all the evidence, jury find
accused to have wilfully testified falsely to any material fact, they can entirely
disregard his testimony, except where corroborated by other credible evidence.
Rider v. People, 616.
26. In Illinois jury may convict upon uncorroborated evidence of accom-
plice. Id.
27. DRuwKzuNESS AS AN Exous FoR CRIME.
If. Bastardy.
28. Bastardy proceeding is quasi-criminal, and defendant must be proved
beyond reasonable doubt to be father of child before he can be compelled to
contribute to its support. Van Tassel v. State, 411.
III. Inderent Exposure.
29. Not necessary that indecent exposure should have been seen, if made in
public place with intent that it should be seen and persons were there who could
have seen it if they had looked. Van Houpen v. State, 616.
IV. Homicide.
30. Party present and encouraging unlawful act resulting in homicide,
equally guilty of manslaughter with him who struck fatal blow. Ritzman v.
People, 746.
31. Where one is assaulted in his home, or the home itself is attacked, a
homicide will not be justifiable unless the slayer, in the careful and proper use
of his faculties, bona fide believes, and has reasonable ground to believe, that
the killing is necessary to repel the assailant or prevent his forcible entry, &c.
State v. Peacock, 69.
V. Larceny.
32. Attempt to steal accompanied' by such overt acts as will naturally result
in its commission, constitutes attempt to commit larceny. Mere preliminary
preparations not the overt acts required. Sipple v. State, 747.
CUSTOM. See INSURACE, 13.
DAMAGES. See CoMMoN CARRIER, 14; CONSTITUTIONAL LAw, 31, 32; Cox-.
TRACT, 17 ; EASEMENT, 2 ; INJUNCTION, 5; INSUiANoE, 14 ; NEGLIGENCE,
28; PARENT AND CHILD, 1 ; PLEADING, 3 ; SHERIFF, 4.
1. Damages for delay resulting from particular character of business of
traveller, unknown to railroad company contracting with him, are too remote.
Railroad v. Hayden, 150.
2. Passenger unlawfully ejected from ferry boat entited to reasonable com-
pensation for indignity and consequent injury to feelings. Allen Y. & 1"y Co.,
748.
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3. Whether interest, eo ,omine, is allowable in ascertaining damages in
actions of tort or not, apsee of time from commission of wrong may be con-
sidered. Clement v. Spear, 747.
4. Measure of, in case against sheriff for escape, is plaintiff's actual damage,
of which amount of judgment in action wherein escape took place is only prima
fade evidence, open to rebuttal by sheriff. heldon v. Upham, 678.
5. Punitive, only allowed because of malicious motive supposed, from cir-
cumstances, to have prompted the wrong. If cause of offence be discontinued
with reasonable promptness, exemplary damages should not be awarded.
Oursler v. Railroad C., 69.
6. On failure to complete work on books and deliver same within time agreed
upon, not admissible to prove that there may have been demand for books had
they been ready. That sales had been made and profits lost in consequence of
delay, would be competent evidence. Hill v. .Parsons, 617.
7. True test as to damages for land taken for public use, is its market value
for any purpose to which it is adapted or maybe applied. If land is in use for
market gardening and is most valuable for that purpose, owner may show this,
and also value of manure on land. Railroad Co v. Jaeobs, 801.
. 8. Exemplary, may be allowed, where agent, by false and fraudulent repre-
sentations to principal, obtains possession of principal's goods and converts
them to his own use ; in such case jury may include plaintiff's reasonable
counsel fees. Iroa Co. v. Harper, 411.
9. Female plaintiff testified that shortly after injury complained of, cancer
was developed at place on her person where she was injured, and medical tes-
timony was offered on both sides of questio" whether cancer resulted from
injury. Held, that that question was for jury : that if they found for plaintiff
on that question, existence of cancer would be element of damage; and that
plaintiff may have had tendency or predisposition to cancer,' could afford no
proper ground of objection to her claim. .ailwary Co. v. Kemft, 412.
DEATH. See Pnxsummom, 2.
DEBTOR AND CREDITOR. See AssioGNXtZr, 2; CONFrLICT or LAws, 2,3;
EQUITY, 4, 9, 18, 19.
1. Transfer of corporate stock with intent to hinder, delay and defraud
creditors void as against them at common law. Beckwith v. Burrough, 617.
2. After such transfer stock was attached and sold as property of debtor.
Purchaser filed bill to obtain stock., Held, that attachment and sale were good
and bill could be maintained. Id.
3. Motive or purpose of voluntary transfer by party indebted, not material:
suchconveyance of itself prima face evidence of fraud. Goodman v. Wireland,
546,
4. Presumption of fraud may be repelled by proving that granter, at time of
gift, was possessed of other means amply sufficient to pay his debts; onus is
upon those seeking to uphold the gift. Id.
5. It is a hindrance to creditors for debtor to dispose of his real property
and tangible chattels and compel them to rely upon merely personal obliga-
tions. rd.
6. If debtor and vendee respectively buy and sell goods in order to defraud
debtor's creditors, sale is void as to creditors without regard to price or change
of possession. Stone v. Spencer, 146.
7. Where right of attaching creditor is contested by transferree of debtor, on
ground that goods were exempt from attachment in debtor's hands, the burden
of proving such exemption is on transferree. Id.
DECEDENTS' ESTATES. See Dowxn. EXECUTORS A D ADmI IXsTRA-
TOES.
1. Where testator directs his executors to sell certain property and divide
proceeds among certain named legatees, they can elect to take the property.
Swann v. Garrett, 146.
2. Court of equity has power to elect for infantlegatee. Interest of all leg-
atees is to be consulted as well as that of infant. Id.
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DECEIT. See CORPORATION, 2. FRAUD, 1.
DEEb. Se CONTRACT, 16; EASEmENr, 3; EJECTMENT, 5; MINES AND MIN-
ING, 9; MORTGAGE, 14; NOTICE, 1, 2; WILL, 1.
1. To make deed executed in blank operate as conveyance, bla,,k must be
filled by party authorized before or at time of delivery to grantee. Allen v.
Withrow, 270.
2. Statutory requirement of two witnesses not answered by one attesting
witness and daughter of grantor also being in and out of room when deed was
executed; but not for purpose of being a witness. Keyonr v. &gar, 678.
3. " Subject to mortgage" in conveyance of one of two parcels of land
mortgaged together, held, not to imply that incumbrance was to be satisfied
wholly out of parcel conveyed or that grantee assumed any personal responsi-
bility. Hall v. Morgan, 679.
4. Record is of itself presumptive evidence of delivery. Ross v. Campbell,
801.
5. Attestation by magistrate raises like presumption. rd.
6. Where grantor gave in the lot conveyed for taxation as property of gran-
tee for several years succeeding execution of deed, this was strong manifesta-
tion of his understanding that deed was delivered and title conveyed. It may
be that grantor would be estopped from denying his grantee's title, especially as
he stated in conversation that he held property as agent of grantee. d.
7. All these circumstances united, in absece of explanation, would" show
delivery of deed, although it was in possession of grantor when he died some
years after its date. rd.
8. Where C. in good faith purchases land from S., and afterwards S.
delivers to C. deed for same completely executed by V., the owner, and C. in
good faith, and without notice, accepts the deed, and S. is not the agent of
either C. or V., but acts for himself, and no question is at any time raised
with regard to validity of deed as conveyance of land; and V. delivers pos-
session to C. without questioning C.'s title, but afterwards claims the growing
crops by virtue of parol agreement with S. Held, that deed conveyed crops
as well as land, although V., when executing deed, believed same was to S.,
.and although deed was in fact executed to blank grantee, and S. afterward
inserted C.'s name, and although there may have been parol agreement between
V. and S. that growing crops should continue property of V. Chapman v.
V'each, 546.
DELLVERY. See DEED, 4-6; GirT, 1, 3 ; PARTNERSUIP, 4; SALE, 2.
DEMAND. See LIMITATIONS, STATUTE OF, 9.
DEMURRER. See EQUITY, 14, 15.
DEVISE. See WILL.
DIVORCE. See HUSBAND AND WIFE, L
DOWER-
Widow is deemed purchaser of devise or bequest in lieu of dower, and upon
deficiency of assets to pay both debts and legacies, legacy to her is only liable
after other assets have been exhausted, even though her legacy exceed value of
her dower. This is the rule though bequest be of one-third "according to
law." Warren v. Norris, 270.
DRUNKENNESS. See CRIMINAL LAw, 27.
DURESS.
i. Mortgage executed by married woman under duress of husband's impris-
onment, is, as between her and mortgagee, void. Bank v. Bryan, 201, and
note.
2. Bonafide holder of negotiable mortgage note, taken for value before ma-
turity, may recover upon it, although both note and mortgage were obtained by
,duress ; but he is not entitled to foreclose mortgage -where property is wife's
homestead mortgaged to secure husband's note. Id.
3. Where answer does not formally allege duress, but sets up facts sufficient
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to constitute it, defence will be received, evidence of duress being admitted
without objection. Bank v. Bryan, 20.
EASEMENT. See EQUITY, 8: PARTY WALL; WATERS AND WATER-
COURSES.
1. One whose foundation walls are injured by water percolating through
soil from adjoining lot has cause of action against owner thereof if water was
unlawfully or unreasonably allowed to remain standing thereon, and not other-
wise. Quinn v. Railroad Co., 513, and note.
2. Damages to owner or occupant of land by reason of diminution of value
thereof causcd by neighboring nuisance must be confined to time during which
nuisance existed. Id.
3. H., in 1848, owned both plaintiff's and defendant's premises. Deed con-
veying plaintiff's contained this clause: "Said sixteen ftet (east) of said
house to be kept open as fhr back as the south end of said house." Defendant
claimed right of way. Held, that same was not reserved, but that clause is
applicable to other matters, such as obstructing light, air or the view. Wlfilder
v. Wheeldon, 617.
4. Right to uninterrupted flow of water, by means of pipes running through
land of another, catrries with it right to enter upon that land for purpose of
cleansing and repairing, &c., such pipes. Injunction will issue to restrain scr-
vient owner from commission of any act which causes greater difficulty or ex-
pense in exercise of such rights, or which, if suffered, might materially affect
them. Goodhart v. H1yett, 240, and note.
5. Defendants, 30 years ago, changed course of natural stream that ran
through defendants' land andi drained complainants' lands, and substituted
therefore a sewer, presumably by consent of owner of complainants' lands.
They have obstructed sewer and recently built embankment near complainants'
line so as to back the water on complainants' said lands. Held, that court
would compel them to remove embankment, and either restore natural stream
to original course or to remove obstructions from sever and rebuild it, although
there is an allegation that if either be done water vill be discharged on lands
of other persons, and also that defendants are necuniarily unable to do either.
Oliver v. Cemetery Co., 546.
EJECTMENT. See PARTITION.
1. Until tax deed is recorded, grantee therein cannot maintain. Hewitt v.
Wed, 412.
2. Where source of title is identical, and parties have no other title to rely
on, neither party can go behind person from whom they hold, or show that his
claim is not good. Stafford v. Watson, 344.
3. Where complaint in ejectment alleges that defendant claims title by mesne
conveyance from plaintiff's grantor, and answer admits that defendant has no
source of title beyond common grantor, it will be presumed, in absence of
allegation and proof to contrary, that defendant's title is junior and subordinate
to plaintiff's. Id.
4. Color of title is that which in appearance is a title, but in reality is not.
It must be so far prima facre good in appearance as to be consistent with idea
of good faith. Bolden v. Sherman, 802.
5. Deed purporting to convey two lots of land in a sub-division by their
numbers, where plat and stakes showed precise location of lots sold, waq held
color of title to entire lots as shown hy plats and stakes, notwithstanding one
of lots as shown by other testimony, extended six feet over and upon adjoining
tract, and description in (Iced showing distances did include the six feet.
.Monuments always prevail over distances. Id.
ELECTION. See DxcEaENTS' ESTATES; PLEADIASG, 3; WILL, 17, 18.
1. Where question is fbr what orwhom ballot should be counted, inten
tion of voter should, if possible, be ascertained and control. JcKinnon v.
People, 748.
2. Where there is mistake or imperfection in ballots cast (Joseph Al. on bal-
lots, Henry Al. nominee), extraneous evidence is admissible in contest to show
intention. Id.
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3. Wher-e patent ambiguity is raised in respect to name of candidate upon
ballot, voter may if he so elects, testify what was intended. McKianon v.
People, 748.
EMINENT DOMAIN. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, IlL. ; DAMAGES, 7.
ENCUMBRANCE. See MORTGAGE.
EQUITY. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 17 ; COSTS; DEBTOR AND CREDITOR, 2;
-IUSBAND AND WIFE, 11, 13, 18; LEGACY, 2; MORTGAGE, 6, 7, 13;
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, 25; PAuTNERsI?, I; SPECIFIC PERFOR3tAxCE,
5; TRADEMARK, 1,; TRUST AND TRUSTEE, 6.
1. Takes no part in administration of criminal law. Pope v. Mayor, 679.
2. Will not protect by injunction claim to trademark or label where either
contains misrepresentation. Siegart v. Abbott, 481.
3. Decree in, must be on facts embraced within pleadings, beyond which
prayer for general relief will not authorize court to go. If necessary pleadings
should be amended. Newham v. Kerton, 679.
4. Requirement that debtor shall reduce his demand to judgment before he
can maintain bill to set aside debtor's conveyance as fraudulent, means judg-
ment in state where bill is filed. Crim v. Walker, 679.
5. Reversal of decree for error will not affect title of purchaser of real estate
before appeal in good faith, who pays part of consideration money and secures
balance by mortgage on premises, if court rendering decree had jurisdiction of
subject matter and parties. Hannas v. Hannas, 617.
6. Bill having been filed in state court to remove cloud upon title to real es-
tate,-one defendant-was served by publication in accordance with state statute and
decree rendered against him. Held, that such decree could not be supported.
Though courts of state might feel bound to give effect to the service, tile judg-
ment would be allowed no force in another state, or against citizen of another
state in United States Court held within state in which judgment was rendered.
Hart v. Sansom, 271.
7. A license agreed to he exclusive was not 6o written. On notice the grantor
at once offered to grant such exclusive license for the original consideration.
Grantee refused to accept a new agreement. Grantor sued for royalties, and
grantee filed bill in equity claiming mistake in agreement and praying to have
it cancelled, Hleld, that grantor was not in default and relief would not be
granted. Laver v. Dennett, 210.
8. Some of windows of plaintiff's house overlooked piece of land belonging
to railway company and used as goods-yard of station. When the house had
been built sixteen years, the company put up screen opposite plaintiff's win
dow to prevent his acquiring an easement of light and air. Held, that plaintiff
was not entitled to injunction. Bonner v. Railway Company, 69.
9. In order to su'tain creditor's bill, there must be judgment at law and
return of inlla bona to execution thereon, unless claim has some equitable ele-
ment, such as a trust or the like. Dornmeil v. Vard, 271.
10. After failure of defendant to satisfy decree, and when attachment has
been ineffectual, Court of Chancery has power to sequester chose in action
belonging to defendant. Hayes v. Hayes, 271.
11. Practice in such cases should be analogous to proceedings under attach-
ment law. Id.
12. Will not enjoin judgment at law merely on ground that process in the
judgment suit was not served on defendant : it must further be shown that if
relief be granted, a different result will be obtained from that adjudged by the
void judtment. Colson v. Leitch, 802.
13. Where courts of equity and of law have concurrent jurisdiction, and
former assumes it first, suitor will not be forced into court of law, unle's at be-
ginning of equity suit a court of law could have given as adequate and com-
plete relief as court of equity could do. Illegas v. Dexter, 802.
14. Will vacate forged paper or direct its surrender for destruction. De-
murrer, therefore, denying right to injunction restraining defendant frum
selling, &e., certain single bill, purporting to be single bill of complainant,
and alleged by him to be forgery, is too broad. Dennison v. Yost, 412.
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15. Where bill calls upon defendant to answer charges imputing to him
punishable offences, he may assert his privilege not to answer anything that may
criminate him, by demurrer. Dennison v. Yost, 412.
16. Where bill was filed in Georgia alleging purchase of land therein, pay-
ment of purchase-money, refusal by vendor to make title, and that vendor was
non-resident of state, and seeking to enforce the purchase and quiet title and
possession, rule that defendant in equity in that state must be sued in county
of his residence, is inapplicable ; the question of jurisdiction is whether any court
in the state has jurisdiction. Harris v. Palmore, 802.
17. In such a case Georgia court of equity has jurisdiction to settle the title
and quiet the possession. id.
18. Judgment creditor in absence of fraud, trust or other ground for equita-
ble relief, and when no statute gives equitable jurisdiction, cannot by proceed-
ings in equity subject chose in action of debtor to payment ofJudgment. Greene
v. Keene, 481.
19. Hence when judgment debtor owned letters patent and arranged with
third parties to do business under these letters and to pay profits to his wife,
there being no fraud on part of third parties, and payments to wife being re-
vocable at debtor's pleasure. Held, that bill filed by judgment creditor for
account of profits and application of them to judgment debt, there being no
statute authorizing intervention of equity, could not be sustained. Id.
20. Written agreement for advance by A. of $3000 to B. for purchase of
land to be improved by subdivision and building, title being taken by B., stipu-
lated for payment in addition to legal interest, of two-thirds of profits, the
money so advanced being at no substantial risk and parties by their acts treat-
ing it as a loan. Held, to be in fact an agreement for a loan, and not a part-
nership, and usurious. Plunkett v. Dillon, 271.
21. Such an agreement held also, to be hard and unconscionable, and, as
such, while it remains executory, not to be enforced in equity. Id.
22. On eve of sale under foreclosure proceedings on joint mortgage where
decree provided for pro rata application of proceeds to demands of H. and
F., H. expecting F. to become purchaser, and intending to defraud him,
moved house on premises and covered by mortgage, to land of his own. F.,
in ignorance of this, bought at sale, price bid being but small part of aggre-
gate amount of mortgage debts. H. was insolvent. Held, that because of
H.'s insolvency, F. might proceed in equity to recover value of house with
interest, and to subject H.'s land and house to payment thereof; and this
whether maker of mortgage notes was insolvent or not. Fox v. Hubbard, 679.
ERRORS AND APPEALS. See CERTIORARI; CRIMINAL LAw, 9 ; EQUITY,
5; EVIDENCE, 17: PROHIBITION.
1. Appeal will not lie from order requiring defendant to answer by certain
day. Dennison v. Want--, 412.
2. Order awarding peremptory writ of mandamus is a final judgment allow-
ing of writ of error to U. S. Supreme Court. Wloodworth v. Blair, 803.
3. Several judgment creditors whose claims aggregated over $5000, obtaired
levy of certain tax to satisfy their claims, and united in application for manda-
mus on collector to compel collection of the tax. .A'dd, that jurisdictional
limit must be measured by amount of tax, and not by any individual
claim. Id.4. Order requiring party refusing to appear before commissioner and answer
certain interrogatories and pay costs already accrued and costs of motion, is
appealable. Cleveland v. Burnam, 147.
5. Decree in favor of plaintiff for title and possession of land and improve-
ments, and ordering reference to ascertain necessity and value of repairs put
upon them by defendant, for which he claims compensation, is not final for
purposes of appeal. Fitzpatrick v. Phillips, 339.
6. To make judgment of state court reviewable in U. S. Supreme Court on
Federal question, it must unmistakably appear that court below either knew, or
ought to have known, that -such a question was involved in decision to be
made : suggestion of Federal question on petition for rehearing, insufficient.
Susquchanna Co. v. W. Branch Co., 344.
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7. Provision of sect. 1007, Rev. Stat. U. S., that where writ of error may be
supersedeas execution shall not issue until expiration of ten days, does not
apply to judgments in highest court of state, and a writ of error operates as
supersedeas only from time of lodging writ in office of clerk where record to be
re-examined remains. Informing judge about to fill vacancy caused by a
removal by state supreme court, of allowance of writ and approval of super-
seveas bond, will not prevent appointment being valid. Foster v. State, 803.
8. In action upon insurance policy exceptions showed that plaintiff conceded
certain facts on former trial from which it was evident he bad given false
answers in the application, and on a retrial plaintiff offered to prove that
answers, though false, were made without his knowledge by defendant's own
agent, 11 written in afterwards," and that the admissions were oral, made by his
.attorneys on the" former trial, and for that trial only. Court, treating exceptions
a part of record, ordered verdict for defendant. -Held, error, and that
plaintiff's evidence should have been submitted. IMullin v. Ins. Co, 547.
ESTOPPEL. See DEED, 6; ERRORS AND .Arr'EAL.L, 8; MUNICIPAL ConaORA-
TI6N, 37.
EVIDENCE. See AGENT, 10; BILLS AND NOTES, 8, 17, 18, 23; CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW, 21, 22 ; CONTRACT, 18, 21 ; CORPORATION, 4; COURTS, 3, 4;
COVENANT, 1; CRIMINAL LAW, 13-15,21, 25, 26; DAmAGES, 4,6; DEBTOR
,AND CREDITOR, 7; DEED, 4-7; ELECTION, 2, 3; EXPERT; FRAUDS, STAT-
UTE OF, 3; INSOLVENCY ; INSURANCE, 4, 13 ; MUNICIPAL CORPORATION,
33; NEGLIGENCE, 24; PARENT AND CHILD, 3; SHERIFFP, 1 ; SLANDER AND
LIBEL, 2,. 7 ; SURETY, 5 ; TELEGRAPH, 1 ; TROVEn,'3; WILL, 10, 18.
1. Court will take judicialnotice of incorporation of city under general act.
Potwi, v. Johnson, 210.
2. Witness cannot refresh his memory by copy, made some time afterward,
of miem. made at time. Lovell v. Wentworth, 210.
3.'Abstract of title but secondary evidence, and, therefore, its contents can-
not be proven in case of loss or destruction. Thatcher v. Olmstead, 618.
4. Non-expert may give his estimate of rate of speed at which railroad train
was moving, but such estimate should be received with great caution. Hoppe
v. Railroad, 803.
5. Judicial notice is not taken of journal of legislature. Burt v. Railroad
Co., 534.
6. When enrolled bill is signed by presiding officer of each house, and
approved by governor, if subject-matter is within constitutional power of legis-
lature, it is primafacie valid; if it assumes to create court, court is prima ]bcie
legal. Id. and note.
7. Where principal negligence charged against defendant is failure to read
instrument which he signed, practical test of his ability by handing him cer-
tain instruments to read befbre jury is proper. Ort v. Fowler, 570.
8. Question being whether certain services were rendered gratuitously,
evidence that third person had been paid, or that it was customary to pay for
similar services, is irrelevant. Kelly v. Houjqhton, 412.
9. Where party admits that services for which claim is made were rendered
and were worth sum claimed, but alleges they were rendered gratuitously,
burden of proof is upon him to show they were so rendered. Id.
10. Strangers to written instrument, when their rights are concerned, are at
liberty to show by parol that the contract is different from what it purports to
be. Washburn Co. v. Chicago Co., 413.
11. If promissory note and accompanying mortgage, executed at same time,
do not correspond as to interest, extrinsic evidence is admissible to show which
paper expresses real intention and agreement of parties. Payson v. Lawson,
70.
12. Non expert witness may testify whether within given time person has
failed mentally or physically, but only an expert (one having scientific train-
ing on subject, or physician) can be asked his opinion as to mental capacity of
person at certain time. Commonwealth v. Brayman, 679.
13. Creditor having judgment against A. levied on stock in corporation
claimed by B. under assignment from A., and summoned B. as garnishee. A.
INDEX. 833
EVIDENCE.
died. Held, that A.'s administrator and B. were competent witnesses on B.'s
behlalf in regard to transactions at time of assignment. Bank v. .Jacobs, 211.
14. If party against whom incompetent witness is called, with full knowl-
edge ol'incompetency, allows witness to be sworn and examined, without ob-
jection, lie will be considered to have waived objection to his incompetency.
clforfort v. Rowland, 547.
15. But, though party has lost his right to object, court may, on its own
motion, if it appears that evidence is opposed to policy of law and dangerous
to administration of justice, suppress it. Id.
16. Where brakeman was killed while attempting to couple cars, no one
being present, in action for damages by his personal representatives, evidence
of his prior habits as to care, prudence and sobriety, admissible ; but not evi-
deuce as to usual mode of coupling and uncoupling cars at same place by
others. .ailtway Co. v. Clark, 211.
17. Allowing witness to answer question only slightly leading, if at all, and
which does not prejudice party objecting, not sufficient to warrant reversal.
State v. Jones, 771.
18. Que.stion calling for conclusion of fact relevant to case, such conclusion
not being ultimate fact to be found by jury, not improper. Id.
19. Declarations to be admissible as res gestee need not he precisely concur-
rent in point of time with principal transaction : sufficient if near enough to
clearly appear to be so spontaneous and free from sinister motives, as to afford
reliable explanation of principal transaction. Id.
20. Questions asked upon cross-examination not tending to modify or explain
testimony in chief, but to elicit testimony which would have effect to discredit
testimony which witness had given in chief, not admissible. d.
21. Instructions must be based upon evidence and must not be mislead-
ing. Id.
22. When defence of insanity is interposed to indictment for murder, evidence
as to conduct, language and appearance of defendant at other times than during
time of alleged killing, is admissible. Id.
23. If evidence makes it merely probable to jury that defendant was insane
at time of killing, he should be acquitted. Id. and note.
EXECUTION. See ERRoRS AND APPEALS, 7 ; HoMESTEAD; MORTGAGE, 9.
1. Where one defendant is surety for others and creditor knows it, he cannot
voluntarily release property of principal debtors which has been seized in execu-
tion and then resort to property of surety. Hyde v. Rogers, 147.
2. Defendant gave receipt of certain property to plaintiff, which lie had
attached as sheriff on writ in favor of attorney, who subsequently brought
another suit on note owned by married woman, but in his own name for con-
venience only, giving writ to another officer, who without directions as to
attachment or knowledge of attorney, attached receipted property which was
afterwards sold to T., who sold it to company, in which attorney was interested,
he being ignorant of sale. Held, that defendants were liable on receipt. Rider
v. Sheldon, 748.
EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS. See CourORATON, 17; Evi-
DENCE, 13 ; WILL, 12, 13.
1. Executor who deposits money to his credit, in official capacity, in bank of
good standing, will not be liable for its loss by failure of bank. Cox v. Boone,
482.
2. Administration should be granted to person entitled at time of application,
not at time of death. Gr~fflth v. Coteman, 482.
3. Testatur cannot affect commissions which law allows his, executor; and
where there has been full administration, even court has no power to deprive
him of minimum amount. Hardy v. Collins, 70.
4. Where property is given to ezecutors in trust, to be equally divided
among testator's children, sons' shares to be paid in cash and those of daugh-
ters held in trust during their lives, executors have power to sell testator's
lands. Belcher v. Belcher, 547.
5. Executors charged with sale of lands to pay debts, purchasing such lands
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at sheriff's sale under execution arainst testator, will, at instance of cestuis que
trust, be decreed to hold same by continuing trust, or held to account for pro-
ceeds if same have been resold to bona fide purchasers. Marshall v. Carson,
481.
6. Where statute provides that no action shall be maintained against admin-
istrator on claim against intestate, without thirty days' previous demand; an
action cannot be maintained without such notice for defhult in payment of
interest on bond given by intestate but on which no default occurred in his
lifetime. Boothby v. Bootiby, 803.
EXEMPTION. See ASSIGNMENT, 3; ATTACHMENT, 2; DE.nTOR AND CRED-
ITOR, 7; HOMESTEAD; TAX AND TAXATIONv 5, 6; UNITED STATES.
EXPERT. See EVIDENCE, 4, 12.
One who has fbr considerable time been engaged in business necessitating
frequent comparison of handwritings is qualified, as an expert, to testify te
genuineness of disputed signature by comparison with others admitted to be
genuine. Ort v. Fowler, 570.
FENCE. See NEGLIGENCE, 13, 14; RAILROAD, 12.
License to build, upon division line, will not authorize worm or zigzag fence.
Morton v. Reynolds, 211.
FERRY.
With respect to goods placed within his control for transportation, ferryman
undertakes for safe carriage against all perils not arising from act of God or
public enemy. Where goods are retained by passenger within his own control,
duty of ferryman is to provide, and use with skill and care, such means and
appliances as are adapted to security of passenger and his property ; and con-
tributory negligence on part of passenger will prevent recovery. Dudley v.
Ferry Co., 147.
FIRE ESCAPE. See NEGLIGENCE, 31.
FLXTURE.
1. Buildings erected on land occupied under contract to purchase become
property of owner if purchase be not completed. Tyler v. Fickett, 70.
2. Tenant at will of lessee erected small building on land resting on stone
posts sunk into the ground. Building was erected with consent of lessor,
and with understanding between him and tenant at will that it could be
removed as trade fixture. Both tenancies expired at same time, and neither
tenant removed building ; lessor resumed possession of land, and soon after
former tenant at will hired it, with other land, at increased rent. Hld, that
tenant at will could not remove the building. McTzer v. Estabrook, 70.
FOREIGN CORPORATION. See CORPOR.ATION, 17; SPECIFIC PERFoRM-
ANCE, 5.
FORMER RECOVERY.
Judgment against agent for fraud committed while acting within scope of
his agency, on which no collection or payment has been made, no bar to action
against principal. That principal was wholly ignorant of fraud is immaterial.
M aple v. Railroad, 70.
FRAUD. See ACTION, 4; BI.LS AND NOTES, 17; CONTRACT, 7; DEBTOj AND
CREDITOR, 3-6; EQuIx'Ey, 22; SALE, 4 ; TAx AD TAXATION, 2.
1. The misrepresentations must be relied on, and must be known to be false
at the time by party making them, to be ground of action on the case for fraud
and deceit. loldon v. Ayer, 804.
2. Defendant, a quarryman, gave order on his employers to pay his monthly
wages to plaintiff, for his, defendant's monthly store bill, and to pay old debt.
Notice was given to employers of order. They refused to accept it, but paid
wages to plaintiff for several months, then notified him they would do so no
longer, and paid directly to defendant. Employers alone were responsible for
discontinunnee of paynient€ to ilaintiftl feld, that the receiving of his wages
by defendant, although then indelted to platiff, did int esnount to a tort.
The element of fraud was lackiing. MlcG.ire v. Kireland, 547.
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FRAUDS, STATUTE OF. See CONTRACT: 7.
1. Lease may be made to take effect ih future and estate begins with future
period, and not with contract. Whiting v. W/dert, 384.
2. Agreement by parol for future term, not exceeding one year, is valid,
and is not "an agreement not to be performed within a year," within thestat-
utc. Id. Contra, Wnite v. l'olland, 385, and note.
3. When written memorandum does not purport to be complete expression
of entire contract, matter omitted may be supplied by parol. Ellis v. Bray,
680.
4. Promise by third person to assume and pay debt in consideration of dis-
charge of original debtor, accompanied or followed by such absolute discharge,
is founded on sufficient consideration and need not be in writing. Wittesaore v.
Wentworth, 804.
5. Verbal agreement to construct section of road within year and twenty
days from date of contract was, made. Work could be completed within year,
and the twenty days was a precaution against contingencies. Held, not "Ihu
agreement that is not to be perfbrmed within the space of one year from the
making thereof." Jones v. Pouch, 413.
6. In pursuance of verbal agreement of owner of lot of _round, to convey
same when building should be erected thereon, and dedicated to religious wor-
ship and society incorporated, subscription was raised, and money expended in
erection of building. Hed, that such expenditure was tantamount to payment
of consideration, which, in connection with taking possession and making
improvements, took case out of statute. Vhitsitt v. Trustees, 618.
7. Surety on non-negotiable note conveyed his real and personal estate to
defendant in consideration of grantor's future support and payment of his
debts. Subsequently defendant niade verbal promise to plaintiff, who became
owner of note by inhieritance, that he would pay it if principal did not. Held,
that promise was not within statute, and that conveyance was sufficient con-
sideration. Bailey v. Bailey, 748.
GARNISHMENT. See ATTACEMENT.
GIFT.
1. Delivery not necessary where donee is already in possession. P:ovidence
Ins.for Savings v. Tql', 680.
2. Gift of'savings bank pass book is in effect gift of deposit. Id.
3. H. deposited sum of money in savings bank in name of E., " subject to
the order of H." A few days afterwards II. asked E. to come to his house,
showed him deposit-book, said lie was going to give it to him, and delivered
it temporarily into his possession. H. then said lie would keep book in his safe
and put it there. On same day, at E.'s request, H. signed and delivered to
E. paper certi -ing that money was for him. H. allowed interest to accumu-
late on deposit during his life, doing nothing to assert personal ownership.
E. gave seasonable notice to bank that lie should claim money; but hank paid
same to H.'s administrator. .eld, in action against bank that jury could
find complete gift to E. ; and that bank had sufficient notice thereof. Eastman
v. Savings Bank, 680.
4. B., plaintill's executor, deposited $800 in defendant savings bank in name
of C. but payable to himself. He took deposit book, which lie kept and con-
trolled. He withdrew little more than half, and in few molnths directed trew-
urer of bank to add to first entry, " Payable to L. Barlow," the words "during
his life and after his death to Marion Cushing." 13. made will before deposit
in which was provision : "1 he-eby confirm all gifts I have made or shall
make to any of my children." C. was grandchild. It did not appear that B.
did or said anything else in relation to deposit, or that indicated intention to
hold pass book in trust for C. Printed by-law in book provided that no
deposit could be withdrawn without production of same. Bank had no coin-
munication with C., and understood that B. was depositor and so treated him.
C. had no knowledge of transaction. Held, 1. There was no delivery, no
acceptance, and therefbre deposit could not be sustained as gift inter vivos; 2.
Bank did not hold money as trustee for C. ; 3. There was no trust relation
between donor and claimnant. Pope v. Savings Bank, 618.
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GUARDIAN AND WARD.
1. That ward comes of age pending suit by guardian on instrument payable
to "A., guardian of B.," affords no ground to abate it. Gard v. NeT, 211.
2. Since Georgia "married woman's act" of 1866 she can be guardian. If
woman, who was guardian of her children by first marriage, remarried and
suffered her last husband to use, or, in conjunction with hiim, used land of such
children, and consumed rents, whether her letters of guardianship abated upon
her marriage or not, she is liable to them for such rents. Bood v. Perry,
680.
HABEAS CORPUS. See CRIMINAL LAW, 23.
HIGHWAY. See MUNICIPAL CoRponATIoN, 7, 24, 32 ; STsizT.
1. Town may, by long acquiescence in use of side track as part of travelled
highway, become bound to keep same in repair, although it has provided
another sufficient track. Cartwright v. Belmont. 147.
2. To relieve itself from such liability it must place obstructions in side track,
or in some other way notify travellers not to use it. ld.
3. Special act appointing three commissioners to locate road, required them,
or majority of them, to meet at place named before time named, and, after being
duly sworn before some justice of the peace' faithfully to review, mark and
'locate road, to -proceed with their duties. Held, that in order to show legal
road, it was necessary to prove they took the oath before proceeding. Crossett
v.. Owens, 749.
4. In such case recital in commissioner's report that they were duly sworn,
without stating they were sworn to perform duties imposed by act or to perform
any duty whatever, is insufficient. Id.
HOMESTEAD. See DunEss, 2.
1. Tenant in common entitled to, exempt from execution, and on his death
right descends to widow and heirs. Wlrard v. .4May/field, 345.
2. Land entered under United States homestead law, where party entering
same dies within five years and before patent issues, will not pass under his
will. Chapman v. Price, 749.
3. Where sold for purpose of removal of family to another state and making
reinvestment there, revertionary interest is subject to levy and sale. City v.
Bryant, 805.
4. In case of sale of Georgia homestead for reinvestment, intention of law is
that such reinvestment shall be within the state; and while purchaser may be
subrogated to rights of head of family, yet a sale and removal from the state
terminates any immunity from levy, at least as to reversion. Id.
5. Senble, that upon removal of debtor from state his homestead terminated,
and levy and sale of reversion would carry, entire title. Id.
6. Under Illinois statute to create homestead three things must concur:
1st. Person must be householder. 2d. He or she must have a family.. 3d.
Property must be occupied as a residence. Rock v. Haas, 804.
7. Person owning dwelling house capable of being occupied as such is house-
holder. Id.
8. Under the act a family is a collection of persons living together. Id.
9. To create homestead by reason of being husband and wife, relation must
be legal aid not pretended. Marriage by man and woman previously living.
together upon her premis6s after judgment against her becomes a lien upon
same, is insufficient. Id.
10. Bonafide intention to acquire certain land for homestead, evidenced by
overt acts in fitting it for such purpose and followed within reasonable time
by occepancy, renders such land exempt from time of its purchase with such
intent ; and such exemption covers also the material actually upon the ground,
and designed for use in construction of dwelhng house, well or other essential
of homestead. Scofield v. Hopkins, 804.
11. Where the judgment creditors are purchasers at execution sale of land,
they are presumed to know what debtor has done and is doing on land, indi-
cating intention to make it his homestead, and if such intention is manifest, no
notice of claim of premises as homestead is necessary to prevent waiver of
exemption. Id.
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HUSBAND AND WIFE. See BILLS AND NOTES, 29, 30; DURESS, 1, 2;
GUARDIAN AND VARD, 2 ; HOMESTEAD, 9; PARENT AND CHILD, 4, 5;
WITNESS.
I. Marriage and Divorce.
1. At common law, persons of suitable age might, by words of present con-
sent, contract a valid marriage without a minister or any particular form.
Jfathewson v. Iron Foundry, 401.
2. Statute of state may take away this right, but where it is merely directory
and does not expressly forbid other marriages, a common-law marriage is valid
and entitles wife to dower. Id.
3. Although early statutes abrogated common-law marriages, yet on their
repeal and passage of statute directory merely, common law is revived. Id.
4. After valid common-law marriage, neither fact that previous relations of
parties had been unlawful, nor after denial of marriage by either party would
destroy effect of contract. Id.
5. Where claim or defence depends upon question whether person was of
sound or unsound mind at time of marriage and afterwards, not necessary that
there should have been decree of nullification or divorce in lifetime of such per-
son. Question may be made and decided in proceeding to obtain year's support
by widoly. Bell v. Bennett, 681.
6. Husband believing wife dead married again, and subsequently discovered
that wife wa.s alive and had cormmitted adultery. Held, that he was entitled to
dissolution of his marriage. Freegard v. Freegard, 69.
7. Mere rudeness of language, petulance of manner, austerity of temper or
eves oeasional sallies of passiojn, if they do not threaten bodily harm, do not
constitute legal cruelty. Gleason v. Gleason, 640, and note.
8. Mass. court has jurisdiction of libel for divorce by non-resident husband,
for adultery occurring in that state, where both parties then resided and wife
has since remained. Watkins v. Watkins, 212.
If. Separate Estate.
9. Married woman having separate estate, who executes promissory note as
surety for husband, will be presumed to intend thereby to charge her separate
estate: such presumption can only be overcome by proof of facts surrounding
execution and delivery of note showing that such was not her intention. Her-
shiser v. Florence, 315, and note.
10. Real estate purchased by married woman with her individual meatns,
becoming her general property, was, by subsequent statute, changed into her
separate estate, subject to vested rights. Such property was not thereby sub-
jected to her debts previously made, and husband's freehold was not divested.
Id.
11. If married womqn lends money out of her separate estate to partnership
of which husband is member, and on dissolution of which partners agree that
partner other than husband shall take assets and pay liabilities and indemnify
his partner against them, but no promise is made by other partner to pay debt
to wife, no trust is impressed upon money so lent bf her; and she cannot main-
tain bill in equity against the two partners for payment of same. Fowle v.
Torre.y, 212.
12. If allowable at all for married woman in Missouri to make parol gift of
separate personal property to husband, since Married Woman's Property Act
of 1874, at least most cogent proof should be exacted. Rieper v. Vehrnmnn,
681.
13. Married woman whose separate personal property had, without her con-
sent, been delivered by her bailee to husband, and by him converted to his own
use. brought action to subject to payment of this indebtedness stock of goods in
hands of husband, and praying for appointment of receiver. Goods were not
identical property converted, but were purchased in part with proceeds of that
property. Held, that equitable principle which prevents following of trust fund
after it has changed its form and become undistinguisbable from rest of trustee's
property, did not apply; and that married woman had no lien, but was entitled
to share pro rata with other creditors, but that her equity was superior to
bailee, also general creditor, and she was entitled to full satisfaction before he
received anything. Id.
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Ill. Contracts, Conveyances, 4-c.
14. Certificate of wife's separate acknowledgment must stand, as to facts
state(] therein, as against mere conflict of evidence. Young v. Duval, 148.
15. Rule that under gift by will to husband and wife and third person, hus-
band and with took only one moiety between them, does not apply in England
to will that has come into operation since Married Women's Property Act of
1882. in re .arch, 70.
16. In action by husband and wife against railroad company to recover dam-
age for personal injuries sustained by wife, it is error to include in claim fbr
damages money expended to effect wife's cure, right of action for same being,
in husband alone. Railway Co. v. Mills, 548.
17. Married woman may, without her husband, execute any kind of power,-
whether simply collateral, appendant, or in gross ; and whether given to her
while sole or married. Armstrong v. Kerns, 548.
18. Husband may settle portion of his property upon his wife, if he does not
thereby impair claims of existing creditors, and settlement is not intended as
cover to future schemes of fraud. His direct conveyance to her, when clearly
intended as such settlement, will be sustained in equity against creditors.
Moore v. Page, 413.
19. PossEssIoN By HUSBAND AND WIFE, 625.
INCUMBRANCE. See MORTGAGE.
INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR. See CONTRACT, 8, 9.
INFANT. See DECEDENTS' ESTATES, 2; LiiiTATiols, STATUTE Os', 6 ; Nag-
LIGENCE, 5 ; RAILROAD, 13.
1. Ratification of contract of, after full age, not afected by ignorance that
he was not legally liable. Anderson v. Loward, 71.
2. Purchasing goods on credit and not returning them, liable for so much of
.price as is equal to benefit derived by him from purchase. Amount of benefit
question of mixed law and fact. hall v. Bntterfield, 261. See also Bartlett
v. Bailey, 272.
3. Making conveyance of real estate must disaffirm it within reasonable time
after coming of age. Reasonableness of time, when there is nothing to excuse
it, for the court. Three and a half yeari, unreasonable. Goodaow v. Lumber
Co., 329, and note.
4. ALLOWANCE FOR MAINTENANCE AND EDUCATION, 489.
INJUNCTION. See CONTRACT, 3; COPYRNGHT, I ; EASEMENT, 4 ; EQUITY, 2,
8, 12, 14; MORTGAOE, 13; MUNICIPAL CORPOUATiON, 4, 37 ; SPECIFIC
PERFORMANCE, 5; TAX AND TAXATION, 2"; TRADEMARK, I.
i. Mandatory injunction will not be granted on preliminary application.
Hall v. Railroad Co., 126.
2. Difference between mandatory and prohibitory injunction. Id.
3. Collection of taxes under internal revenue laws, by officers claiming same
to have been properly assessed, will not be enjoined. Snyder v. Marks, 7 1.
4. Interruption of business of city horse railway for three or four days by
moving large house along street lengthwise with track, not ground for. Rail-
way Co. v. Anderson, 212.
5. On dissolution of injunction granted on condition that bond of specified
amount be filed, and bond was filed, with no other order as to payment of
damages, defendant can recover no greater amount than penalty of bond. Se-
lectinmo v. McGafey, 618.
6. Alay be granted to restrain oral slanderous statements concerning
another's business, without showing actual loss. Loog v. Bean, 701, and
note.
7. B. was employed to manage one of L.'s branch offices for sale of ma-
chines, and resided on premises. He was dismissed, and gave postmaster di-
rections to forward to his private residence all letters addressed to him at L.'s
branch office. He admitted that among letters so forwarded were two relating
to L.'s business, and that lie returned them to senders. After dismissal he
went about among the customers making oral statements reflecting on L.'s solo
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vency, and advised some not to pay L. for machines supplied through himself.
L. brought action to restrain B. from making such statements, and from slan-
dering L. or injuring his reputation or business, and from giving such notice to
post office, and also asking that he be ordered to withdraw notice already
given. ield, that injunction (mandatory as to withdrawal) ought to be
granted, but that plaintiff should be put under undertaking only to open such
letters at specified times with liberty to defendant to be present. Looy v. Bean,
701.
INNKEEPER. See ACTION, 6 ; SLEEPING CAR CoMPANY,
1. Is by common law responsible for loss in his inn of goods of guest, except
when loss arises from negligence of guest or act of God or of public enemy.
Olson v. Crossman, 114, and note.
2. Guest is not to be charged with negligence merely because theft was com-
mitted by another guest whom he did not bring there, even though with his
consent they are placed to sleep in same room. Id.
3. Notice to guest to deposit valuables with landlord, where not such as stat-,
ute prescribes, is of no avail unless guest consents to it. Id.
INSANITY. See CRIMINAL LAW, 10, 11, 14, 19; EVIDENCE, 12, 22, 23;
HUSBAND AbM WIFE, 5 ; INsURANCE, 4; NEGLIGENCE, 24, 25.
INSOLVENCY. See CONFLICT OF LAWS, 3; EQUITY, 22 ; SALE, 2.
1. If facts are known to creditor which give him reasonable cause to believe
debtor insolvent, and be also knows that debtor knows same thcts, he has rea-
sonahle cause to believe that debtor believes himself to be insolvent, and the
payment of debt by him is made in fraud of insolvency laws. Cozzens v. Holt,
681.
2. If debtor is insolvent before making payment of debt, and there is no evi-
dence of subsequent change, jury will be warranted in finding him insolvent at
time of payment. rd.
INSURANCE. See CoMMoN CARRIER, 2, 14.
I. Generall.
1. Person induced by false and fraudulent representations of agent to take
policy and to pay premium thereon, may rescind contract and sue agent for
amount of the premium. Heddin v. Griffin, 682.
, 2. RAILWAY INSURANCE, 553.
II. Life and Accident.
3. Deceased must have understood moral character of act he was about to
commit to make self-killing death " by suicide" or "by his own. hand." Ins.
Co. v. Broughton, 71.
4. Opinion of person not an expert, in connection with statement of facts
and circumstances within his personal knowledge upon which that opinion is
based, admissible on question of insanity. Ins. Co. v. Lathrop, 482.
5. Plaintiff, while travelling by railway, fell asleep from weariness and
motion of cars, and when it was quite dark, not knrwing what he was doing,
involuntarily walked to platform of car and fell. Held, that injuries were not
"self-inflicted" or the result of "design" or " voluntary exposure to unneces-
sary danger" within conditions of accident policy. &cheiderer v. In3. Co., 148.
6. Person whose life was insured, on demand refused to pay second annual
premium and died in about ten days after default. Two days after death, subor-
dinate agent of the company, and friend of assured, being ignorant of his deat,,
paid premium. On learning of death friend returned receipt and company the
money. Held, that party to whom policy was payable acquired no rights.
Miller v. Ins. Co., 619.
7. By-laws of unincorporated mutual association provided that in case member
had, for failure to pay assessment promptly, been dropped by secretary, hoard
of directors should have power to reinstate him on his presenting reasonable
excuse and paying arrears. Such a member the board refused to reinstate
because they alleged his health was then precarious. He died very soon after-
wards. Held, that court might, after death, determine adequacy of reason
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offered, and in proper case, compel association to pay amount to. which such
delinquent's widow was entitled. Van Houten v. Pine, 549.
MI. HTre.
8. Existence of prior insurance in same company at time of making contract
of insurance, by agent of insured with agent of company, which was not known
to either party, will not avoid the contract. Iron Co. v. ins. Co., 71.
9. If, at the time of making verbal application for insurance, applicant pro-
duces list of existing insurances, and states his honest belief that it is correct,
and insurance company, with means to verify statement, fails to do so, and list
proves incorrect, this will not avoid policy subsequently issued, containing
express warranty that all the facts and circumstances have been truly stated in
application, and a condition that "if any material fact or circumstance shall
not have been fairly represented" the policy shall be void. Id.
10. If previous to expiration of policy, company's agent agrees orally to
renew same, and minds of parties meet as to terms, company is bound, and
can avoid liability only by tendering renewal receipt and demanding premium,
and failure of insured to pay, same, or by notice that it refuses to carry risk.
King v. Ins. Co., 148.
11. Denial of all liability waives proof of loss required by policy. Id.
12. Clause in policy that any person other than assured procuring the insur-
ance, "shall be deemed to be the agent of the assured named in this policy,
and not of this company under any circumstances whatever, or in any trans-
actions relating to the insurance," imports nothing more than that person pro-
curing insurance is to be deemed agent of insured in matters immediately
connected with procurement of policy; and subsequent notice to him of its
termination by company was not notice to insured. Grace v. Ins. Co., 149.
' 13. Parol evidence of custom to give such, notice to such agents, inadmissi-
ble. Id.
14. Steamboat on which were goods insured against "immediate loss by fire,"
collided, and a fire caused thereby prevented the goods being saved. Vessel
sank before goods were touched by the fire. Parties agreed that in case of
plaintiff's, recovery amount should be a sum stated, unless it should Appear on
proper evidence that amount should be charged. Judge excluded evidence of
-o expert, offered by defendant, that the goods in that situation, in sinking boat,
were of no value ; and instructed jury that if this was loss by fire within policy,
. they should find as damages sum agreed upon. Hdd, that defendant had bo
• ground of exception. Dis. E .Co. v. Ins. Co. 272.
- 15. Sale by one partner to his copartner, and mortgaie back of seller's share
of partnership property, upon which there is insurance policy, issued to part-
nership, not a breach-of condition in policy against sale without written consent
of insurer: and held, further, in action on policy in which both partners joined,
thqt it could not be said, as matter of law, after a finding for plaintiffs, that
there was breach of condition that policy should be void,' if, without written
assent of insurer, "the situation or circumstances affecting the risk shall, by or
with tl e advice, agency or consent of the insured, be so altered as to cause an.
increase of such risk." Powers v. Ins. Co., 548.
INTEREST. See MIMs AND NoTFs,4; DAMAGES, 3 ; EvIDEN CE, I1; LEGACY,
1 ; LIMrrATIONS, STATUTE OF, 3 ; PATENT, 5; USURY.
.INTERNATIONAL LAW. See EQUITY, 8.
1. Act of Parliament of Canada enacted that scheme of arrangement of
affairs of railroad company, which had received assent of majority of bond-
holders, should be deemed to be assented to by all the bondholders. Reid,
that act was binding on citizens of United States who were bondholders at
time of enactment. Railroad Co. v. Gebbard, 55.
2. Every person who deals with foreign corporation impliedly subjects him-
self to such laws of foreign government, passed or to be passed, affecting
powers and obligations of corporation, as known and established policy of
that government authorizes. Id.
INTOXICATING LIQUORS. See CRIMINAL LAw, 6; MUNICIPAL CO)HOstA-
TION, 15.
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INTOXICATION. See CRIMINAL LAW, 19, 20, 27.
JUDGMENT. See ATTORNEY, 4 ; EQUITY, 12 ; JUDICIAL SALE, 2 ; MAOfT-
GAGE, 14 ; PRACTICE, 2.
1. Entered by clerk as by default on complaint imperfecly verified and not
stating cause of action, irregular not void. Anderson V. Anderson, 682.
2. Motion to set aside judgment for mere irregularity must be made at same
term, or if judgment is entered in vacation, at next term at which motion can
be heard. Id.
3. In order for Rune pro tnnec entry of judgment to bind person not a party,
it must appear that he had notice of judgment really rendered at time his
rights were acquired or liability fixed, or that he had notice of application and
opportunity to appeal. Koch v. Railroad Co., 149.
JUDICIAL PROCEDURE. See CERTIORARI, 1.
JUDICIAL SALE. See HOMESTEAD, 1 I; TRUST AND TRUSTEE, 3, 4. -
1. Purchaser of land sold under decree erroneous, hut not void, protected,
though decree afterwards set aside. Moore v. Woodail, 273.
2. Purchaser at, runs no risk in respect to correctness of legal principles
on which judgment, under which he purchases, is founded ; reversal of such
judgment subsequent to passage of .his title will not affect it. He cannot
impeach decree under wh;ch he purchased, on application to be discharged
from his contract. Shultz v. Sanders, 549.
JURISDICTION. See EQUITY, 13, 16, 17; HusnuD AND WIFE, 8.
JUROR AND JURY. See CRIMINAL LAW, 4, 8.
1. In trial of appeal from determination of commissioners as to value of real
estate appropriated by railroad company, it is misconduct for two of jurors,
without direction or consent of court, after evidence has been submitted and
before argument, to go together and examine real estate in controversy. Ort-
man v. Railway, 749.
2. Where jury is polled in murder case, each juror should say whether
he finds the prisoner guilty of murder in the first or second degree ; where
response is simply "guilty," that clerk, immediately after, called upon them
to hearken to the verdict as the court has recorded it-" your foreman saith
that J. W., the prisoner at the bar, is guilty of murder in the first degree, and
so say you all," does not save verdict. Williams v. State, 71.
3. After verdict, it is too late to object to age of juror, though not known
before. Johns v. Hodges, 72.
4. Judge may in his discretion exclude from panel juror not legally qualified;
exceptions do not lie to act. Ile may put legal juror off, but cannot allow
illegal juror to go on. Snow v. It-eeks, 72.
JUSTICE OF THE PEACE. See PRACTICE, 1.
LACHES. See MORTGAGE, 12; SPECIFIc PERFORMANCE. 2.
LANDLORD AND TENANT. See FIXTURE, 2; FRAUDS, STATUTE OF, 1,
2; PARTNERSHIP, 14; VENDOR AND VENDEE, 1.
1. Where person occupies house us servant of another, it must appear that
occupancy is for master's benefit and as accessory or aid to performance of
servant's duties. Snedaker v. Powell, 750.
2. Where B. employs P. to labor for him on farm for eight months from
March 6, 1883, at $50 per month and agrees to furnish him a house from that
date to March 1, 1884, free of charge, and subsequently permits P. to transfer
his interest and sublet house to S., P. is not Servant after eight months have
expired, and his occupancy of house thereafter is that of tenant, and S. holds
under P. and not under B. Id.
LARCENY. See CRIMINAL LAW. V.
LEASE. See COVENANT, 2 ; LANDLORD AND TENANT; REAL ESTATE.
LEGACY. See DECEDENTS' ESTATES, I, 2 ; DOWER; WILL, 9.
1. When given to one not testator's child, nor to whom be stood in loco
VOL. XXXII.-106
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parents, payable "at the age of twenty-one years," legatee only entitled to
interest from time legacy is payable. Weatherly v. Kier, 549.
2. If one of several executors, who are also the residuary devisees, is
devisee of parcel of land on condition of paying a certain legacy, the giving of
a bond by all the executors, conditioned to pay debts and legacies, will not vest
in him an absolute title, which he can convey to bonafide purchaser free of lien
of legacy ; and such purchasers cannot maintain bill to compel legatee to seek
payment from residuary estate, or from sureties on the bonds before proceeding
against the land. Trustees, 4-c., v. Snith, 72.
LIBEL. See SLANDER AND LIBEL.
LICENSE. See CONTRACT, 11 ; MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, 41-43: PATENT, 3.
LIEN. See ATTORNEY, 2; CONTRACT, 6; HUSBAND AND WIFE, 13; ME-
cirAics' LIEN; MORTGAGE, 9, 14, 17.
LIFE TENANT.
New shares of capital stock in corporation, representing its surplus property
and distributed to its stockholders, not income. Petition of Brown, 482.
LIMITATIONS, STATUTE OF. See MORTGAoE, 2; SURETY, 9.
1. Part payment of note and indorsement of it OR Sunday not sufficient to
toll statute. Witcher v. McConnell, §73.
2. Payment upon note owned by two persons of amount owned by one will
not renew note in favor of other. Id.
3. Payment of interest on note of firm by cd-partner, after dissolution, tolls
running of statute. Casebolt v. Ackerman, 750.
4. Period of coverture cannot be added to that of minority of sane person
ib order to prevent running of statute. Farish v. Cook, 482.
5. Municipal corporations bound by. City v. McKibbi, 345.
.6. When statute is pleaded and adverse possession for statutory period is
shown in action of ejectment brought by one who has.recently attained to major-
ity, burden is on him to prove that action was commenced within three years
-from majority. Yell v. Lane, 345.
7. Payment on account of scheduled note out of debtor's assets by his
" ssignee for benefit of creditors avoids bar of statute under sect. 24 Kansas
code; and this notwithstanding proceedings under such assignments are con-
trolled by genera]f statute. Letson v. Kenyon, 345.
8. If debtor, residing out of state when cause of action accrues, comes to
reside in state, not necessary that creditor have knowledge of this fact in order
to set statute in operation; enough if he can acquire such knowledge by reason-
able diligence. Davis v. Field, 750.
9. Due bill, headed by place and date, and continuing "Due J. C. Douglass
five hundred dollars in brickwork at ten ($10) per thousand measured in the
usual way," is payable at once without demand, and statute runs from its
execution. Douglass v. Sargent, 750.
10. Amendment by substituting another person as plaintiff, made after the
period limited by statute in a suit commenced within that period, will not allow
statute to be pleaded : but the introduction of new cause oT action would.
Thomas v. Ins. Co., 212.
11. At death of trustee who had given no bond as such, if identity of trust
property is lost, cestui que trust stands in position of general creditor of estate ;
or if trust is not terminated estate becomes at once liable to new trustee who
may be appointed, and statute applies, though new trustee is not appointed.
Fowler *. True, 805.
12. Debtor in bankruptcy wrote to creditor: "I shall pay you all I owe
'yom with interest, but at this time I cannot. As soon as I can, I shall pay you.
When I can, I shall pay up all my debts, and yours shall be the second that I
pay. To pay you now, I cannot spare a dollar from my business, but if you
will wait, I think I can pay you some time." Held, to amount only to condi-
tional promise to pay when able; and in absence of evidence of ability, under
Mass. Pub. Sts. c. 78, 3, not to deprive debtor of relying upon discharge in
bankruptcy, in bar of recovery of judgment upon debt. Riwell v. Cuianer,
549.
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13. Debtor in bankruptcy wrote to creditor: "My lawyer says I must not
pay anyone a dollar until I get through bankruptcy, then I can pay if I want
to do so. I sliall pay you all and the interest, but you will have to give mc
time. This is all I can say now." Hdd, not such evidence of new or contin-
uing contract, within Mas . Pub. Sts. c. 78, 3, as would deprive debtor of
relying upon discharge in bankruptcy. Elwell v. C£umer, 549.
14. Defendant without leave took plaintiff's iron ; in following year he prom-
ised to pay for it. Held, that statute commenced to run at time of promise,
Farnham v. Thomas, 550.
LIVE STOCK CARRIERS. See ConxoN CARRIER, 21.
LUNATIC. See INSANITY.
MALICIOUS PROSECUTION.
1. Express malice insufficient, if defendant with good reason believed that
plaintiff committed offence. Murphy v. Matin, 149.
2. There must first be final determination of the criminal action, as by entry
of nolle prosequi for any reason other than some irregularity or informality in
information itself. Woodworth v. Mills, 682. i
3. If defendant instigated the criminal action without probable cause, thal
person who, at his instigation, made criminal complaint had probable cause to
believe it true, no defence. Id.
4. In action against several defendants for conspiring together to procure
plaintiff to be indicted and convicted by perjured testimony, and for causing him
to be so indicted and convicted, gist of action is alleged tort and not alleged
conspiracy. Garing v. Fraser, 805.
5. At common law action does not lie against witness for-perjury. fd.
6. Simple nol pros. is not such a determination of indictment as will entitle
accused to maintain this action. Id.
MANDAMUS. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAw, 20; CORIORATION, 4 ; CouaT, 2;
ERRORS AND APPEALS, 2; MUNICIPAL CORon ATION, 12, 17.
1. Where statute clothes county board with ultimate discretion as to perform-
ance of certain act, or is merely directory and not mandatoty, mandamus will
not lie to compel performance. Supervisors v. People, 806.
2. Performance of ministerial duty by public officer may be compelled by,
in absence of other relief ; but where such officer in determining upon perform-
ance of public duty, is called upon to use official judgment and discretion, his
exercise of them, in absence of fraud, bad faith and abuse of discretion, wiU
not be controlled or directed by mandamus. State v. Moore, 346.
MARRIAGE. See HUSDAND 'AND WIFE, I.
MASTER AND SERVANT. See CONIFLICT OF LAWS, 4; LANDLORD AND
TENANT, 1, 2; MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, 39; NEGLIGENCE, 6, 11, 12;
RAILROAD, 5, 6 ; TRovzR, 5.
1. Railway station agent havinggeneral charge of tracks in and about station
is fellow servant of locomotive engineer. Brown v. Ruailwajl Co., 335.
2. 'Where step of railroad engine is slightly defective, and conductor has full
knowledge of its conditon and continues to use it, he cannot recover for injuries
resulting therefrom. Jackson v. Railroad, 346.
3. Reversal of engine in switching and in making up trains, not negligence
per so, and negligence is never presumed without proof. Id. •
4. When it exists a master's duty to give notice to servant of risks of
employment, is absolute, and is not performed by delegating it to competent
third person who fails to give the information. Wheeler v. Wason Afg. Co.,
273.
5. Master is liable for act of his servant when done within scope or general
course of his employment, although done contrary to master's orders. Heen-
rick v. Pullman, 459, and note.
6. Statute making railroad "liable to any person injured for all damages
sustained" by reason of neglect to ring bell in certain manner, does not make
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it liable for injury caused by negligence of fireman, in this respect, to fellow-
servant. Randall v. Railroad Co., 212.
7. Corporation owning lighter is ,bound to use reasonable care in maintain-
ing in suitable condition the appliances for hoisting. &c. ; but if it furnishes such
appliances, and employs competent servant to see that they are kept in proper
condition, it is not, liable for injury to another servant in consequence of
neglect of first servant in not renewing what he knew to be defective through
wear: whether the fellow-servant acted as such, merely, or as representative of
master, is question of law. Johnson v. Towboat Co., 273.
8. Any negligence on part of other employees of railroad in connection with
their business, from which serious injury results, constitutes criminal negli-
gence, and contract oti part of employee waiving right of suit therebr is con-
trary to public policy and void. Cook v. Railroad, 149.
9. In action against railroad company to recover for death of locomotive
engineer killed through negligence of train dispatcher, plaintiff must show that
they are not fellow-servants. Blessingv. Railway Co., 150.
10. Repairman on railroad, while proceeding down track on band car on
very foggy morning, to surface up track, was run into by extra train coming in
opposite direction, at rapid speed and without previous warning, and was per-
manently injured. It was company's practice, of which W. had knowledge, to
run extra trains without previous notice. Held, that he could not recover.
Railroad Co. v. Wadder, 72.
1 1. Where railroad employee, rightfully engaged in repair of freight car be-
longing th employer, calls upon his son, minor under eleven, to render him
necessary temporary assistance in work, son is not trespasser; and if he while
so assisting, without any negligence on his part or his father's, is injured
through negligence of agents and servants of another railroad, in backing cars
upon side track while car is being repaired, latter company is liable for damages
for injury. Railroad Co. v. Gallagher, 593, and note.
12. The apparatus for raising certain frame-work consisted of windlass,
tackle, blocks, ropes, &c., all of which had been placed in position and adjusted
under direction of foreman. Frame-work fell by reason of giving way of anchor
post, which had not been set in ground to sufficient depth, and injured work-
man. Held, that whole apparatus for hoisting could not be considered as single
machine which defendant was bound to furnish adjusted and in position, but
placing and adjustment of detached appliances were part of work to be done.
The injury was therefore caused by negligence of foreman in management of
appliances. Peschd v. Railroad, 806.
t3. Such foreman had no geueral authority to employ or discharge men, but
was subordinate to master carpenter. Held, that foreman was fellow servant
of, plaintiff. Id.
14. Fact that brakeman in employ of railroad knew, or might have ascer-
tained, that draw-bars of I-nmotive engine and of car, to which it was to be
coupled by him while standing upon plank in front of engine, were of unequal
height, so that they would be likely to pass instead of coupling, though fur,
nishing strong evidence of carelessness, will not., as matter of law, preclude him
from maintaining action for injuries vcasioned by reason of draw-bars so
passing each other, that of engine being too low for purpose for which it was
used. Lamlels v. Railroad Co., 550. %
15. Railroad companynot responsible for negligent acts of postal clerks upon
its trains. Master v. Railroad, 806.
16. Evidence showed that small mail-bag was thrown either from the mail-
car, express-car or baggage-car. Bag could not lawfully have been in any
other than mail-car, and no person other than postal clerk could lawfully enter
such car or throw bag therefrom. Reld, that in absence of evidence to con-
trary, it will be presumed that bag was thrown from mail-car by postal clerk.
Id.
17. Bag was usually thrown from tmain about 200 feet west of depot, and
there was no evidence that it had ever been thrown off at depot prior to occa-
sion in question. Held, that company was not chargeable with notice that it
was likely to be thrown off at depot, and hence was not bound to guard, by
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notice or otherwise, against injury to employee resulting from its being thrown
off there. Master v. Railroad, 806,
18. Defendant contracted to tear down wall built of two courses of brick,
the inner of which supported chimney down to second floor. There was evi-
dence tending to show that on day of accident defendant's foreman discovered
crack between the courses of brick where chimney was; that he notified de-
fendant who was present in direction and control of work ; that foreman
called plaintiff to aid in putting up braces to prevent wall from falling, and
while they were at work well and chimney fell and plaintiff was injured. Held,
sufficient evidence of negligence to carry case to jury. Ryan v. Tarbox, 274.
19. Where number of servants are working together and one has power to
control and direct actions of others, master is only liable for negligent act of
one in charge whereby another servant is injured, when the negligent act arises
out of and is direct result of authority conferred by master. Railroad Co. v.
May, 274.
MECHANICS' LIEN.
I. A. made verbal contract to purchase lot of 1B., took possession, erected
building, and failed to pay for labor and materials. One lien creditor attached
building as personalty and another as realty. Held, that building was part
of B.'s real estate, and that, as against him, neither attachment was valid.
Dustin Y. Crosby, 73.
2. A. by special contract engaged to build house for B., and afterwards
assigned contract to 0. At time of assignment, A. had taken no steps to
secure mechanics' lien. B. consented that C. should finish house under con-
tract. Held, that this was a consent to transfer of contract. Held, further
that C. was entitled to perfbct and enforce mechanics' lien ; using name of
assignors, it not appearing that C. entered into any contract with B., or that
A. was ever released by B. McDonald T. Kelly, 619.
MINES AND MINING.
Deed giving right to mine, excavale and remove coal, carries with it right to
go upon land and dig for coal or sink coal shaft. Eicing v. Coal Co., 750.
MINOR. See INFANT; GUARDIAN AND WARD; PARENT AND CHILD.
MISREPRESENTATION. See FRAUD, 1.
MISTAKE. See EQUITY, 7.
MORTGAGE. See BILLS AND NOTEs, 31 ; DEED, 3: DURESS, 1, 2; FQUITT,
22; SUBROGATION; TRUST AND TRUSTEE, 2; WILL, 4.
I. Generally.
1. Mortgages executed on same day have equal lien, except where contrary
intention appears. Coleman v. Carhart, 683."
2. Remedy on, not lost because personal action on mortgage note is barred
by Statute of Limitations. Ballout v. Taylor, 620.
3. In Ill. the record of a trust deed reciting that grantor had on same day
made his promissory note, without giving amount, will not charge subsequent
bonafide purchasers, without actual notice, with knowledge of amount. Bullock
v. Latttenlousen, 214.
4. If debt is not ascertained, mortgage should give such data as will put
person interested on track of discovery. Id.
5. Where notes secured by mortgage of real estate were endorsed before ma-
turity and delivered to plaintiffs for valuable and adequate consideration paid
by G., to be held as collateral security for G.'s indebtedness to them, it is no
defence to foreclosure suit by plaintiffs that notes have been paid by-mortgagor
to mortiragee since assignment, and in ignorance of it. Mead Y. Leavitt, 274.
6. When mortgage has been foreclosed, and premises are not worth enough
to pay mortgage debt, excess may be pleaded as equitable offset ; and, mort-
gage having been executed to both orators, but usury having been paid to one
for benefit of both ; mortgage notes having been sold and merged in judgment
in name of third party, and then repurchased by orators, and mortgage fore-
closed by them and in their names ; action at law having been brought to re-
cover usury- against party alone to whom same had been paid, and hence excess
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could not at law be peaded in offset. Held, that bill in equity would lie to
compel equitable offset mortgagor being insolvent. Smith v. McDonald, 619.
IL. Of Chattels.
7. Of personal property not yet in esse, production of which is in contewpla-
tion of parties, will impose lien in equity thereon when produced. ,tutherford
v. Stewart, 683.
8. Of specified number of articles out of larger number, not good against
creditors and others acquiring adverse rights, unless it furnishes data for sep-
arating mortgaged part from mass. Dodds v. Ned, 346.
9. Actual knowledge on part of judgment creditors, of mortgage of growing
wheat, not filed with proper township clerk, does not prevent the lien created
by levies under their judgments being superior to lien of mortgage, nor is de-
livery of wheat, after it has been harvested and thrashed, to third person in
pursuance of agreement to sell it to him for cash, made by sheriff at request
of judgment creditors but without any order from court or judge to sell at pri-
vate sale, an abandonment of the levies. Houk v. Condon, 346.
m. 0J Realty.
10. No precise form necessary, but there must be a present purpose to pledge
the, land. Association v. Adams, 73.
11. Whether deed for land is an absolute salewith agreement for repurchase
by grantor, or a mortgage, depends upon intention. Bearas v. Ford, 213.
.12: Delay of four years in filing bill by former owner to set aside sale of his
real estate under trust deed, on ground of alleged irregularities and inadequacy
of price, when he knew of such sale shortly after it was made, and neglected to
redeom property- by paying sum due from him, such privilege having been
bffered by purchaser, and he allowed taxes to accumulate to large amount, was
held such laches as to bar relief. Hoyt v. Pawtucket Inst., 751.
13. Where mortgagee of lands recovered judgment on bond, sold mortgaged
premises under execution, and purchased them himself, mortgagor is not, ipso
facto, etititled to injunction to restrain him from selling other lands of mort-
gagor under his judgment, on ground that purchase of dquity of redemption
extinguished 'mortgage debt, but mortgagor may enjoin such other sales until
it shall have been determined, in Court of'Chanceiy, whether niorigagee ought
to be permitted to raise any more money, by execution, on account of debt, and
if so, how much. Lydecker v. Bogert, 469, and note.
14. Owner of real estate conveyed same to trustee to secure debt to third
person. After granting clause to trustee in fee, was condition that if debt was
paid at maturity, conveyance was to be void, otherwise trustee was authorized
to sell land at public sale to pay same. Held. that conveyance was deed of
trust in nature of mortgage, and not an absolute conveyance in trust to secure
ihe debt; that legal title remained in mortgagor in possession after default,
subject to right of trustee or creditor to entbrce condition of mortgage ; and
that judgment against grantor who remained in possession with acquiescence of
mortgagee, after default, was lien on premises subject to such mortgage.
.3artin v. Alter, 347,
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION. See ATTORNEY, 1; CONSTITUTIONAL L.AW,
5, 7, 10, 13, 14, 19, 23; EVIDENCE,' 1 ; HIGmrvAy, 1, 2; LIMITATIONS,
STATUTE oJ', 5 ; MANDAMUS, I ; NUISANCE ; PiACTISE, 3 ; RAI,.ROAD, 11;
TAx AND TxATjoN, 4, 7.
1. City is not bound to maintain railing in front of basements that line its
business streets.- Beardsey v. City, 117.
2. Bona fide holder of municipal bonds not prejudiced by noncompliance
with merely formal requirements of statute in their issue. Rouede 'v. Mayor,
306, and note.
3. Overdue coupons attached to such bonds insufficient to put purchaser on
inquiry, so as to charge him -with notice of detects of title. Id.
4. When issue of municipal bonds may be enjoined. Id.
5. Provisions of, city charter as to duration of terms of officers must be
strictly observed, and ordinance beyond scope of powers granted by charter is
void., State v. Aewark, 620.
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6. Whole of ordinance not necessarily inoperative because some of its
sections are inconsistent : section not dependent on inconsistent sections may
stand. State v. Newark, 620.
7. Must use ordinary care to make or keep bridge over ditch in highway;
whether constructed by it or not, safe and convenient crossing both by day and
night. Town v. Vinton, 347.
8. Statute directed county commissioners to cause bonds of county to be'
issued in certain event, signed by chairman and attested by county clerk under
seal of county. Held, that signature of clerk was essential, even though he had
no discretion to withhold it. Bissell v. Township, 347.
9. Powers of, in this country analogous to those of similar bodies in England.
Claiborne County v. Brooks, 483.
10. Power to issue negotiable paper is expressly foreign to purposes of crea-
tion of counties and townships, and is never to be conceded except by express
legislation, or by necessary or at least very strong implication from such legis-
tion. Id.
11. Where charter requires proceeding to be instituted by ordinance, it can-
not be effected by resolution merely. State v. Barnet, 620.
12. When mayor declines to sign bonds authorized by ordinance to pay for
sewers, &c., directed by resolution, a legislative act and requiring an ordinance,
Held, that he will not be compelled by mandamus to sign them. Id.
13. Clerk of, whose duty by law it is to keep records, unless councils other-
wise direct, is mere agent of corporation, and writ of certiorari to briig.up
such records is properly directed to it. Return under its direction by such
officer is correctly made. State v. Harrison, 620.
14. Is not liable for simply failing to provide drainage for surface water.
City v. Spence, 213.
15. Under power to pass ordinances for the peace and good order of the
borough as they may deem expedient, a common council may pass an ordinance
prohibiting sales of vinous, spirituous and malt liquors after 10 F. x. and
before 4 A. 3f. State v. Inhsabitants, 213.
16. Municipal body cannot deprive a member of his place for causes, affect-
ing his eligibility, that existed at time of his election. Ellison v. City, 137.
17. Where, in such case, one is removed, and his successor elected and
inducted into office under power to fill vacancies, such successor is de facto
officer, and removed member cannot be reinstated by mandamus, but must
resort to quo warranto. id.
18. Power to " borrow mnney on the credit of the city, and to issue bonds"
therefor, insufficient to authorize subscription to railroad stock and issuing
bonds in payment thereof. City v. lwazroad Co., 275.
19. Legislature can authorize issuing of bonds by city in payment of such
subscription, in accordance with result of election previously held when no
power existed to submit question to vote, notwithstanding any irregularity in
the election or the notice thereof. Id.
20. Power to issue bonds in such case not affected by adoption of constitu-
tion, after legalizing act, forbidding such subscription, &c., but providing that
it should not affect municipality authorized by vote to make such subscription
under existing laws, prior to adoption of constitution. Id.
21. Receiving and opening bids does not prevent abandonment of work or
change of plan ; and bidding in response to advertisement containing reserva-
tion of right "to reject any or all bids," is a consent to this reserv.t right.
Keoqh v. Mayor, 274.
22. Courts only interfere with discretionary powers of municipal corporations
or their officers to protect private rights, to restrain assumption of powers not
granted, or to guard public interests against any corrupt or fraudulent abuse of
powers granted. They do not interfere merely on the ground of inexpedi-
ency. Id.
23. If between sidewalk and carriage-way of city street there is a grassed
space, over which footpath has been worn by persons going to or from another
street, abutting but not crossing this street, city is liable to person injured by
defect in such path, if same was known to and recognised by city as part of
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wrought line of travel, in absence of any other path, or barrier or warning.
Aston v. City, 73.
24. Incorporated village not liable for injury caused by defect in strcet.
crossing when charter does not impose legal duty of keeping highways in repair.
Such duty not imposed by acceptance of charter which merely allowed village,
as volunteer, to take supervision of highways, town never having surrendered
right of control over them, nor having been released from its obligation to
repair. Parker v. Rutland, 621.
25. Commissioners authorized by statute, upon obtaining consent of tax-
pavers, to issue town bonds under hands and seals of commissioners, issued
bonds without such consent, on which their seals were omitted by oversight and
mistake ; Held, that as to bona .fids purchaser, the town would be restrained
from setting up the want of seals. Township v. Stebbins, 210.
26. Legislative power, held by legislature or municipalities, is in its nature
governmental and discretionary, and, as a rule, a right of action as for tort
will not arise from any exercise of discretion in regard to it. Burford v.
Grand Rapids, 501, and note.
27. But if act done by municipal corporation would be tortious if done by
natural person, corporation is similarly liable. Id.
28. Common council having full control of streets, and having licensed par-
ticular one for coasting-a sport not necessarily a nuisance-its determination
is an exercise of its discretionary authority, and, therefore, no action will lie
against city by reason of accident resulting from such use. Id.
29. Has right, under power to preserve health and safety of inhabitants, to
'pass ordinances creating boards of health, appointing health commissioners
with other subordinate officiaLs, regulating removal of house dirt, night soil,
refuse, offal and filth, by persons licensed to perform such work, and pro-
viding for prohibition, abatement and suppression of whatever is intrinsically
a nuisance. Boehm v. Mayor, 482.
30. Statute empowering city authorities to c6nstruct sidewalks, and make
local assessments on property fronting on same, "for so much of the expense
thereof as they shall deem just and equitable," is unconstitutional; in that
there is no certain and legal standard for assessment. Such assessments should
be made in View of benefit to adjoining land. Barnes v. Z.yer, 751.
31. Not liable for injury occasioned by negligence of driver employed to
remove ashes, &c., to public dumping ground, though driver was at time driv-
ing horse and cart owned-by city, and his negligence was in making dump from
cart. Cordid Y. City, 751.
. 32. Use of road for public travel, lhwever extensive, insufficient to consti-
tute it a highway by adoption so as to impose duty upon town to keep it in
repair. There must be in addition some act of tQwn recognising it as highway
-as putting same in rate bills of highway surveyor, expending money thereon,
shutting up old road, leaving no other avenue for travel, &c. Tower v.
Rutland, 550.
33. Plaintiff claimed that her horse became frightened at dump-cart "tipped
up" on side of street opposite carriage shop. Held, that what one of seleef-
men said immediately after accident was not admissible to charge town with
liability, not being connected with any official act. Id.
34. Power of city of Baltimore to make police regulations must be derived
from legislature by express grant or fair and reasonable intendment. Within
power granted, degree of necessity or propriety of its exercise rests exclusively
with proper corporate authorities ; whenever question of existence or limit of
power is raised, it becomes plain duty of courts to see that corporate author-
ities do not transcend authority delegated. State v. Mot, 483.
35. Particular use of property declared nuisance by ordinance is not thereby
made so. Where city charter only confers authority to "prevent and remove
nuisances," mere possibility that all lime-kilns within city limits may, in future,
become nuisances, does not justify city in prohibiting business entirely in
anticipation. Id.
36. Where supposed addition to city of first class has never been subdivided
into lots, blocks, streets and alleys, by proprietors with any intention that it
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should become part of city, and no map or plat of such supposed addition has
ever been made, acknowledged or recorded, by such proprietors, or with
their consent or authority, and such proprietors have never consented that
such supposed addition should be made or become part of city. Held,
that ordinance defining boundaries of city, and including such supposed
addition therein, does not bring same within said boundaries. City v.
Gillet, 778.
37. And where city claims that such supposed addition is within city limits,
,but such claim has always been disputed by proprietors, they are not estopped
from maintaining action to enjoin collection of tax ldvied by city upon leh
property. Id.
38. Where city authorized railroad company to lay double tracks on part of
street, reserving right to require superstructure, except rail, to be covered with
plank, and also to require company to light road with gas. Held, that city's
supervision of, and responsibility for street, subject only to use by company as
granted, continued : although space not granted to company was ample for pas-
sage of persons who had, or might have, occasion to use it as a street, and
although other part had not been kept up as a 9treet, and was in exclusive pos-
session of company. City v. McGill, 620.
39. Principle of respondeat superior applies to municipal corporations, where
acts of their servants or agents refer to powers and duties ministerial in their
nature and character. City organized under laws of Ohio held title to and
right of possession of public cemetery located within its limits, which was under
management, control and regulation of board of cemetery trustees, chosen by
electors of corporation and remnovable for cause by city council. Employee
while engaged in cemetery in improving vault owned by city, was injured
through carelessness and want of skill of superintendent of cemetery, and
negligence of trustees. Employee worked under superintendent and both
received appointment from board of trustees, subject to approval of council.
Held, that city was liable for injuries to employee. City v. Cone, 621.
40. Bonds were issued by county in excess of limited per cent. of assessed
valuation : they contained recitals that they were issued in pursuance of' an
election and under act of assembly and state constitution, and the required
certificates of certain officers were endorsed on said bonds. Hd, that pur-
chaser, amount of bonds issued being known, could only protect himself by
examination of assessment, a " public record equally accessible to all intend-
ing purchasers of bonds," and by calculation determining whether issue of
bonds was within limit. Dixon County v. FIeld, 414.
41. Upon certiorari to review action of common council in revoking license
without notice to licensee, question is whether such proceeding was accord-
ing to law, and not whether license has been so violated as to justify
revocation. Common Concil v. State, 414.
42. Fact that such license expired about time proceedings were reviewed
on certiorari does not affect right of licensee to have revocation set aside.
d.
43. Common council, in revoking license, represents city, and where it has
acted in good faith, though under mistake as to its powers, costs on proceeding
by certiorari to review its action may be adjudged to be paid by city. Id.
NATIONAL BANK.
Corporation received stock of, as collateral security, certificate of which was
origlnally made out in name of president, as such; by direction of corporation
stek was within few days transferred to irresponsible employee, who executed
irrevocable power of attorney in blank, and certificate was so held by company
for some years. Neither company nor its employee collected any dividends
thereon, or exercised any act of ownership over it. Plan was adopted in order
to avoid incurring liability on part of pledgee as shareholder, and bank at
time of transfer was in prosperous condition, but failed several years after-
wards. Held, that pledgee was not liable as shareholder. Anderson v. Ware-
house Co., 483.
NEGLIGENCE. See BtLLS AND NOTES, 17 ; Co sMboN CAnIER, 3, 4, 7 ; CoN-
PLiCT oi LAwi. 4 ; CONTRACT, 8 ; DAMsAGES, 9 ; EvIDENCE, 7, 16;
VOL. VXXII.-107
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FERRY; IX EFPER, 1-3; MASTER AND SERVANT, 2, 3, 6-8, 11, 12, 14,
18, 19 ; MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, 23, 31, 39 ; RAILROAD, 1, 6, 9, 12, 13;
TELEGRAPli. 1, 2.
1. Mere fact that person attempting to cross bridge on dark night knows it is
not provided with railing, will not prevent recovery for fall therefrom. Loewer
v. City, 150.
2. Whether want of warning light at a bridge at night, tends to establish
negligence is for the jury, as also is question of plaintiff's contributory negli-
gence in using dangerous sidewalk, when he might have walked in the road-
way. Id. -
3. If plaintiff injured at highway crossing by railway train omits some slight
precaution for his safety, and company omits all care, he can still recover.
Wabash Co. v. Wallace, 621.
4. If accident by which plaintiff was injured resulted from intervening cause,
and was only connected with defendant's negligence by fact that latter brought
plaintiff into position where accident occurred, plaintiff cannot recover. Lewis
v. Railway Co., 604.
5. Where 19 month's old child -was injured by being run over in highway
adjoining its home; held, that its being there unattended, was prima facie, but
not conclusive evidence of contributory negligence on part of person in whose,
charge it was. Gibbons v. Williams, 275.
6. In suit by employee against railroad for injuries inflicted by negligence
of co-employee, it is incumbent upon plaintiff to show that injury was result of
neither fault nor negligence on his part. Question of negligence belongs pecu-
liarly to jury and except in clear case, where there is no conflicting evidence,
should be submitted to them. Redding v. Railroad, 807.
7. Although plaintiff may have been guilty of negligence, and such negli-
gence may, in fact, have remotely contributed to accident, yet, if defendant
could, in the result, by exercise of reasonable care and diligence, in view of
circumstances of case, have avoided accident, plaintiff's negligence, being more
remote cause, will not excuse defendant. Kean v. Railroad Co.. 415.
8. 'Railroad corporation not liable for carelessness or wilful act of inde-
pendent contractor engaged to construct road. Hughes v. Railroad, 73.
9. Right reserved to company to direct as to quantity of work or condition
when completed, is not a right to control mode or manner of doing work. Id.
10. Contracts in respect to real estate are within the rule of non-liability on
part of employer for wrong of contractor, except where contract is for erection
of nuisance, or injury to third persons, necessarily or naturally results from the
doing of the work in the manner contracted for. Id.
] 1. Where party drives upon street car track, without looking to see whether,
car is coming, and then, with ample opportunity, refuses to get out of the way,
he cannot recover in action on the case for negligence of driver. Wood v.
Railway Co., 243.
12. If action were trespass it might become necessary to decide whether in-
jury was purposely inflicted; but car company would not be liable for wilful
trespass of driver. Id., and note.
13. One who, knowing that severe storm on Sunday had prostrated fences,
on Monday evening turned his cattle upon unenclosed lands, without inquiry
as to whether railroad fences abutting them were injured, was guilty of such
contributory negligence as would defeat his recovery for injuries received by
such cattle on track. Carey v. Railroad Co., 683. See RAILROAm, 12.
14. Railroad bound only to use ordinary diligence in repairing its fences.id.15. Where two railrQad companies have, by agreement, joint occupancy of
depot grounds, in which their respective tracks are so situated and used that
servants of the two companies must necessarily, in .proper discharge of iheir
duties, pass over each other's tracks, each company will owe same duty to ser-
vants of other company that it does to its own. Railroad v. Frelka, 807.
16. Sign upon such grounds warning all persons to keep off tracks, &c.,
would not be regarded as applying to servants of either company. Id.
17. In action against railroad, on Mass. St. of 1881, c. 199, 2, for running
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over and killing girl 16 years old, at grade crossing, there was contradictory
evidence upon question of defendant's neglect to give signals required by law,
but it was conceded that head light was burning, that girl was familiar with
locality, that track was visible for nearly a mile, and that, at time, it was not
dark, but twilight. Plaintifif's evidence tended to show that, when engine was
within 3 to 6 rods of crossing, whistle was blown twice, and girl, then within
few feet of track, quickened her pace and ran upon track and was killed. Hed,
that burden was upon defendant to show that girl was guilty of gross or wilful
negligence : also, that court could not say, as matter of law, that attempting to
cross track; under such circumstances, was gross or wilful negligence. COpley
v. N. R. and N. Co., 551.
18. Defendants, who had contracted to th'esh plaintiff's grain, put in oper-
ation their steam engine within four rods and upon windward side of several
stacks of grain, on hot, dry day when wind was blowing a gale. Stacks
were destroyed by fire from engine. Held, that although engine was furnished
with all proper appliances to prevent escape of fire, defendants were guilty of
negligence. Mlartin v. Bishop, 414.
19. But plaintiff, whose employees were assisting defendants, having directed
placing of engine, and though present and knowing the danger, not having
objected when it was put in operation, was guilty of contributory negligence.
Facts being undisputed, special finding bf jury that plaintiff was not guilty of-
negligence, held to be but erroneous conclusion of law. 1d;
20. In action against railroad by passenger to recover for injuries, plaintiffis
evidence must be assumed to be true, in considering question whether there was
sufficient led evidence to sustain recovery. Railroad Co. v. Stanle, 484.
21. In passing through long tunnel lights are necessary, and windows, doors
and ventilators should be closed. But it does not follow that officer should he
provided for every car, or that omission to shut out gas and smoke, would, of
itself, give right to passengers to sue for discomfort and annoyance. Id.
22. Passenger sitting close to front door of crowded car, when passing through
tunnel, attempted to shut door while car was in total darkness in order to keep
out smoke and cinders, and was injured." Held, that all the facts and circum-
stances taken together would justify verdict for plaintiff, unless his conduct
amounted to contributory negligence, and that court below properly refused
to instruct jury that plaintiff was chargeable with contributory negligence. Id.
23. Dock owner supplied and put up staging outside of ship in his dock
unter contract with ship owner. A workman, in employ of ship painter who
had contracted with owper to paint outside of ship, in order to do the painting,
went on and used the staging, when one of ropes by which it was slung, being
unfit for use when supplied by dock owner, broke and workman fell and was
injured. Held, that dock owner was liable for neglect of reasonable care that
ropes were fit for use. Heaven v. Pender, 74.
24. In action against physicians for falsely certifying to insanity of person
who is thereby committed to asylum, where pleadings raise the issue as to sanity ct
time certificate alleges it, burden of proof is on plaintiff. Penneil v. Cummings, 74.
25. In such a case the falsehood, and not the insufficiency of certificate is the
ground of action ; if the physicians have not made inquiry and exaninatio-i
required by statute, or if their evidence and certificate are not sufficient, commit-
ment is fault of municipal officers and not of physicians, provided they have stated
facts and opinions truly and have acted with due professional skill and care. id.
26. The Illinois statute which declares that in actions for damages for injury
to property "occasioned by fire communicated by any locomotive engine while
passing along any railroad," the fire shall be prima facie evidence " to charge
with negligence" owner or operator of road at time, was intended to charge
upon company using locomotive all injuries which are shown to have resulted
from fire from passing train, unless company can show that loss was not occa-
sioned by its negligence. Railroad v. Pennell, 807.
27. Where railway company, through negligence by escape of fire from loco-
motive, sets fire to depot, from which hotel in vicinity is destroyed, to make
company liable to owner of hotel, it is enough if the burning thereof be a con-
sequence so natural and direct from the burning of the depot that a reasonable
person might, and naturally would, see that it was liable to result therefrom. Id.
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28. Plaintiff cannot hold defendant responsible for injury to which he has
contributed or which is caused by some new intervening cause not incident to
injury caused by defendant. Pullman Co. r. BluKm, 414.
29. In case where plaintiff's arm has been broken from negligent copduct of
defendant, and plaintiff exercises ordinary care to keep parts together and in
selection of. surgeons, doctors and nurses, and employs those of ordinary skill
and care in their profession, and still, by some unskilful or negligent act of such
surgeon, doctor or nurses, bones fail to unite, defendant will be liable for
unfavorable result of injury. Id.
30. Young man in vigorous health, strong, active and in full possession of
all histfaculies, having valise in right hand and basket on left arm, attempted,
in broad daylight, to leave train while moving slowly, distance from lower
step to platform being eighteen inches, and in doing so was seriously injured.
Hid, that plaintiff was not guilty of such negligence as would justify court
in taking cawe from jury. Railroad Co. v. Maugans, 415 and 518, and note.
31. Local act of legislature affecting city of Providence provided that "every
building * * * in which twenty-five or more olieratives are employed in any
of the stories above the second story, shall be provided with proper and sufficient,
strong and durable, metallic fire escapes or stairways, constructed as required
b this act, unless exempted therefrom by the inspector of buildings, which
shall be kept in good repair by the owner of such building, and no person shall
at any time place any incumbrance upon any such fire escapes." Other sec-
tions provided remedies as follows: "Any person violating any provision of
this aet, wherein no penalty is herein otherwise prescribed, shall be 'fined
tvienty dollars for every violation thereof, and shall be fined nbt exceeding
twenty dollars for each day's continuance of the said violation after the service
of the warrant issued upon the first complaint. The Supreme Court in term
time or any justice thereof in vacation, may restrain, by injunction, any viola-
tion of this act, 'and may, according to the course of equity, secure the fulfil-
ment and execution of the provisions thereof." Chief engineer of fire depart-
meat was charged with executing provisions of act. Held, that scheme of act
was to secure safe structures as police measure and for general safety; and
that it was not scheme of act to create any duty which could be made subject
of action by individuals, and that no remedy in favor of individuals beyond
what is expressly given in aet should be implied for mere neglect to perform duties
created by act. Grant v. Slater Co., 484.
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT. See BILLS AND NOTES; COSTITUTIONL
LAW, 9; MUNICIPFL CORPORATION, 10.
Bona fide purchaser of, before maturity, when same is 'void between original
parties, can recover only what he or some prior holder paid for it, with inter-
est. De Kay v. Hackensac, 551.
NOTICE. See ATTORNEY, 4 ; BROKER, 2 ; EXECUTORS AND ADmINISTRATORS,
6 ; GIFT, 3 ; [OXEaSTEAD, 11 ; INNKEEPER, 3; MASTER AND SERVANT,, 4 ;
MORTGAGE, 3; MUNIC I PAL CORrE-OATioN, 3; PARTNERsnip, 7 ; WARIE-
HOUs RECEIT, 2.
1. To constitute, record of deed, &c., must show proper execution and
acknowledgment. Girprdin v. Lampe, 151.
2. In ejectment contention was over division line and turned on question
Ivhether defendant was chargeable with notice of contents of unrecorded deed
when he knew of deed but not of its terms. Held, that defendant was put on
inquiry. Hill v. Murray, 622.
NOVATION. See UsuRY, 2.
NU1SANCE. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 3; EASEMENT, 1, 2; MUNICIPAL
CORPORATION, 28, 29, 35; NXGLIGENCE. 10.
If effect of dense smoke emitted from smokestack or chimney is detrimental to
certain classes of property and business within limits of city, and is personal
annoyance to public at large within same, it is a public nuisance, whether so
declared by ordinance or not. Unless such is the fact, act of so declaring it
will not make it a public nuisance. Hlarmon v. City, 808.
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OATH. See HIGHWAY, 3, 4.
OFFICER. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 5; DAMAGES, 4; EXECUTION, 2;
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, 5, 13; UNITED STATES COURTS, I.
1. Partial payment to levying officer in whose hands distress warrant has
,been placed, discharges defendant pro tanto. White v. Mandeville, 348.
2. Writ of attachment in proper form will protect officer executing it,
although affidavit on which it issued was fatally defective. Matthews v. Dens-
more, 214.
3. Taking of goods, upon writ of attachment, into custody of marshal, as
officer of court that issues writ, is, even when goods are property of third per-
son, an official act, and, if wrongful, a breach of marshal's bond and his sure-
ties are liable. Lamon v. Fensier, 415.
4. When office is created by constitution, but compensation is left to legis-
lature, it may be increased or diminished so as to affect incumbent, whether it
be by fees or salary. lHmphry v. Sadler, 276.
5. Election or appointment to office creates no contract between state and
officer, which is protected by clause of Federal Constitution prohibiting im-
pairment of contracts. Id.
ORDINANCE. See MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, 5, 6, 11, 12, 36; TAx AND TAXA-
TION, 7.
PARDON. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAw, 11.
PARENT AND CHILD. See CONTRACT, 12.
1. Mother, father being dead, can recover for services of minor son actually
living with and supported by her at time of injury; also for care and labor of
nursing him and expense and cost of medicines and medical attendance, but
not for pain and suffering of her son, or her own anxiety and suffiering on his
account. Corrnissioners v. Hamilton, 75.
2. Plaintiff was injured by frightening of her horse by two boys, who
shouted and fired pistols as she passed their father's premises. In action
against father, held, that it was proper to show that such acts had been previ-
ously performed by the boys, sometimes in their father's presence. Not neces-
sary that he should have directed wrongful act by express command. Hover-
son v. Noker, 670, and note.
3. Father is entitled to custody of his infant cuild unless its interests forbid.
Petition of Vetterlein, 485.
4. In habeas corpus by father for custody of infant, to which mother made
return showing decree of divorce granted in 1877, on her petition in Indiana,
and giving her custody of child: Query, whether decree, so far as it affected
custody of child, bad any force outside of jurisdiction where made. Id
5. But it appearing that proceedings for divorce were irregular and void,
that child had for 8 years been kept under its mother's influence, and in
ignorated of its father and that its nurture and education would be as well
cared for by father as by mother: held, that father should have custody of
child, mother to have access to it at all reasonable times. rd.
PARTICULAR WORDS AND PHRASES.
"Executed." Nicholson v. Coombs, 193.
PARTITION. See SERIrr, 5.
Cannot be had of lands held adversely, or to which title is in dispute, unless
vacant. Where co tenant has been ousted or his rights totally denied by his
co-tenant, his remedy is by ejectment, in which he may recover his just propor-
tion of land and of rents and profits. London v. Overly, 276.
PARTNERSHIP. See ACTION, 4 ; AsSIGNMENT, 1 ; ATTACHMENT, 5 ; BILLS
AND NOTES, 18 ; CORPORATION, 11 ; EQUITY, 20; HUSBAND AND WIFE,
11; LIMITATIONS, STATUTE OF, 3; SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE. 4; WILL,
12-17.
1. Bill in equity may be maintained by administrator of deceased partner
against survivor, for sale of letters patent belonging to partnership, and for an
account of profits from its use. Freeman v. I"reeman, 684.
2. One partner cannot bind his co-partner by signing instrument under spal
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in firm name, unless such act has been previously authorized or is subsequently
confirmed : such authority or confirmation may be shown by parol or by cir-
cumstances. Herzog v. Sawyer, 551.
3. One of several partners, without consent of others when they cannot be
consulted, can assign firm property to pay firm debts, if, being in charge of
property. be acts in good faith to meet business crisis. Petition of DanieLs,
683.
4. Where actual delivery of goods cannot be made symbolical delivery suf-
fices ; and where assignee of property, part of which was attached, took possession
of that not attached and demanded that attached. Held, that he had done all
that was necessary to perfect his title. Id.
5. Sale by one of two partners of his partnership interest to his successor in
firm, does not destroy priority of right of creditor of original firm to payment
out of partnership property of original firm to extent of the other original
partner's interest therein. Spurr T. Russell, 276.
6. If holder of firm note after dissolution accepts note of one of partners,
payable at future day, retaining interest for said time by discount, and agrees
, to release otler partner, no action on firm note can be maintained. -Such agree-
ient may be implied. Bank v. Green, 214.
7. Where partners have dealt as such with seller, and after becoming incor-
porated continue to deal as before, having their bills made in same way, with-
out giving notice, they will continue liable as partners, unless seller have actual
knowledge of change. Martin v. Fewell, 684.
8. Permanent improvements erected upon real estate owned by one partner,
will, notwithstanding real estate is used as place of business of firm, be pre-
sumed to be .individual property of partner until contrary is proven. Goepper
T. Xiasiqer, 75.
9. Unless the partner is estopped from denying the ownership of firm by his
conduct or representations to creditors, their ririt to subject such property to
payment of partnership, in preference to indil .dual debts, must depend upon
right of partners as between themselves; and where all the facts proved are
eonsistent with the use alone, having been contributed to firm, that view should
be adopted. Id.
10. Person who is not partner cannot be held liable by reason of having
.ield himself out as such, by.one who bad no knowledge or belief of such hold-
ing out. There may be cases,, however, in which holding out has been so
pubic and long continued that jury may infer reliance upon it. 7ompson v.
Bank, 485.
11. Ordinarily, partners in non-trading firm (e. g. insurance, real estate.
and collecting) have no implied power to bind each other by commercial paper
executed in firm name. Deardorf v. Thatcher, 485.
12. Plaintiffs, at St. Louis, sent reaper to C., K. & Co., at Sullivan, Mis-
souri. C., K. & Co. afterwards reported by letter that they had sold reaper to
K., member of firm, and sent firm's note for price. It turned out that K. had
made transaction and written letter wholly without knowledge of other members
of firm, and had also gotten the benefit, but it also appeared that they habitu-
ally left management of business to K., and permitted him, whenever he wanted
goods, to take them and charge them to himself. Hield, that they were liable.
Rayner v. Crow, 684.
13. One member of defendant firm promised to pay debt due plaintiff from
certain marble company. Firm owned one-fourth of company's stock, con-
trolled its financial operations until it became hopelessly involved, and consider-
.tion of promise was forbearance, to attach its property. Partner making
promise managed firm's business; all his operations and negotiations indicated
purpose to absorb and get title to property of company; and this purpose was
accomplished. It did not appear but that the transactions were within scope
of partnership. Held, that receipt of benefit in obtaining title to and posses-
sion of prolerty by firm were ratification of all acts done in obtaining it. Lynch
v. flint, 551.
14. C. and M., partners, held lease 6f certain premises for ninety-nine years,
renewable forever, with covenants for payment of rent, taxes and assessments.
Partnership was dissolved, and C. conveyed to M. his undivided interest in
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leasehold. Assignee of reversion brought suit, on covenants for rent against
C. and M. jointly, for arrears accrued after dissolution. Pending suit, M.
being in default of answer, C. filed answer denying all liability, but afterwards
paid to assignee of reversion $500, who discharged him from all liability grow-
ing out of lease. Held, there is not such presumption that above-named sum
was paid on accrued rent, and not in discharge of future contingent liability on
lease, as would -entitle C. to recover such sum of M. as money paid for and
on his account upon implied promise to reimburse C. therefor. McHenry v.
Carson, 622.
15. POWER OF PARTNERS TO WITHDRAW AT WILL PROM PARTNERSHIPS ENTERED
INTO FOR A DEFINITE PERIOD.
PARTY-WALL. See CONTRACT, 8, 24.
Owners of, not tenants in common, but each owns in severalty so much as
stands on his own lot, suibject to easement of other. And owner on one side
may, within limits of his own lot, increase thickness, length or height of wall,
if he can do so without injury to adjoining building. Andrae v. Haseltine,
151.
PATENTS. See EQUITY, 19 ; PARTNERSHIP, 1 ; SrPciFiC PERFORMANCE, 3;
TRADEMARK, 3, 4.
1. Discretion of commissioner of patents in issuing, not subject to review
by secretary of interior. "Butterworth v. United States, 808.
2. Purchaser of patented articles from territorial assignee,does not acquire right
to sell articles in course of trade outside of territory granted to vendor. Hatch
v..Adams, 794.
3. License for term of years will terminate upon death of licensee within
the period, in absence of express words showing an intent to extend the right
to executor, administrator or assignee. Oliver v. Chemical Works, 75.
4. When patentee has applied for re-issue, making affidavit that he believes
that by reason of insufficient or defective specification original letters-patent
are void, and re-issue is obtained, which is void because too broad, original
letters cannot be revived by disclaimer of all changes, but only, if at all, by
surrender of re-Issue and grant of another re-issue. McMurray v. Mallory,
416.
5. As general rule patentee is not entitled to interest on profits made by in-
fringer, hut where case was sent back to master to make certain deductions
from damages. Held, that plaintiff was entitled to interest on corrected
amounts from date of master's last report. Railroad Co. v. Turrill, 276.
6. Suits and right of suit for infringement of patent survive to patentee's
legal representatives. Id.
7. By terms of license royalties, payable monthly, were, if paid by given
day of each month, subject to reduction of sixty per cent. "until such time as
a decision of the United States Circuit Court" might be had sustaining patent ;
afterwards of only twenty-five per cent. Held, that decree pro confesso--upon
failure to plead, answer or demur-and reference to master to ascertain profits
and damages, was not decision contemplated. Heater Co. v. Stove Co., 751.
PAYMENT. See BILI AND NOTES. 13; IwsuBANOE, 6 ; LIMITATIONS, STAT-
UTE OF, 7 ; OFFICER, 1.
1. Satisfaction of debt made by stranger for or on account of debtor and
adopted by debtor, is valid satisfaction. Debtor need not formally adopt such
satisfaction before availing himself of it by plea, plea being an adoption.
Bennett v. Hill, 622.
2. A. being indebted to C., agreement was made between B. and C. by
which A. and B. were to carry on business formerly owned by C. ; and B. was
from profits to pay C. debt due from A.. while C. was to accept agreement in
lieu of his claim against A. Held, that agreement discharged A. from C.'s
claim, and that discharge of C.'s claim was sufficient consideration for agree-
ment and for B.'s promise. Id.
PENALTY. See ABATEMENT; CONTRACT, 17; CORPORATION, 9.
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PERJURY. See MALICIOUS PROSECUTION. 4, 5.
PHYSICIAN. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAw, 20; CONTRACT, 3 ; NEGLIGENCE,
24, 25.
PLEADING. See BILLS AND NOTES, 7 ; COVENANT, I ; DURESS, 3.
1. Default after due service of summons admits only allegations of com-
plaint. Chaffin v. McFadden, 348.
2. In slander defendant may set up : First, that he did not use the language;
and, second, that it is true. Cole v. Woodson, 552.
3. Petition counted upon two distinct wrongful acts as causes of killing of
horses: First, neglect to keep in repair a fence as required by contract;
and, second, negligence in running train.. Held, that plaintiff could not be
required to elect upon which he would rely, that doctrine applying where one
wrongful fct is charged, and plaintiff is entitled to treat it as having either of
two natures. Of course he cannot recover double damages. Railway Co. v.
Hedges, 623.
PLEDGE. ' See BaSKn, 2 ; CORPORATION, 8 ; NATIONAL BANx.
POSSESSION. See DEED, 7.
POWER. See HUSBAND AND WIFE, 17.
PRACTICE. See CORPORATION, 15, 16; CRIMINAL iLAw, 9; EQUITY, 3;
ERtRORS AND A_.PEALS, 8; JUDGMENT, 2.
1. Where cause in court for trial of smallcauses has been adjourned to par-
ticular time and place, and justice fails to attend, hut, at another place, in
absence of parties and without consent of defendant, adjourns cause to another
day, he cannot on that day proceed to trial and judgment, although notice of
adjournment has been given defendant; such adjournment operates as discon-
tinuance of suit. &tate v. Board of Health, 623.
2. .Wbere act provides that summons must be served by delivering copy with
endorsements duly certified to defendant, or leaving same at his residence:
Held, that return "served on the second day of January 1861, by reading,'"
shows want of service ; and judgment by default thereon is nullity and, may
be attacked collaterally. Roblns v. Clem"mngs, 752.
3. Although township in Kansas fails, neglects and refuses to elect or per-
mit or allow its trustee, clerk or treasurer to qualify or to designate some per-
son upon whom service of legal process can be made, it cannot be brought into'
court upon service by publication, as it does not thereby, within terms of
statute, conceal itself. Roclway v. Oswego, 552. /
4. Absence of counsel not favored as ground of continuance. Where one of
counsel representing defendant was engaged in attendance uponU. S. Circuit
Court, and the other was suddenly summoned to attend Supreme Court to argue
case from circuit other than that in which he resided, and voluntarily left with-
out leave or application for delay, this furnished no ground for continuance.
Ins. Co v. Edwards, 808.
PRESUMPTION. See BILLS AND NOTES, 27; COMMON CARRIER. 3; CON-
TRACT, 10, 12 ; CRIMINAL LAW, 17 ; DEBTORAND CREDITOR, 3, 4 ; DEED,
4, 5; EJECT-MENT, 3; HUSBAND AND WIFE, 9 ; MASTER AND SERVANT, 16;
PARTNERSHIP, 8, 14 ; RAILROAD, 4; TAx AND TAXATION, 7.
1. Is that note produced from among deceasedI debtor's effects by adminis-
trator has been paid. Liddell -,. 1riqht, 348.
2. Death presumed after seven years' absence: something more than similarity
of name necessary to overcome presumption ; identity of person must be proved.
Hoyt v. Newbold, 151.
PROHIBITION. .
I. Writ of, cannot be used as substitute for appeal. Ex parte Pennsyhania,
76.1 2. Congress alone has power to determine whether judgment of U. S. Court,
of competent jurisdiction shall be reviewed. Id.
PUBLIC POLICY. See. CoxxoN CARRIER, 7 ; CONTRACT, 3: CORPORATION5
5 ; LIXITATIONS, STATUTE OF, I; MASTPR AND SERVANT, 8.
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PUBLIC POLICY.
1. Agreement for location of route of railroad at particular intermediate place
not per se void as against public policy. Railroad Co. v. Ralston, 416.
2. Pooling agreement made by all tobacco warehouseme, of large city, fix-
ing prices, &c., restricting freedom of parties to it, and providing for forfeitures
for breaches of it, is void. Hoffman v. Brooks, 648, and note.
3. Agreement between several that one shall bid at public sale or letting of
contract and shall share profits, is voidable, if either intention, effect or
necessary tendency of combination be to stifle or limit competition. Woodruff
v. Berry, 276.
QUO WARRANTO. See MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, 17.
1. Use of in case of intrusion into office of public nature, as that of keeper
of jail. State v. Meean, 214.
2. Granting or withholding leave to file information in nature of, at instance
of private relator, to test right to an office, rests in sound discretion of court,
even though there be substantial defect in title by which office is held. State
v. Aead, 623.
RAILROAD. See AGENr, 4, 6 ; COMMON CARRIER; CONSTIUTIONAL LAW, 4,
15, 31, 33 ; CONTRACT, 11 ; EVIDENCE, 4 ; INJUNCTION, 4 ; INSURANCE, 2 ;
INTERNATIONAL LAW, 1 ; MASTER AND SERVANT, 1-3, 6, 8, 11, 14, 15, 17 ;
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, 18; NEGLIGENCE, 3, 8, 14, 15, 17, 20-22, 26,
27, 30; PUBLIC POLICY, I ; Tax AND TAXATION, 1.
1. Liable for-injury caused by defect in derrick obviously existing at time
of delivery, furnished by agreement to contractor, where person injured was
not servant of corporation or contractor. Conton v. Railroad Co., 277.
2. Passenger on drover's pass has same rights, and is under same obliga-
tions as if he had bought his ticket. Railway v. Miles, 277.
3. Station agent has no implied authority to direct passenger where to ride,
and if, by his direction, cattle drover ride upon top of cattle car and sustain
injury in consequence; he cannot recover unless he proves express authority to
agent to give such directions. Id.
4. When two companies are authorized to consolidate, it is to be presumed
that franchises and privileges of each continue to exist in respect to the several
roads so consolidated. County v. Conners, 76.
5. Road master whose duty it is to direct repairs and keep road in safe con-
dition, is, in line of his duty, representative of company, Railroad v. Moore,
348.
6. Where such road master is culpably negligent, company, even under
common-law rule, is liable for damages resulting therefrom to one of its other
servants. Id.
7. Person purchasing ticket which has been fraudulently obtained from com-
pany, from holder, for value and without notice, acquires no title. Hrank v.
Ingalls, 752.
8. Agent authorized to sell tickets and stamp and deliver same upon receiving
pay therefor, cannot bind company by stamping and delivering such tickets t6
third person to be sold by him, and to be paid for when sold. Id.
9. Company left loaded car, coupled with two empty cars, standing on switch
which inclined toward main track, same being secured by brakes and railroad tie
under wheels of loaded car; car got upon main track and accident occurred.
Held, company was not irresponsible as matter of law, even though cars could
not have got on main track but for wrongful act of stranger. Smith v. Raid-
road Co., 623.
10. Proof that certain promoters of road guaranteed that route would pass
near certain land, and of deviation from such line, insufficient to discharge
subscriber who had subscribed in reliance on such statemept, there being no
evidence of fraudulent intent. Braddocki v. Railroad, 151.
It. Right of way through city was granted to railroad by ordinance re-
quiring it to build suitable fence "of such height as the common council may
direct." Held, that obligation to build fence was absolute, and that right
reserved to council was only to give specific directions if it saw proper. Hayes
v. Railroad. 416.
VOL. XXXII.-108
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RAILROAD.
12. Plaintiffs horse escaped from his adjoining meadow directly on to track.
and was killed by train. Defendant had neglected to maintain lawful fence.
Held, that company was liable, although owner knew of defect in fence, that
his horse was breachy, and although there was no neglect in running train.
Doctrine of contributory negligence not applicable. Congdon v. Railroad
Co., 752. See NEGLIGENCE, 13.
13. Where employee rightfully engaged in repair of employer's freight car,
calls upon his-son, under eleven years of age, to render him necessary temporary
assistance, and son while so assisting, without negligence on his part or his
fathers, is injured through negligence of agents and servants of another com-
pany in backing train of cars, latter -company is liable in action by son.
Penna. Co. v. 1Gallagher, 348.
14. DISCRIMINATION IN RAILWAY FACILITIES, 417.
15. eSTATE LEGISLATION REGULATING RAILROAD TRAnFIC, 81. See also
LEGAL NOTES, 473.
RATIFICATION. See ARBITRATION, 4 ; PARTNEERSHIP, 2, 13.
. REAL ESTATE. See COVENANT, 3; EJRCTMENT, 4, 5; EQUITY, 16; NEGLI-
GENCE, 10.
Where property is leased to which the title is inchoate, a subsequent convey-
ance to lessor will at once enure to benefit of lessee. Skcidmore v. Railway Co.,
808.
RECEIVER. See CONFLICT Or LAWS, 1.
1. Foreign, as against domestic creditors, cannot remove debtor's assets from
state. Railway Co. v. Packet Co., 277.
2. But where he has obtained rightful possession of personal property situate
iwithin the jurisdiction of his appointment, he will not be deprived of its posses-
sion though taken by him, ia performance of his duty, into foreign jurisdic-
tion. Id.
3. A corporation, may be sued for tort committed by corporation before his
appointment. Judgment, if for plaintiff, will be against him, as receiver, and
is leviible out of assets in his hands. Combs v. Smith, 486.
4. Court may authorize receiver of railroad to issue certificates of indebted-
ness hud make them first lien upon road to raise funds to make necessary repairs
and improvements, but power is to be sparingly exercised. Credit Co. v.
Railroad Co., 35, and note.
5. Discharge of receiver by court and restoration of property to corporation,
without reservation of jurisdiction as to existing rights of action, discharges both
receiver and property from liability to suit for injuries inflicted through negli-
gence of employees of road. Davis v. Duncan, 582, and note.
6. After such order has been complied with court cannot, after adjournment
of term at which order was made, alter it, so as to again obtain jurisdiction
over property and funds. And that receiver was also president of corporation
can make no difference. Id.
7. Neither receiver, personally, nor corporation liable for torts of receiver's
employees : proceedings against receiver for such torts in nature of proceed-
iugs in rem Id.
8. Although permission has been granted to sue receiver, receiver can set up
any defence by plea, answer or demurrer. Id.
9. Who may be receivers. Id., note, 589
REDEMP..TION. See MORTGAGE, 12.
RELEASE. See SURETr, 7.
RELIGIOUS SOCIETY. See ConroutATiow,"3.
REMOVAL OF CAUSES. See CoRPORATION, 18.
1. Bill of interpleader, by citizen of one state against two citizens of another,
cannot be removed, on petition of one of defendants, to U. S. Circuit Court,
under Stat. of Ali 3d 1875, 2. Ins. Co. v. Allen, 76.
2. If interests of plrties are so identified that they must or should be decided
together, cause cannot be removed to United States Court if any one of parties
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on one side is citizen of same state with opposite party. Wilsn v. Railroad
Co., 724, and note.
3. Railroad company, incorporated in several states through which it runs is
citizen of each state, and cannot remove cause to Federal courts on ground of"
its citizenship in other states. Borne v. Railroad Co., 102, and note.
4. Can state court inquire into facts and judicially determine whether case is
removable? Id., note.
5. Is order granting or refusing removal, appealable? .7d., note.
6. Before jurisdiction of state court in criminal prosecution will cease, jutis-"
diction of U. S. Court must attach : and where case was never duly removed,
and was dismissed from U. S. Court for want of jurisdiction, forfeiture of
recognisauce for non-appearance in state court would be good, otherwise not.
Eunter v. Colquit, 348.
7. The limitation upon suits on contracts to be commenced by assignees in
U. S. Circuit Courts (confining them to cases whic'h might have been prosecuted
there, if no assignment had been made, except as to bills and notes) contained
in sect. 1, ch. 137, Act of March 3, 1875, does not apply to removal of suits
under sect. 2. CTaflin v. Ins. Co., 349.
REPLEVIN. See CotkoiRTzOx, I; UNTED STATES CoURs, 1.
1. Defendant in, cannot lawfully retake replevied property from plaintiff"
on another writ of replevin. Bonney v. Smith, 277.
2. That defendant in, himself replevied the goods from third person, does
not affect plaiqtiffs right. Kelleher v. Clark, 214.
3. Possession obtained by plaiptiff in,.who claims special ownership, vests in
him title he claims, and as against general owner, bond takes place of property
to extent not exceeding interest clAimed by plaintiff. Lugerbeel v. Lemert,
215.
RESCISSION. See IsuwoE, I ; SALE, 2.
SALE. See )EBTOR AND CREDITOR, 6 ; PATENT, 2.
1. No delivery of personal property named in formal bill of sale is necessary
to pass title, as between the parties. Philbrook v. Eaton, 76.
2. Prior agreement for purchase of goods is not ipsofacto revoked by buyer's
insolvency or his assignment for benefit of creditors. Seller may stop goods
in transtu- but if he does not, title passes on delivery. MfcEsy v. &eU,
552.
3. Where W. contracted to sell T. safe in' possession of L., and that L.
shall deliver same to T., and T. agrees to pay $15 upon delivery, on absolute
refusal by L. to deliver, T. may, without tender of $15, commence action
against W. Thompson v. Warner, 349.
4. If A., fraudulently assuming name of reputable merchant in certain
town, buy goods in person, the property therein passes to A., and seller can-
not maintain action against common carrier for delivery to A. Otherwise
where A. represents himself to be brother of reputable merchant and buying
for him. Edmunds v. Trans. Co., 277.
5. S. S. & Co. sold and delivered threshing-machine to K. upon conditions:
1. That title, ownership or possession of machine should not pass from them
to K. until notes given for price should be paid in full. 2. That sellers should
have power to declare notes, so given, due at any time, they should deem debt
insecure, and to sell machine at public or private sale and apply proceeds upon
unpaid balance of purchase price. Held, that first condition was valid, and
that second condition did not divest sellers of right of property reserved in
first condition. Call v. Se.amour, 416.
SAVINGS BANK. See CORPORATION, 2.
Treasurer of, has no implied authority to assign mortgage belonging to: that
by verbal consent *and under direc tion of investment committee, he had assigned
other mortgages relating to other estates, not sufficient to give him general
authority to assign or justify the inference that he had such authority. oldea
v. Phelps, 215.
INDEX.
SEAL. See CONTI-ACT, 16, 20; MUmICIPAL COEPORATIOx, 25; PART m-
SHIP, 2.
SEQUESTRATION. See EQUITY, 10, ii.
SET-OFF. See ATTACHMENT, 5 ; ATTOrnEY, 4; BILLS AND NOTES, 22 ; Con-
pORATION, 6, 12 ; MORTGAGE, 6.
SHERIFF.
I. On motion to amerce sheriff fbr neglecting to levyfifa., value of pro-
perty need not be shown with precision. White v. Rockafeller, 151.
2. Under Missouri statute officer to whom execution is delivered, in case of
false return, is liable for whole amount directed to be levied. In such an action,
where falsity consisted in stating that writ was'ordered to be returned satisfied
by plaintiff's attorneys, an amendment by leave of court striking oqt false
statement, held, no defence. State v. Case, 151.,
Si Flea of insolvency 9f defendant in the execution, no defence in such an
action. Id.
4. Where no damages are proven, sheriff not liable even for nominal dam-
ages, for failure to return execution at time fixed. Id.
5. Liable for failure to deliver to proper parties money paid him for note
and mortgage taken for purchase-money. of land sold on partition, though no
special order bf distribution thereof had been made, and money was paid after
expiration of his term of office. Such liability not discharged by paying
moneyto attorney who procured the sale. Calvui v. Bruen, 215.
SLANDER AND LIBEL. See 'xjxcTxoN, 6, 7 ; PLEADING, 2.
1. Communication made to public prosecutor absolutely privileged. Vogel
v. Gruaz, 273. '
if. Article circulated in good faith by elector among voters relating to char-
seter of candidates for public office, privileged. State v. Balch, 345.
-S. In action for slander for words imputing crime of horse stealing, where
* truth of alleged defamatory words is pleaded, it is not necessary io prove it
beyond a reasonable doubt. Bell v. McGinness, 76.
4. In action against counsel for defamatory words spoken, questions of malice,
bonafides and relevancy cannot be raised ; only question is, whether what is
~mplaned of has been said in course of administration of law. M2Vnster v.Lamb, 12, au note.
5. Privileged communications. Id., not.
6. If person atcased by employer of stealing money, informs friend of accm
sation and seeks his advice, and latter has interview with employer, in which
he informs him of grounds of charge, and during which accusbd comes in and
begins -conversation with employer, referring to charge, whereupon employer
repeats accusation the third person still being present, occasion renders words
privileged. Bilings v. Fairbanks, 549.
7. At trial of indictment for libel against publiser of newspaper, who offers
evidence of truth of statements, other publications in eame paper, if they tend io
show general ill-will towards person alleged to have been libelled, and are of
* such nature as to indicate persistent disposition of hatred towards him, or if
they appear to be part of settled purpose to bring him into public hatred, con-
tempt or ridicule, and are sufficiently near in time to afford natural inference
titat saiie state of mind existed when alleged libellous publication was made,
are admissible, although published after alleged libel and not expressly refer-
ring to it. CGwmonwealit v. Damon, 682.
s. At such trial if truth of statements is established, government must show
that difendant, in legal sense, actually participated in or authorized publica-
tio,.ad with actual malicious intention. Id.
8LEPMiG CAR COMPANY.
Does not incur towards passenger liability of inn-keeper or common carrier,
but impliedly undertakes to keep reasonable watch over him and his property:
he must therefore not only show his loss but also company's negligence. Pull-
an Co. v Gaflord, 788.
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SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE. See COVENANT, 3; EQUITT, 16, 17.
1. Part performance of parol contract for salc of land must be in life of
vendor to bind his infant heirs. Shirey v. Cwmberhouse, 349.
2. Laches not available as defence to bill for, of agreement to convey land,
where complainant has been in continued possession. Whitsitt v. Trustees,
618.
3. May be decreed of contract for assignment of interest in patent. Satter-
thwait v. Marshall, 278.
4. Agreement for future execution of formal articles of copartnership will
be enforced in equity, although after they are executed court cannot compel
parties to act under them. Id.
5. Foreign construction company cannot maintain bill in equity in Massa-
chusetts against foreign railroad corporation and citizen of that state, to enforce
specific performance of contract to deliver bonds and stock certificates in pay-
ment of work to be performed by construction company in foreign state, and
to restrain by injunction citizen of Massachusetts from disposing there of stock
and bonds alleged to have been delivered to him in violation of plaintiff's
rights, although railroad corporation has office in Massachusetts for transfer
'of stock and has appeare'd by attorney. Railroad Cos. Co. v. Railroad
Co., 216.
STATUTE. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAw, 15, 20, 21, 22, 23 ; CONTRACT, 28;
CORPoRATION, 19; CounTs, 3; EVIDENCE, 5, 6; HUSBAND AND WIFE, 2,
3 - MUNICIPAL ConRORATIoN, -2 ; NEGLIGENCE, 31.
1. In absence of proof act of legislature is presumed to take effect from first
moment of day of its passage. .Arrows th v. Hormening, 249, and note.
2. Rule that law never regards fraction of day not applied where it would
work injustice ; but where an act has exception in'favor of pending actions, it
is incimbent on party bringing action commenced on same day, to prove exact
time at which act was passed. Id.
3. Repeals by implication not favored. To produce such result, either the
two acts must be upon same subject, and there must be plain repugnancy
between their provisions ; in which case, to extent of repugnancy, later act
repeals former; or later act must cover whole subject of first and embrace new
provisons plainly showing it was intended as substitute for first. Coats v.
Hill, 349.
STOCK. See BANE, 2; CONTRACT, 22; CORPORATION, 1, 5, 15, 16, 20, 21;
DEBTOR AND CREDITOR, 1, 2; NATIONAL BANK; RAILROAD, 10.
STOPPAGE IN TRANSITU. See SALR, 2.
STREET. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 31, 33; MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, 1,
30, 38 ; TAx AND TAXATION, 7.
1. Owner of land adjacent to, in city, not liable for injury resulting from
unsafe or dangerous condition of land, where person left street and went upon
same without knowledge of or inducement from owner or occupant. Kelly
v. City, 6"24.
2. Fact that pavement was continuous from sidewalk over adjacent land to
place of danger, was not, of itself, implied invitation to go upon adjacent lands.
Id.
SUBROGATION.
If party purchasing land subject to mortgige, contracts with mortgagor to
pay same, and afterwards mortgagor is compelled to pay it himself, he 'Vill be
subrogated to rights of mortgagee as against such purchaser and any 6ne claim-
ing under him with notice. Orrick v. Durham, 684.
SUICIDE. See INSURANCE, 3.
SUNDAY. See CRIMINAL LAw, 7; LIMITATIONS, STATVTE OF, 1.
If last day of statutory period for redemption of land falls on Sunday, tender
on following day is too late. Haley v. Young, 76.
SUPERSEDEAS. See ERRORS AND APPEALS, 7.
INDEX.
SURETY. See BILLS AND NOTES, 6; EXECUTION, I ; FRAUDS, STATUTE: OF,
7 ; HUSBAND AND W F', 9 ; OFFIcER, 3.
1. Where third person (as wife of principal) exclusively indemnifies one of
several sureties, the others are not entitled to share therein. Leggett v. Mc-
Cldland, 216.
2. Cashier's surety not discharged by fact that cashier was defaulter at time
bond was given, or neglect of bank to ascertain that fact. Bowne y. Bank,
152.
3. Rule that contract pf surety is to be construed strictly, applies only to con-
tract itself, and not to matters collateral and incidental, or which arise in exe-
cution of it. Warren v. as. Co., 152.
4. If, after creditor has given time to principal, surety, with full knowledge
of facts, promises to pay if principal does not, he is liable without any new con-
sideration. Bramble v. W ard, 77.
5. When answer of surety sets up that, without his knowledge or consent,
extension of time was given to principal, he must make this appear by prepon-
derance of evidence. Ed.
6. Agent having, by culpable carelessness, lost money collected by him, was
required to give bond or leave. Principal did not inform sureties of agent's
former carelessness and they had no knowledge thereof. Held, that principal -
.could not recover. Snith v. Joselyn, 77.
7. Where sureties contract severally, creditor does not break contract with
ono by releasing another. Ward v. Bank, 77.
8. Creditor not bound to active diligence against principal even upon re-
quest of surety. Equity only interferes with creditor's election between his
double remedy against principal ind surety, on special grounds ; as when prin-
cipal becomes bankrupt, creditor may be compelled to prove his debt ; or where
creditor holds collateral not available to surety on assignment. Vqids v. Atlix,
278.
9. Plaintiff and defendant were co-sureties on promissory note. All parties
to same were residents of Vermont. After Statute of Limitations became bar
there, plaintiff voluntarily and without knowledge of defendant, but with no
fraudulent intent, went to New Hampshire, where there was no defence to
note, and there -was sued by payee, judgment obtained against him, and he was
compelled to pay. Held, in action for contribution, that payment was com-
pulsory, and that defendant was liable. Aldrid v. Aldrich, 624.
10. In action againstsureties upon bond, given to bank, conditioned for faithfil
discharge by C. of "all his duties as clerk," and against misapprqpriatidnof
funds "which maycome under the care or dontrol of said C. as clerk," evidence
showed that C., during whole term of his employment, performed duty to some.
extent usually performed by teller. It was found, as fact, that "the dutiel as
clerk," coftemplated in bond, did not mean merely duties as bookkeeper, but
embraced duties of receiving and paying out money at counter of bank. Held,
that defendants were not entitled to ruling, as matter of law, that there had
been such change in duties of clerk as to discharge them from liability. Bank
v. Carlton, 685.
11. Payee of promissory note, given as collateral for liability as endorser of
another note made by same person, may sue maker thereon, although payment
of other notv has not been enforced. Hapgood v. Wellington, 685.
TAX AND TAXATION. See DEED, 6; EJECTMENT, 1; ERRORS AND AP-
PEALS, 3 ; INJUNCTION, 3 ; MUNICIPAL" CORPORATION, 30, 37.
1. Rolling stock belonging to corporation of one state and used upon roads
leased to it in another state, is personal property, and not taxable under general
statute§ of latter state'imposing taxes on railroad property. Railroad Co. v.
Allen, 739.
2. Fuity will only restrain collection of tax when unauthorized by law, or
assessed upon property not subject to taxation, or where assessment or levy has
been made without legal authority, or fraud has occurred. Railway Co. v. John-
son, 216.
3. Strictly an assessment differs from a tax in being confined to local impo-
sitions upon property for payment of cost of public improvements in its immedi-
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ate vicinity, and levied with reference to special benefits to property assessed.
City.v. Association, 35G.
4. Municipal corporation insisting on right to impose assessment, should
be able to show that such power has been clearly granted by statute ; but
authority being shown, in general terms, to make assessment, whoever insists
on exemption must support his claim by provision equally clear. Id.
5. Incorporated cemetery association not relieved from assessment for street
improvement by statutory exemption from taxation. Id.
6. While lands of such associanon, so thr as exempted, cannot be sold to
pay such assessment, municipal corporation may entbrce same by such remedies
as statute and courts of equity afford., Id.
7. If ordinance providing fbr opening or improving street declares in terms
that improvement is for general public benefit or convenience, without anythlinr-
more, it will be presumed that ordinance was enacted with exclusivie rbfercn,.
to general public convenience, and cost should be borne exclusively from pubht:h
treasury. But if ordinance be silent upon subject of interests or benefits to J6
subserved, presumption will be that it contemplated local benefits as well si
general public convenience. Mayor v. Hanson, 552.
TELEGRAPH. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 28, 29r.
1. Companies -not insurers, but they do undertake for ordinary care and
vigilance : and when it is proved that sgent received message and failed to deliver
it, and there is no proof to account ror or excuse the negligence it may be
assumed to have been intentional or gross disregard of duty. Telegraph Go. v.
Davis, 350.
2. LIABILITY OF TELEGRAPH COM"PANIES FOR FRAUD, ACCIDENT, DELAY
AND MISTAKES IN TaE TRANsMISSION AND DELIVERY OF MESSAGES, 281, 353.
TENANTS IN COMMON. See HOMESTEAD, 1 ; PARTITION ; PARTY WALL.
TENDER. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, I ; SALE, 3.
TIME. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 2; INFANT, 3; STATUTE, 1, 2; SUNDAY.
TITLE. See EJECTMENT.
TORT. See DAMAGES, 3; EQUITY, 22; FRAUD, 2.
TRADE- See CONTRACT, 3.
TRADEMARK. See EQUITY, 2.
1. A. made and sold " Morse's Syrup of Yellow Dock Root." B. sold
preparation in bottles having words, "Dr. Morse's Celebrated Syrup," blown
in glass, and resembling perfectly A.'s bottles in size and shape. Labels used
were different and A.'s bottles were wrapped in paper cover, B.'s not. Held,
that A. was entitled to injunction, and account of profits derived from use of
bottles similar to his. Alexander v. Aorse, 685.
2. A. made his preparation under one trade name and sold it under another.
He also advertised it as "sold only in quart bottles," while his bottles, though
known among druggists as quart bottles, held substantially less than quart.
Held, immaterial. Id.
3. Where patented machine becomes known to public by distinctive name
during existence of patent, any one at expiration of patent may make and
vend such machines, and use such name; and no one by incorporating such
name into his trademark, can take away from public right of so using it.
Brill v. Singer Co., 624.
4. Where machines, during life of patent, become known and identified in
the trade by mechanism, shape, external appearance or ornamentation, patentee,
after expiration of patent, cannot prevent others from using same modes of
identification, in machines of same kind. Id.
TRESPASS. See MASTER AND SERVANT, 11; NEGLIGENCE, 12.
TRIAL. See EVIDENCE, 21.
After evidence had closed, arguments been completed, and jury been charged
and retired, court took recess until' next morning, at same time remarking he
would receive verdict any time before I I F. 3t. Jury not agreeing, judge, be-
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fore hour mentioned, in absence of one party and their counsel and without
their consent, had jury brought into court room and delivered another charge
on main points in case. Held, eiror. Bryant v. Simmons, 685.
TROVER.
1. Is not maintainable by owner of house against owner of the land who
refuses to employ any tenant of house. Heywood v. Tillson, 77.
2. Employer has right to refuse to employ tenant of certain premises with-
out subjecting himself to action by owner, though done through malice or ill-
will to such owner. Id.
3. Refusal'to deliver another's chattel to owner on demand ordinarily prima
fade evidence of conversion.. Singer Co. v. King, 686.
4. Bailce receiving chattel in good faith from one not owner may refuse to
deliver it to owner till he has had time to ascertain ownership. id.
5. Servant receiving chattel from master may retain it till he has consulted
his master, but if after consultation he relies on his master's title and refuses
to deliver it, be is guilty of conversion. Id.
6. Agent received chattel from fellow employee, and under prior instruc-
tions from principal refused to deliver it to demanding owner until storage had
been paid. Claim for storage was untenable. Held, that. agent was guilty of
conversion, Id.
TRUST AND TRUSTEE. See.CQAAuITr; EXECUTORS AwD ADmiInSTR.TORS,
5 ; GIFT, 4 ; HUSBAND AND WIFE, 5, 13 ; L MITATIONS, STATUTE OF, 13;
MORTGAGE, 14; VENDOR AND VENDEE, 2; WILL, 16.
1. Confidential agent privately obtaining lease of theatre held at the time on a
lease by his principal, and which lease his principal desired to renew, as he
was aware, held in equity a trustee for his principal as to same. Davis v.
Hamlin, 207.
2. In absence of fraud beneficiaries in railway mortgages are bound by what
is done by their trustees : and this is so where in suit by trustee court has de-
4reed foreclosure for full amount of mortgage debt without necessary consent of
holders of one-third in amount of bonds. Credit CO. v. Railroad Co., 35, and
note .
3. When prpperty of Tailroad company is sold under foreclosure and all per-
sons are authorized to bid, its purchase by president of company in his indi-
vidual right will not entitle holder of bonds of company to treat him as trustee.
Id.
4. One claiming right to avoid purchase made by another at judicial sale, or
of treating purchaser as trustee cannot delay assertion of this right in order to
see whether its assertion would benefit him. Id.
5. T~stator gave to wife all his real and personal estate "to her sole use,
benefit and disposal ;" and provided that "whatever may be left of my estate,
if any, she may by will or otherwise give to those of my heirs that she may
think best, she knowing my mind upon that subject. I am willing to leave the
'matter entirely with her, feeling satisfied that she will do as I have requested
her to in the matter." Held, that wife's estate was absoltute. Davis v.
.Jlaile., 77. See, also, in re Adams and Kensington Vestry, 78.
6. Real and personal estate were held by two trustees, one of whom, at
request of other and of third person, resigned without requiring previous pay-
ment of his demands against trust estate, and the third person was appointed in
his place. The two trustees then agreed, in writing, with outgoing trustee, to
apply to payment of his said claims all moneys to come into their hands as
trustees "after first paying therefrom all taxes and current expenses of said
property and trust." Held, that this was a contract to be enforced at law
against the parties individually, and not a trust to be'enforced in quity ; and
that current expenses of trust did not include construction of fire-proof build-
ings and unusual expenditures for protecting the property. Taylor v.'Davis,
350.
ULTRA VIRES. See CoRPonvATIoN, 13, 14.
,UNDUE INFLUENCE. See WILL, 5.
INDEX.
UNITED STATES. See ABATExexT; CONSTITUTIONAL LAw, 1; HomE.
STEAD, 2.
Under sect. 2505 of Rev. Stat., now sect. 2503, by virtue of sect. 6, of
March 3d 1883, c. 121 (22 St. 521), following are exempt from duty: I.
Wearing apparel owned by passenger and in condition to be worn at once
without further manufacture. 2. Brought with him as passenger, and intended
for use or wear of himself or his family who accompanied him as passengers,
and not for sale, or purchased or imported for other persons, or to be given
away. 3. Suitable for season of year immediately approaching at time of arri-
val. 4. Not exceeding in quantity or qG.ny or value what passenger was in
habit of ordinarily providing for himself and family at that time, and keeping
on hand for his and their reasonable wants in view of their means and habith
in life, even though such articles had not been actually worn. Astor v. er:
ritt, 476.
UNITED STATES COURTS. See CoaPoRATiox, 10; EQUITY, 6; E uaos
AxD APrEALS, 2, 3, 6, 7 ; REMO'VAL OF CAUSES.
1. Property taken in execution by United States marshal cannot be replevit
in state court, even when belonging to third person. Covel v. Heyman, 487,
2. When jurisdiction of Circuit Court depends upon citizenship, it must
plainly appear in the record. Averment that parties reside in or that firm does
business in or is "of" particular state, not sufficient to show citizenship
therein. Grace v. Ins. Co., 152.
3. Where record does not show case within jurisdiction of Circuit Court,
Supreme Court will notice that fact, though question not raised by parties.
rd.
4. Goods claimed by third person having been seized on writ of attachnent
issued in United States Court, and remedy which third person would have had
in state courts by way of writ of replevin against officer executing such process,
not existing against marshal. Hdd, that United States Court would, on bill
filed by claimant, grant him full relief, although he was stranger to original
suit, and citizenship of parties to bill was not such as would give United States
Court jurisdiction in original proceeding. Krippendorfv. Hyde, 351.
5. Widow residing in New Jersey appointed citizen of New York trustee to
collect an insurance policy on husband's life, and, after paying a certain claim,
invest the surplus for her benefit. The New York court granted a nonsuit
because evidence showed that death was caused by suicide, according to law of
.New York. Citizen of New Jersey was afterwards substituted as trustee, at
request of widow ; there was evidence to show that one object in this appoint-
ment was to bring suit in United States Court, in a suit therein: Beld, that it
had jurisdiction ; and that case was not within 1st or 5th sections of act of
March 3d, 1875. Ins. Co. v. Broughton, 78.
6. THE RELIEF OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 360.
USURY. See EQUITY, 20; MORTGAGE, 6.
1. Statute prescribing rate of interest and forbidding taking of higher rate
"under pain of forfeiture of entire interest so contracted," and that "if any
person hereafter shall pay on any contract a higher rate * * * the same may
be sued for, and recovered within 12 months of the time of such payment,"
confers no authority to apply usurious interest actually paid to discharge of
principal debt. Suit within the 12 months exclusive remedy. Walsh v.
Maflyer, 487.
2. Insurance company made loan to W., and took from him promissory note
for amount thereof, with interest at eight per cent., secured by mortgage, and
took other notes for usurious interest. W. afterwards conveyed the property
to B., who as part of consideration agreed to pay-notes and mortgage given by
W., and to secure performance of his agreement, executed to W. mortgage on
some property. B. conveyed the property to J., and made to him warranty
deed therefor, and agreed with him to pay off encumbrance thereon. Held,
that in action of foreclosure by insurance company, defence of usury is not
available to J. against mortgage given by W. Jones v. Franklin his.
Co.. 351.
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VENDOR AND VENDEE. See DEED, 4-8; EJECTMENT, 4, 5; EQunir, 16,
17 ; FixTuPts, I ; MEECHAxics' LIEN, 1 ; MORTGAGE, 11.
1. Option to purchase given to lessee, his executors, administrators and
assigns, passes with lease to lessee's administrator; and if exercised by him,
next of kin must be joined in conveyance from him, although he be also heir of
lessee. In re Adams and Kensington Vestry, 78.
2. G. and wife, in consideration of conveyance to them by B. and wife of
certain real estate, agreed in writing under seal, to snpport B., wife and
daughter, and to pay certain sums of money; these and the support were computed
at $5000-the consideratiou nL.! inthe deed. -On bill filed by grantors charg-
ing non-payment of consideration and praying a sale for payment thereof:
eld, that complaints were not entitled to such a decree; that G. and wife
were bond.inequity foithfully to perfbrm the duties undertaken by them, and
the land was properly chargeable with the trust; and that G. and wife should
not create liiis beyond those authorized by the title given. Benacotter v.
green, 79.
3. Purchaser who has taken conveymice and paid purchase-money cannot sue
at law or in, equity for damages on account of errors as to quantity or quality,
unfless such er"or amount to breach of some contract or warranty contained
in conveyance itself or there has been fraud. J.oILiffe y. Baker, 162, and
note.
VERDICT. See NEGLIGENCE, 19.
WAGER. See CONTRAOT, 22, 23.
WAGES. See ASSIGNMENT, 2; ATTACMET, 4; COTrEACT, 12,'13.
WAIVER. See Bris aND s o s, 27 ; CoNv.ACT, 5 ; CmxNAr. LAw, 1, 5;
.EYvIDCE, 14; HOMESTEAD, 11; INSUAN CE, 11 ; MASTER AND SEnE-
VANT, 8.
WAREHOUSE-RECEIPT.
' 1. Effect of endorsement and delivery, in one state, of private warehouse re-
ceipt for goods stored in another state is to be determined bh law of latter.
Rallgarten v. Old'an, 216.
2. Endorsement and delivery, by bailor, of receipt for goods stored in pri-
vate warehouse, in which bailee undertakes to deliver the goods to bailor upon
payment of charges, but not to hold br deliver to his order, do not pass title in
1goeds, as against creditor of bailor, who attaches goods before notice of such
endorsement has been given to hailee. Id.
WARRANTY. See BAiLmENiT ; BILLS AND NOTES, 23.
Where bridge company assigned contract to build bridge, and assignee agreed
to assume and pay for the work and materials already done and furnished, and
false work already done was defective, but its defects could not have beeh dis-
covered by inspection at time: held, that there was implied warranty upon part
of company that the false work it had done was suitable and proper for purpose
for which it was to be used. Bridge Co. v. Hamilton, 279.
WATERS AND WATER-COURSES.
In consequence of extraordinary rainfall water accumulated against railroad
embankment. Thereupon company cut trenches through embankment and
caused the water to flow on plaintiff's land. This was reasonably necessary
for protection of their property. Held, that company was liable for damage,
which, but for cutting of trenches, would not have happened to plaintiff. Wial-
ley v. Railway Co., 633, and note.
WILL. See CONTRACT, 13; HOMESTeAD, 2; HusRAwD AND WIFE, 15.
1. If title vests eo instanti at execution of paper, it is deed ; but if same is
not to take effect until death of maker, it is testament. Ward v. (ampbdl,
351.
2. In absence of plain expressions, or intent plainly inferrible, earliest time
for vesting of property will be adopted, where more than one period is men-,
tioned in will. Instance. Crisp v. Crisp, 487.
3. Where donee of power executes instrument making disposition of the
INDLB7.
WILL.
property within scope of power, but not referring to same, and in order for in-
strument to have its due legal effect, it must be construed as an exercise of
power, it will be so regarded. Warner v. Ins. Co., 152.
4. Power to encumber " by way of mortgage or trust deed, or otherwise,
and renew the same for the purpose of raising money to pay off any and all
encumbrances now on said property," is broad enough to include renewal of
existnig encumbrance. Id.
5. Where mother, mentally enfeebled by reason of disease, and in position
where one of two sons could exercise improper influence over her, made will
leaving nearly all her property to this son, burden is upqn him to show that
such instrument was executed without exercise of undue influence. Dale v.
Dale, 488.
6. Evidence offered in support of paper propounded as will showed that it
was written in language not understood by supposed testatrix ; that witnesses
attested not at her request, but at request of one of legatees ; and that Site
neither said nor did anything, nor was anything said or don in her prerscet
which indicated that she knew she was making a will. Held, that execulb.H
of paper'as will was not proven. Miltenbergcr v. Miltenberger, 488.
7. Legatee whose interest as such in establishment of will still contintes
will not be allowed-to testify to itl due execution, notwithstanding he may ntr
have signed as attesting witness, though statute only disqualifies him iq express
terms in latter case. Ad.
8. Statute lirovided "evry person * may * devise lands ***
acquired subsequently to the execution of his will, provided his intention to
devise the same appears by the express terwns of his will." Residuary devise
was ; "All the rest, residne and remainder of my property of every kind,
nature and description, and wherever the same may be, I give, devise and
bequeath unto my son." Hed, not to pass subsequently-acquired realty.
Church v. Manfg: Co., 686.
9. Testamentary gifts prompted by personal regard of testator for legati
were given by will made while following statute was in force. "--.henefer
any child, grandchild or other person, having a devise or bequest of real -or
personal estate, shall die before the testator leaving a lineal descendant, such
descendant shall take the estate, real or personal, as devisee or legatee, in the
same wiay and manner as such devisee or legatee would have done in case he
had survived the testator. Held, that statute applied' unless contrary intent
appeared. Dom. 6- For. Mis. oc. v. Bell, 686.
10. Following paper was propounded as a will: "Baltimore, July 20th,
1882. In anticipation of my departure from the cityof Baltimore, and to pro-
vide for possible contingencies, I hereby give, bargain and sell and'transfer
unto my daughter, Ann C. Kelleher, her personal representatives and assigns,
all my machinery, horses, wagons, goods, chattels and effects, which I now
have, or may hereafter acquire, or possess, and all moneys, claims and demands
to which I am, or may be hereafter, entitled, reserving to myself the use of
the same, and the right to dispose of the same otherwise, if I deem proper.
Witness my hand and seal this 20th day of July, 1882."
his
Witness-Jss MCO .NGx, OwEN + KnawNv. (Seal)
mark
Maker was nearly 80. He made expected trip and died shortly afterwards.
.ed, that paper ought to be admitted to probate, and that parol evidence re-
specting testator's purpose and efforts taprovide for his daughter, in anticipa-
tion of his trip, were admissible to determine testamentary condition of mind.
Kelleher v. Kernan, 79.
11. Influence which will avoid will must amount to force or coercion. Lay-
man v. Conrey, 80.
12. Testator empowered his executors to continue his interest in certain'
firms, and to form said firms into joint-stock compainy or companies; to receive
stock in same, in place of his interest or interests, and hold same for benefit
of his estate, &c. Held, that executors were authorized to continue in business
of these firms all property of testator embarked therein at time of his decease,
668 .,DEX.
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including real estate owned by him individually and as a partner, and that held
in trust by him for firm.. Ballentine v. Frelinghuysen, 487.
13. That executors have power to Act in forming corporation, and to convey
thereto testator's interest in firms, which includes above-named real estate ; and
to receive stock in proportion to his interest. Id.
14. That in making such conveyance, lands and buildings owned by him
individually, but used by firms so that they cannot be separated, for which rent
was allowed, shall be valued at their fair present value as individual pro-
perty. .d.
15: That lauds owned by him which have been built upon and appropriated
by firms so that they cannot be separated in use from buildings on lands of
firms, will be likewise valued as his, as of time of appropriation. rd.
16. That lands onveycd to testator, paid for out of partnership funds and
bought for use in partnership hnsiness, are held in trust for partnership. Id.
17. By his will H. gave to his brother "I the full amount of his indebtedness
to me, and the remainder of my property, both real and p.ersonal, to my sister."
This debt, amounting to $4200, evidenced by note and secured by deed of
trust, had in fact been transferred by testator to his sister eight months before
execution of will, and his brother was not then indebted to him at all, and after
his death she attempted to collect the debt. Held, that she should, elect whether
she should affirm the will and accept the devise to her, or renounce same and
hold the debt. 1!tzhugh v. Hubbard, 351.
18. In cofistruction of wills parol evidence is admissible to show condition
of subject-matter and surrounding circumstances, so as to place court in posi-
tion of testator; but his purpose to put devisee to election "must appear from
-will itself. Id.
TESS. See ABITRATIO, 5 ;DEED, 2 ;EVIDENCE, 2, 13, 14, 15 ;WILL, 6, 7.
Where husband is party with wife in action for damages for injury by third
rties to her, he is competent witness for plaintiffs, so long as he remains
•ty to record. Hovers= v. Noker, 670.
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